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Abstract  
In recent years, microfinance has grown drastically. In emerging economies, microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) are used to provide financial services to the poor that have been deemed 
“unbankable” by the traditional banks. The emergence of the microfinance industry is seen as 
an answer to an unmet demand by the relevant literature (see, among others, Robinson, 2001; 
Littlefield and Rosenberg, 2004), but MFIs have not evolved equally everywhere. During their 
development, MFIs have experienced different fates; some have expanded while others have 
ceased to exist. But what explains this disparity? 
To explain these regional differences, many scholars have focused on investigating the 
relationship between MFIs’ performance and changes in the macroeconomy together with the 
institutional environment of the country MFIs operate. According to Vanroose (2006), the 
environment in which MFIs operate plays a vital role in these cross country differences. Despite 
this, in the literature not much attention has been paid to the relationship between the 
microfinance sector and its environment. 
To fill this gap, this study intends to contribute to the current state of knowledge by empirically 
investigating the relationship between institutional environment and the performance of MFIs, 
by comparing South Asia and Latin America. In doing so, this study aims to analyse: (1) Does 
institutional environment matter for the performance of MFIs in South Asia and Latin 
America? Do MFIs perform better in the context of well-developed institutions? (2) What are 
the differences between the performance of MFI in South Asia and Latin America?  
These questions are addressed by employing a two stage least squares (2SLS) regression. The 
dataset of this study consists of 20 countries and 373 MFIs containing financial performance, 
outreach, institutional environment variables and macroeconomic indicators of Latin America 
and South Asia from 1996 – 2014. The robustness of the models is also tested with different 
variables from various studies.  
One of the key findings is that MFIs in South Asia and Latin America service different 
clientele, in line with the findings of the previous literature. Specifically, MFIs in South Asia 
serve poorer clients while MFIs in Latin America attend to richer clients. In addition, it is also 
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observed that microfinance industry is experiencing mission drift 0F1 where some of the MFIs are 
seen to be gradually giving out larger loans 1F2. 
The main estimations further indicate that institutional environment of the host economy plays 
a role in the performance of MFIs such that regulations deter MFIs from accomplishing their 
responsibility as banking for the poor. However, the impact of institutional environment is 
different for each region. In South Asia, well-developed institutions negatively affect the 
performance of MFIs. On the other hand, the results suggest MFIs in Latin America is no 
different than commercial banks. In particular, MFIs in Latin America suffer from weak 
enhancement of rule of law and political instability. The results also disclose that corruption 
makes it tougher for MFIs in Latin America to maintain sustainability and profitability.  
These evidences then may help governments in South Asia and Latin America to undergo 
institutional reforms to support the development of microfinance industry. In conclusion, 
microfinance industry in both regions appears to perform better in a non-regulated 
environment, implying that it could be better for governments to deregulate the sector.  
 
  
                                                          
1 Mission drift in microfinance refers to the phenomenon where an MFI increases its average loan size by reaching 
out to unbanked wealthier customers while crowding out the core poor (Armendáriz and Szafarz, 2009). 
2 Larger loans is an indication that an MFI has moved into new customer segments in the pursuit of profitability 
because it targets richer communities that have the ability to take on larger loans. 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
1.1 Overview of Microfinance 
Since the revolutionary microcredit movement in 1976, microfinance industry has 
progressively become an important channel in fighting poverty. The industry is developing at 
an unprecedented rate and is considered as a part of the formal financial sector in many 
emerging economies. The success story of the first microfinance institution - Grameen Bank, 
has convinced many governments to use microfinance as a mechanism to tackle income 
inequality. However, as microfinance develops, another issue then comes into play – whether 
industry should give priority to the “the entrepreneurial poor2F3” or the “core poor”. 
Beyond the segments microfinance institutions (MFIs) choose to serve, the development of 
microfinance industry is also affected by both external and internal factors - external factors 
are environmental variables that are specific to the policy and economic setting of the country 
in which MFIs operate, including the degree of governance within financial markets as well as 
the level of political stability of a country; while internal factors are related to the organisations 
and are part of the organisations’ management and governance policies. The effect of external 
environment on businesses was first documented by open systems theorists 3F4 who observed that 
organisations cannot function as self-sufficient isolated units without interacting with the 
surrounding environment (Pearce and Robinson, 2003).  
In response to its growing success, there has been an increasing interest in microfinance among 
investors, scholars and policymakers. Despite being a strong enabler in providing credit access 
to the financially underserved and unserved population, the microfinance industry faced many 
challenges. One of the challenges that can affect the performance of MFIs is the quality of 
institutional environment of the host country where an MFI is located. Local governments and 
policy makers can encourage microfinance industry to shift towards a sustainable, market-
based industry by undertaking regulatory reforms and improving business environment. In 
addition, there is growing literature that provide evidence on good institutions improving firm 
                                                          
3 In this study, the entrepreneurial poor is defined as the population slightly below the poverty line while core/chronic poor 
are those who remain significantly below the poverty line even with welfare benefits 
4 Before the 1960s, traditional theorists looked at organizations as closed, isolated systems and ignored the influences of 
external environment. External environment consists of other organizations that exert various forces of an economic, political, 
or social nature. Two early pioneers in this effort, Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn argued that the closed-system approach fails 
to address how organizations are reliant on external environments. 
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performance and stimulating economic development (see, among others, Acemoglu et al., 
2014; Ahlin et al., 2010; Barry and Tacneng, 2014; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; North, 1990; 
Rodrik et al., 2004; Tchuigoua, 2014). Similarly, bad institutions are recipes for unsatisfactory 
economic growth and poor performance of firms (Aidis, 2005; Eifert et al., 2008; Robson and 
Obeng, 2008).  
Without a ‘well-functioning regulatory framework’, microfinance institutions cannot provide 
effective financial intermediation for the underserved population (Armendáriz and Morduch, 
2005). Studies have also found that governments that undertake regulatory reform to improve 
overall business environment help market-based microfinance by eliminating unfair 
competition from public institutions (Hubka and Zaidi, 2005). From the public policy 
viewpoint, regulation is justified by “market failure arising from asymmetric information, 
market power and negative externalities” (Freixas et al., 1997). These arguments are also 
relevant for microfinance.  
1.2 Theoretical Background and Research Questions  
The main motivation of this research is to study the effect of governance, political and 
economic stability on the performance of microfinance institutions. Although there is a lack of 
literature in the microfinance field exploring the effect of institutions on the performance of 
MFIs, a few available works (See Chikalipah, 2017; Chowdhury, 2005; Gine and Karlan, 2014; 
Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007 and Schicks, 2013) agree that institutions play an important 
role in the performance of MFIs. While the institutional framework of a country can contribute 
to its overall performance of formal finance sector  (Zeller and Meyer, 2015), it is still not clear 
how institutional environment contribute to the differences in the microfinance performance 
across regions. There is a lack of comparative studies in the field of microfinance that 
investigates the relationship between institutional environment and the performance of MFIs.  
To explain these institutional and regional differences, many scholars have focused on 
investigating the relationship between MFIs’ performance and changes in the macroeconomy 
together with the institutional environment of the country MFIs operate (see Ahlin et al., 2010; 
Gonzalez, 2007; Imai et al., 2011; Krauss and Walter, 2009). These studies state that both 
macroeconomic and institutional environments are important determinants for MFIs’ outreach 
and performance in addition to the institution-specific characteristics. One such study that 
utilised institutional environment as a control variable is by Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007). 
Their work emphasized the impact of regulation on MFIs’ sustainability. Ledgerwood (1998) 
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investigates the impact of policy and regulatory issues on MFIs. He finds that regulated 
environment and strong property rights play an important role for sustainability of the 
microfinance sector. Other recent papers explore how institutional quality affects the social and 
financial performance of microfinance institutions (Barry and Tacneng, 2014) as well as the 
gender orientation of their lending (Boehe and Cruz, 2013). In addition, Wagner and Winkler 
(2013) examine how microfinance outcomes are affected by the global financial crisis. These 
studies further suggest that poor macroeconomy, poor regulatory environment and weak 
government policies will undermine the viability of small business owners and the 
microfinance industry that supports them.  
This study differs from the aforementioned papers by focusing on both institutional and 
macroeconomic environments between two regions, Latin America and South Asia. 
Microfinance has been the subject of much debate, with many studies that focus on Asia, Africa 
and Latin America provide evidence on the benefits of microfinance. However, due to the lack 
of country level data in Africa, this study only looks into Asia and Latin America.  Besides, the 
microfinance movement emerged around the same time (during 1970s) in South Asia and Latin 
America. Since then, the microfinance industry in both regions has achieved much progress 
that it has become a sizeable part of the domestic financial system, both on numbers of clients 
served and total private sector credit (Di Bella, 2011). The characteristics of MFIs in each 
region are different, which is why it is also worthwhile to compare these regions in terms of 
MFI performance.  
Hence, motivated by the works of Ahlin et al., this study seeks to investigate whether 
institutional environment – specifically, the quality of government institutions, the effect of 
natural disasters and macroeconomic factors – affect the difference in MFIs’ performance 
between South Asia and Latin America. 
The objective of this research is to answer the following questions:  
1. Does institutional environment matter for the performance of MFIs in South Asia and 
Latin America? Do MFIs perform better in the context of well-developed institutions? 
2. What are the differences between the performance of MFIs in South Asia and Latin 
America?  
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1.3 Organisation of the Study 
This study is structured into seven chapters. Chapter two reviews the microfinance literature to 
explore various theoretical and empirical components to identify the research questions.  
Chapter three looks at the methodology that will be used in this study. Using a unique dataset 
of unbalanced data of 4,124 observations across 20 South Asia and Latin America economies, 
an empirical framework is used to investigate the effect of MFI-specific, county-level 
institutions and macroeconomic determinants on the performance of MFIs.  
Chapter four builds on the econometric framework developed in chapter three to investigate 
the effect of institutional environment on the performance of MFIs in South Asia. Using the 
dataset that consists of 731 observations across 5 South Asian countries, the results are 
interpreted and compared with the previous empirical models in literature.  
Using the same econometric framework in the previous chapter, chapter five explores the 
impact of institutional environment in Latin America. The motivation of this chapter stems 
from the commercialisation of microfinance in this region and this chapter’s dataset consists 
of 3,393 observations across 15 countries in Latin America.  
Chapter six investigates the effect of region and fiscal year on the performance of MFIs. An 
interaction effect between region and fiscal year is used to identify the effect of region on the 
performance of microfinance industry. Marginal effect is then used to measure the results on 
conditional mean of MFI performance by observing the change in fiscal year.  
The final chapter then concludes this study by summarizing the main findings, policy 
implications while identifying areas for further research.  
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Chapter 2 : Literature Review  
This chapter discusses three pertinent topics on poverty alleviation, development of 
microfinance industry, and the characteristics of microfinance institutions in South Asia and 
Latin America. As elaborated below, Chapter 2 begins with a brief discussion of poverty 
alleviation and the history of microfinance. The evolution of microfinance industry and the so 
called microfinance schism provides the groundwork for the measures adopted for this study. 
Finally, literature examining the role of institutional environment and macroeconomic factors 
that influence the performance of microfinance institutions (MFIs) is reviewed. This 
examination provides the context for present empirical analysis in chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
2.1 The History of Poverty Alleviation and the Rise of Microfinance  
Despite robust global economic growth over the previous decade, poverty remains a major 
problem in many parts of the world. Prior to the microfinance movement, the works on poverty 
alleviation concentrate on the area of economies of scope, maximizing production (Galbraith, 
1967; Leff, 1979), increasing productivity (Jones and Romer, 2010) and accumulating capital 
(Zanden, 2009). The earliest efforts in poverty eradication focus on bringing the poor into the 
broader economy context by improving macroeconomic performance, such as creating 
employment opportunities by encouraging economic growth and price stability (Ellis and 
Biggs, 2001; Zeller and Meyer, 2002). Following World War II, the establishment of World 
Bank in 1944 marks the international recognition of poverty issues. The creation of World 
Bank is the first official measure that institutionalises poverty alleviation.  
In the 1950s, many countries provide agricultural grants, subsidies and small loans to rural 
farmers (Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega, 1996). The main motivation behind providing these 
subsidies and loans is to include agricultural productivity as part of the economic recovery 
process post World War II (Gutiérrez-Nieto et al., 2007; Von Pischke, 2002). This is known as 
the 1950’s rural agricultural movement. Despite supporting the post war economic recovery 
process, the rural agricultural movement was eventually terminated when it was found to be 
crowding out the domestic investments (Wenner, 2002). In addition, poor repayment rates, 
operational inefficiencies led to minimal outreach in the rural communities and over-reliance 
on government subsidies contributed to the failure of the agro-banking movement as the banks 
became unprofitable and unsustainable. (Morduch,1999; Brüntrup and Heidhues, 2002). 
Therefore, many commercial banks eventually took rural agricultural loan products off their 
shelves.  
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The failure of the rural agricultural movement and subsequent failures in abolishing absolute 
poverty and income disparities post World War II led to the creation of two major poverty 
alleviation movements in 1960s (Dichter, 1999). The two major alleviation movements, also 
referred to as “basic human needs” and “integrated rural development” are formed based on 
the concept that viewed poverty as an existing problem stemmed from the lack of public 
awareness, education and community health services. This concept saw poverty as a situation 
that is interrelated with the development of economy and infrastructure (Dichter, 1999). These 
two movements, for the first time, placed non-governmental organizations (NGOs) at the 
frontline of poverty eradication.  
Despite managed by professionals with unique knowledge from local embedded ties, these 
poverty alleviation movements were not sustainable. By 1980s, both movements had failed. 
Policy-makers began to realise that these comprehensive poverty alleviation programs were 
challenging to manage due to the overemphasis on social investment. In addition, the programs 
always face sustainability issues due to their over reliance on donor grants. As such, these 
programs were often far beyond the NGO’s capabilities although they were managed by 
knowledgeable practitioners. As a result, these programs had become ineffective overtime 
(Dichter, 1999). At the same time, development actors, inter-governmental organizations and 
state agencies which had previously been in charge of these poverty alleviating programs were 
facing their own legitimacy crises, such as allegations of corruption and pandering to special 
interests (Kent and Dacin, 2013).  
 
Figure 2-1History of Poverty Alleviation 
The downfall of “basic human needs” and “integrated rural development” movements created 
a unique void that is filled by the microfinance movement. In the mid-1970s, microfinance 
emerged to help address this shortcoming. The origin of microfinance can be traced to Grameen 
Bank. The founder of Grameen Bank, Professor Mohamed Yunus, defines the mission of 
1944
•Creation of World Bank
1950
•Rural Agricultural Movement
1960
•Poverty Alleviation Movement
•Basic Human Needs
•Integrated Rural Development
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•Microfinance Movement
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microfinance as – providing capital to the poor, whom he describes as “natural entrepreneurs”.  
By providing them with working capital, these “natural entrepreneurs” can realize their 
“entrepreneurial instincts” to get out of poverty (Bruck, 2006). By gaining access to 
microcredits, every individual in the poor community was said to possess the skill to generate 
income, by establishing informal microenterprises and self-employment in basic product and 
service market - such as cross-border shuttle trade, handicrafts making (souvenirs for sale to 
tourists), petty retail, simple day to day services (clothing repairs, shoe-shining, and bicycle 
maintenance), street food preparation and selling, individual transport (rickshaws, tuk-tuks), 
and so on. Hence, access to capital can potentially minimise a poor household’s vulnerability 
to external shocks as it is expected that borrowers will invest the capital in a profit generating 
venture.  
Broadly speaking, the term microfinance refers to the provision of financial services to the poor 
but economically active individuals (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2005; Khavul et al., 2013). 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) are institutions that provide such services and have been 
identified as organizations that can improve the financial prospects and living conditions of 
people at the base of the economic pyramid (Khavul et al., 2009). These populations, in general, 
lack the required collateral to obtain loans from the traditional banking sector and consist of 
extremely poor households that carry elevated levels of risk. As such, they do not qualify for a 
loan. Before the existence of microfinance, small loans can only be obtained from informal 
lenders such as loan sharks and local pawnshops. Informal loans where the interest ranges 
between 110-200% can drastically reduce the volume of productive assets held by these poor 
households (McIntosh and Wydick, 2005).  
Fast-forward, microfinance is now an industry that offers a wide range of microbanking 
services to households living on or below the poverty line in both urban and rural markets 
(McGuire and Conroy, 1997; Besley, 1994). Since microloans provided by MFIs can help 
develop microentrepreneurships which encourage economic development, microfinance 
becomes an important instrument for poverty alleviation in many developing countries (Yunus, 
2007). 
2.2 The Development of Microfinance  
The development of microfinance industry saw the emergence of two extreme benchmarks 
governing the industry – the non-for-profit model and the commercial model (Robinson, 2001). 
Initially, microfinance started off as a non-for-profit endeavour to help eradicate poverty and 
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is highly dependent on grants, donations and subsidies. The non-for-profit model originated 
from the work of the founder of Grameen Bank (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2005; Robinson, 
2001). However, some of the non-for-profit MFIs evolved into commercial models, claiming 
that lending to the poor could be sustainable by charging sufficient interest rates to cover the 
costs of lending (Adams and Von Pischke, 1992). The departure from the non-for-profit 
archetype became more extreme in the early 1990s, when MFIs in Latin America (BancoSol 
and Los Andes) spun off their lending operations into regulated commercial organizations in 
order to gain access to commercial funds to cope with the increasing demand for microloans 
(Battilana and Dorado, 2010).  
The lucrative promise of potential profit in the commercialised microfinance institutions drew 
massive interest from investors. Since then, a more diverse set of beliefs and socio-political 
perspectives began to diffuse into the microfinance industry. Many of the recent and larger 
players in the commercial finance industry see microfinance as the perfect investment tool to 
help the poor with additional advantage of improving the organisation’s reputation for its 
commitment to Corporate Social Responsibility (Copestake, 2007; Hulme and Mosley, 1996; 
Otero, 1999; Rhyne, 2001). The commercialisation of microfinance industry has led to growing 
emphasis on achieving both social mission and sustainability.  
In this respect, profit-oriented MFIs are seen as part of the movement that shift the microfinance 
sector towards a more commercialised business. MFIs that adopt commercialisation are seen 
to realign their operational focus to profit-making in order to fulfil the investors’ positive return 
promises. However, greater emphasis on profit making might cause MFIs to overlook the well-
being of the clients which leads to concerns on MFIs trading off social impact for financial 
performance. Interestingly, similar concerns also apply to non-for-profit MFIs, as recent 
attention to financial sustainability has resulted in various microfinance managers emphasizing 
on generating financial surplus.  
Since there is a possibility of an increase in return on investment from the entrepreneurial poor 
as opposed to the core poor, practitioners that favour commercialisation argue that by 
concentrating on lending to the entrepreneurial poor strengthens the local economy as 
microenterprises have the ability to improve the local economy (Dale, 2001; Maloney, 2002). 
The spillover effects generated by employment opportunities through microenterprises will 
then help alleviate absolute poverty (Hermes and Lensink, 2011).  Over the long term, 
commercialised MFIs behave as a poverty reduction mechanism to strengthen capital flows to 
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poorer households by assisting in the creation of micro projects that can create positive 
employment opportunities in local communities (Wibbels, 2006; Zeller and Johannsen, 2008). 
However, there is no research evidence that a direct relationship can be formed between 
increased capital flows of the entrepreneurial poor and the assumption that the local community 
will immediately be more productive (Karlan and Morduch, 2009). 
Diverting the importance towards financial sustainability has led to the concerns of the shift 
from outreach in the microfinance industry. Since lending to the core poor can be costly, this 
leads to the conflict between emphasizing on only one goal, which is to focus on either financial 
sustainability or outreach. This leads to a trade-off - a focus shift towards financial 
sustainability and efficiency that weakens the weight of the traditional objective for 
microfinance industry. A study by Cull et al. (2009) reveals that commercially-oriented MFIs 
focus on clients that are better off and MFIs that have adopted this strategy tend to behave more 
like commercial banks.  This has led to the fear of microfinance sector shifting away from their 
original mission as the sector becomes more commercialised (Armendáriz and Szafarz, 2009; 
Kono and Takahashi, 2010).  
The supporters of non-for-profit model believe that the trade-off between outreach and 
sustainable financial performance is alarming. The trade-offs include prioritizing urban over 
rural areas, prioritizing clients in micro-retail trade and moving away from agriculture to 
minimise operating costs and increase profits. The concern on the focus shift where MFIs desert 
its original promise to provide finance services for the poor in search for more reliable profit, 
is known as “mission drift” (Copestake, 2007). Mission drift is a common risk faced by social 
enterprises and non-for-profit organizations which thrive to survive due to limited donations 
and funds.  
Generally, microfinance donors associate mission drift with increase in average loan size. 
Granting larger loans correlates to MFIs shifting away from poorer clientele to attract clients 
who can afford to repay a substantial amount of money (D’Espallier et al., 2016). Therefore, 
larger loans are used as an early indication that MFIs are shifting away from poorer clientele 
which demands for smaller loans. Hence, the emergence of commercial microfinance has 
created significant debates amongst interested scholars and practitioners in assessing the 
suitable operating system for microfinance institutions. The commercialisation of microfinance 
industry gave rise to an important debate, further dividing microfinance scholars and 
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practitioners into two school of thoughts (Conning, 1999; Woller et al., 1999). This division is 
known as the microfinance “schism” and will be discussed in the following section. 
2.3 The Great Microfinance Divide  
Woller et al. (1999) and Morduch (1999) are amongst the first scholars to recognise the 
existence of this microfinance “schism”. The two divisions are known as welfarist and 
institutionalist. The existence of the alternative school of thoughts appears to surround 3 issues: 
(1) targeted population (2) institutional structure and (3) reliance on subsidies.  
The welfarist approach, similar to the non-for-profit model, is highly dependent on donations 
and subsidies. Welfarist insists that subsidies are important to support the high operational 
costs; without subsidies, MFIs will be forced to loan to richer clients. The advocates of welfarist 
are more concerned with the initial social responsibility that came with the creation of the 
microfinance industry, which is to focus on reaching the poorest with the objective of reducing 
absolute poverty with the help of subsidies, donor funds and grants. These welfarist 
practitioners perceive the unavailability of financial services to the core poor as “market 
failure” (Moon, 2009). Welfarist assess the performance of microfinance by measuring changes 
in dependent variables such as the level of income of the clients after borrowing from MFIs 
(Bhatt and Tang, 2001; Olivares-Polanco, 2005). This is to measure the impact of microfinance 
on the living conditions of the targeted population. Thus, it can be concluded that welfarist 
focus on improving the general well-being of participants and are more interested in using 
financial services as a way to achieve broad social or human development. 
Welfarist practitioners believe that commercialised microfinance services have limited 
contribution in poverty alleviation (Bruce E. Moon, 2009) and cannot reach the core poor as 
they are more interested in financial sustainability and only serve microentrepreneurs who are 
better off. A growing number of scholars that support the welfarist school of thought argue that 
microfinance has lost its way by breaking away from the traditional social objective in favour 
of a focus on generating profits (Lewis, 2008; Woller et al., 1999). They argue that such 
developments suggest that commercialisation is transforming microfinance into an industry 
that favours profitability over outreach and supports conventional economic views. The 
critiques of microfinance point out that the arguments for commercialisation are based on 
conservative economic mechanisms such as supply and demand. These critiques also further 
condemn that it was the same economic mechanisms that sent the poor, predominantly the core 
poor, out of the economic system in the first place (Bennett, 2009; Sinclair et al., 2012).  
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To summarise, the primary concern for welfarist is whether the clients are better off after 
borrowing from MFIs (Cheston and Reed, 1999). The main advantage for this approach is that 
it allows knowing whether microfinance industry has positive impact in fighting poverty.  The 
best-known examples of welfarist institutions are Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and its 
worldwide replicates, and FINCA-style village banking programs in Latin America.  
Institutionalists reproached this school of thought to be too subjective and over-reliable on 
subsidies.  The institutionalist approach represents the complete opposite position. The basis 
of this approach is that poverty alleviation requires massive scale, given the increasing demand 
from the poor households (Woller et al., 1999). Practitioners that support the institutionalist 
school of thought argue that MFIs that operate without subsidies are more likely to expand to 
meet the bottomless demand for access to microcredit. This massive scale in turn requests for 
financial resources far beyond the levels traditional NGOs, governments and aid donors can 
afford. Commercialised MFIs are expected to operate with greater efficiency and set more 
appropriate loan prices, attracting more private investors investing into this sector. In turn, this 
will allow MFIs to deliver the microfinance promise to alleviate poverty (Hermes, Lensink and 
Meesters, 2009). A report by World Bank (2007) confirmed that commercialised MFIs which 
have an interest in achieving social goals perform better in terms of reaching out to the poor in 
comparison to non-for-profit MFIs that are highly dependent on subsidies. 
The commercialisation of MFIs has created a shift in MFIs’ traditional objectives. Instead of 
focusing on the core poor, these MFIs serve clients that are slightly above the poverty line who 
have the ability to run microenterprises with short production cycle. Therefore, institutionalist 
MFIs are seen to be gradually moving away from the non-for-profit status into regulated 
commercial institutions (Cull et al., 2007). Commercial MFIs are defined as institutions that 
operate as “legal for-profit entities that strive to make profit with profit sharing possibilities 
with investors” (Cull et al., 2007). The commercialization of microfinance sector also refers to 
“moving microfinance out of the heavily donor dependent arena of subsidized operations into 
one in which microfinance institutions manage on a business basis” as part of the regulated 
financial system (Christen and Drake, 2002). This has led to a revolution in microfinance 
industry attempting to fulfil a dual objective – to be self-sustainable as well as to reach the core 
poor (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2005; Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt and Morduch, 2009) 
The main performance assessment criterion for this school of thought is “sustainability”. The 
advocates of institutionalist view that the only feasible way of providing sustainable 
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microfinance services is through for-profit enterprises. Practitioners from this school of thought 
measure the success of MFIs by its progress towards achieving financial self-sufficiency; while 
assuming the impact of poverty reduction (Copestake, 2007; Hulme and Mosley, 1996; Otero, 
1999; Rhyne, 2001). With regards to the measurement of MFI’s performance, institutionalists 
are interested in market variables such as financial self-sufficiency, profitability and quality of 
services.  
This school of thought views microfinance from the perspective of traditional banking services 
and is engaged by commercialized microfinance consultancy groups, such as the Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP). Defenders of institutionalist approach are more concerned 
with the profitability and financial self-sufficiency of MFIs. Similar to welfarist’s view, the 
institutionalist paradigm focuses on creating MFIs as financial institutions to serve clients that 
are overlooked by the formal financial system, but institutionalist MFIs are more interested in 
lending to the entrepreneurial poor. Institutionalist paradigm maintains that sustainability of 
MFIs is the most important goal due to the limited capacity of the donors. Practitioners that 
endorse this approach quote the failure of rural credit agencies in the 1960s and 1970s as 
evidence that receiving aid in the form of donations, grants and subsidies is detrimental to the 
microfinance industry (Hollis & Sweetman, 1998b). Citing the initial failure of poverty 
alleviation movements post World War II, institutionalist views the overdependence on 
subsidies as operational inefficiency.  
The advocates of institutionalist assert that the financial health of the institution is vital as MFIs 
must survive on their own resources without relying on the help of external donors (Adams and 
Von Pischke, 1992). In addition, there has been a reduction in donors’ investment and subsidies 
in the microfinance sector due to the recent global financial crisis (Imai et al., 2011). As grants, 
donations and subsidies are not sustainable in nature, the supporters of this school of thought 
believe microfinance programs that rely heavily on them must eventually be suspended. 
Therefore, the compilation of “best practices” by the supporters of institutionalist approach 
embraces commercialization and self-sufficiency. As such, institutionalists view “best 
performance” in microfinance sector as generating the highest returns for investors to attract 
capital to expand the industry, serve more clients, which in turn will help eradicate poverty 
(Ayayi and Sene, 2010; Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega, 1996; Schreiner, 2002). The most 
prominent examples of the institutionalist approach are Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) and 
Banco Solidario (BancoSol) in Bolivia. 
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School of Thought  Welfarist (Also known as Non-
for-profit Model) 
Institutionalist (Also known as Commercial 
Model) 
Source  Originated from the works of the 
founder of microfinance, Professor 
Mohd. Yunus. 
Evolved from the non-for-profit model by 
claiming that lending to the poor can be profitable 
by charging sufficient interest rate. 
Objective Aims to reduce absolute poverty 
Views the unavailability of 
financial services to the core poor 
as “market failure”. 
Aims to reduce poverty 
More interested in sustainability of the 
microfinance institutions, assumes the effect of 
poverty reduction. 
Targeted Clients Targets the core poor. Prefers microentrepreneurs/clients that slightly 
above the poverty line. 
Dependence on 
Subsidy/Grants 
Highly dependent on grants and 
subsidies. 
Shuns subsidies and grants. Attracts private 
investors with profit sharing possibilities. 
Performance 
Measures  
Interested in whether the clients 
are better off after borrowing 
microloans. 
Interested in the sustainability and financial 
performance of MFIs. 
 
  
Examples of 
Prominent MFIs 
 
Grameen Bank, FINCA-style 
village banking programs in Latin 
America. 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), Banco Solidario 
(BancoSol). 
Table 2-1 Comparison between Welfarist and Institutionalist 
 
While welfarists maintain that MFIs have to help the poor first and sustainability should be a 
secondary issue; the irony is that these two views are not inherently incompatible (Hulme and 
Mosley, 1996). In fact, there are numerous MFIs that embrace both ideologies in practice. 
Instead of completely embracing the traditional banking structure, they progressed into a 
unique hybrid that combines both welfare and banking logics (Drake and Otero, 1992). The 
welfare logic led them to preserve the traditional microfinance mission of providing access to 
financial services to demographics ignored by the conventional financial sector, whilst the 
traditional banking logic pressed them to fulfil the obligations of commercial financial 
institutions. By doing so, these MFIs contributed to the construction of the new breed of MFI 
– the new modern microfinance that provides to the poor and generates profit (Otero and 
Rhyne, 1994). This leads to a win-win proposition that supports both sustainability and 
outreach. Being financially sustainable and achieving outreach are two different objectives that 
modern MFIs are expected to attain. Although several empirical studies show that these two 
objectives seem to alternate (Woller et al., 1999; Paxton, 2002; Woller, 2002; Hermes et al., 
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2009), in an ideal scenario, MFI should pursue both financial performance and outreach 
simultaneously (Brau and Woller, 2004; Pinz and Helmig, 2014) 
As MFIs are used as instruments to help eradicate poverty, most of these organisations are 
located in the developing countries where the external environment can be volatile. Poor 
external setting that includes weak infrastructure seems to be a common denominator in the 
emerging markets (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000). It is in these countries that the poor 
are suffering from a host of institutional failures, such as poor legal systems, inefficient 
regulation and corruption that prevent the development of economic system, which lead to the 
issue of poverty (Mesquita and Lazzarini, 2008; North, 1990). In emerging economies, 
government involvement in poverty alleviation and financial development programs can assist 
in creating institutional environment that promotes overall economic stability. The challenge 
remains for local governments to maintain a balance in the external environment to encourage 
stability while promoting micro businesses to positively contribute to overall economic growth 
and to double as job creations for the poor community (Manos and Yaron, 2009). In order to 
create a favourable atmosphere to nurture the microfinance sector, the local government has to 
ensure a stable external environment that supports steady economy growth, minimal inflation, 
adopts strict regulations and policies (Thapa , 2007).  
The literature review reveals that the MFIs’ organisation mission plays a role in the 
performance of MFIs, but not many studies have focussed on the effect of external 
environment, typically from the perspective of institutional environment. External factors are 
environmental variables that are specific to the policy and economic setting of the country in 
which the MFI operates in. Internal factors are institutional variables related to the institutions 
and are part of institutions’ management and governance policies (Armendáriz and Morduch, 
2005). As discussed earlier, the microfinance industry is governed by welfarist and 
institutionalist approaches. To investigate whether the external environment has different 
impact on these two schools of thought, this study then looks at how institutional environment 
affects the performance of MFIs in both South Asia and Latin America. In what follows, the 
next section looks at institutional environment, before discussing the potential impact of 
economic settings. 
2.4 Institutional Environment 
This section provides definition for the measures of country’s governance and institutional 
environment that will be used in this study. A country’s institutions and governance play an 
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imperative role in the rise and fall of a country (Acemoglu et al., 2012), development of 
organizations (Khavul et al., 2013), and policies that promote economic inclusion (Banerjee 
and Duflo, 2011). This is further supported by recent research whereby scholars have 
demonstrated the importance of institutional environment in the performance of firms and 
countries (Commander and Nikoloski, 2010).   
However, one common difficulty faced by scholars when conducting empirical studies 
involving institutional environment is the limitations in the definition and measurement of 
institutions and governance (Tebaldi and Elmslie, 2008). As a rule of thumb, institutional 
environment consists of “taken-for-granted social and cultural meaning systems, or norms” that 
outline social reality (DiMaggio, 1998; Scott, 1987; Scott and Meyer, 1991). These institutional 
norms originate from educational systems, ideologies and are unwritten guidelines of proper 
social conduct. If an organisation wants to be accepted as part of the society (Scott, 1987), it 
must then conform to the institutional environment created by the society (Davis and North, 
1970), which is “a set of fundamental political, social and legal ground rules that create the 
foundation of economic and political activity” (Davis and North, 1970). Therefore, it can be 
said that institutional environment shapes the structure of political, social and economic 
incentives (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott and Meyer, 1991). For the purpose of this study, 
country governance is defined in the context of institutions that support economic growth and 
development. The components of country governance include state capacity, political stability, 
and regulation of finance institutions (Acemoglu, 2008). 
To study the institutional environment of different countries in a comparable approach, scholars 
developed the idea of institutional strength and weakness (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Hermelo 
and Vassolo, 2010; Meyer et al., 2009). Institutional strength refers to “the ability of a country’s 
government to provide rules and legislations (for example: property rights protection, contract 
enforcement, policy stability and the provision of transparent rule of law) to facilitate private 
investment and market development” (Ault and Spicer, 2014). A country’s institutional 
environment is considered to be “strong” if the government supports “voluntary exchange 
underpinning an effective market mechanism” (Meyer et al., 2009). On the other hand, a weak 
institutional environment refers to “conditions that weaken property rights and contract 
enforcement as well as jeopardizing a fair market exchange” (Delios and Beamish, 1999). 
Therefore, strong market institutions are beneficial to businesses as it encourages their 
expansion. When market institutions are weak, businesses face greater institutional hazards 
that will eventually limit their performance. Institutional hazards are potential threats faced by 
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businesses in a weak institutional environment, such as political uncertainty, corrupted 
government officials demanding for payments to grant business licenses and potential violation 
of formal contracts (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Hermelo and Vassolo, 2010).  
Institutional environment can be further divided into three categories — macro, meso and 
micro levels (Elsner, 2010). The distinction between these three categories is useful with the 
discussion of institutional environment for this study. Macro-environment is expressed as 
“national level policies, culture, laws and economy and comprises of institutions such as norms, 
rules and organizations that can affect a government’s transparency and business certainty”, 
whereas meso-environment refers to “regional, support services, initiatives and organizations, 
and can include industries” (Pitelis, 2005). Micro-environment is where individual agents 
interact and includes businesses and individuals who adjust to adapt the macro and meso-level 
institutions (Dopfer, Foster and Potts, 2004). While macro, meso and micro level environment 
are interrelated, this study looks beyond the effect of industry considerations and focus on the 
potential impact of macro-level institutional environment on microfinance industry.  
 
Figure 2-2 Differences between macro, meso and micro institutional environment 
Researchers have focused on three sets of measurements when studying the effects of 
institutional environment. The first set of measurements, found in the researches of Knack and 
Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2001), is made up of survey 
indicators of institutional quality collected over the years of 1980s and 1990s, from the 
International Country Risk Guide (IRCG). The second set of measurements is an aggregated 
index of survey assessments collected by Kaufmann et al.(2004) and is also found in the works 
of Rodrik et. al (2002). The third set of variables is datasets collected by Jaggers and Marshall 
(2000), and focus on measuring the limit of executive power.  
Macro
• National level policies -
political, economical 
politcieis
Meso
• Regional support 
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2.4.1 Institutional Environment and Poverty Alleviation 
After looking at definitions of institutions and the measurements used in various studies, we 
now explore how institutional environment can affect the poor and the efforts of poverty 
alleviation. When local government authorities use their legal but discretionary power to grant 
legitimate or illegitimate rewards to cronies, the problem of economic inefficiency arises 
(North, 1990b). Hence, it could be said that good governance is a pre-requisite for poverty 
alleviation. To achieve good governance, it is then imperative for institutions to establish sets 
of laws between political and economic agents (Grindle, 2004).   
In order to assist with poverty alleviation, local governments and development actors such as 
World Bank have put in extra effort to develop strong institutional environment to include the 
poor in broader economic activities (Mair and Marti, 2009). However, the impact of institutions 
on poverty alleviation is highly dependent on the competencies and entitlements of the poor 
(Sen, 1999). This is because the efficiency of resources distributed to the poor and how well 
the poor can access their share of distribution rely on institutions. Failure of either one can 
worsen poverty.  Therefore, the well-being of institutional environment that supports 
microfinance industry is important in poverty eradication (World Bank, 2002).  
Interestingly, researchers found that institutional reform can impose high transaction costs on 
the poorest and subsequently may increase poverty before decreasing it (Chong and Calderón, 
2000a). An effective government which ensures property rights and control of corruption 
(Campbell and Lindberg, 1990; Fligstein, 2001) are preconditions for the development of 
financial institutions of a country. This suggests that in order for microfinance institutions to 
be well-functioned, the support of the local government in creating a strong institutional 
environment (Porta et al., 1998; Spence, 1974) is more important than the government’s 
intervention.  
In a developed economy where the institutional environment is supportive of the formal 
market, the decision to start a business is usually an occupational choice whereby individuals 
can choose between becoming an entrepreneur or taking a formal employment. But in 
developing countries where formal employment opportunities are limited, many of the poor 
turn to micro-entrepreneurship to fulfill basic human needs (Naudé, 2010). Researchers have 
suggested that starting a small business in developing countries helps eradicate poverty by 
enhancing welfare of the poor (Adekunle, 2011; Tamvada, 2010).  
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However, the common problem in emerging economies is underdeveloped institutional 
structures and biased institutions. Biased institutions where contracts are not enforced 
impartially but in favour of specific groups such as corrupt bureaucracies that discriminate the 
poor may lead to a more unequal distribution of income and higher absolute poverty (Klitgaard, 
1998). In many emerging economies, the poor are unable to start a new business in the formal 
market due to ‘institutional voids’ – a situation where institutional environment that supports 
markets are absent, weak, or fail to accomplish the role that is expected of them (Mair and 
Marti, 2009). In a fragile state, local government has zero capacity to implement any credible 
rule of law, which then leads to a weak formal market structure. The collapse of institutions in 
fragile states often see a rise of informal markets, drug lords and black markets that supply 
illicit goods and services (Rotberg, 2010). The existence of these markets creates threats and 
uncertainty to both formal and informal businesses that operate in the fragile states (Hiatt and 
Sine, 2014).  
Scholars backed this theory by suggesting that social-political factors reduce the costs of 
bargaining, contracting, monitoring and enforcement in economic development process 
(Campos et al., 1994; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; North, 1990b). Literature further suggest 
that market inefficiency and misallocation of resources caused by weak institutions play a 
major role in explaining the links between weak institutions and the level of poverty (Olson, 
1996). This is consistent with the findings of North’s (1990) study. Therefore, the key to 
economy development and poverty alleviation is policies that support institutional 
arrangements (Olson, 1996), such as effective legal system, constitutional provisions and good 
enforcement systems. As such, the development of a strong institutional environment is 
important to promote economic growth. Ironically, Rodrik (2000) argues that laws and 
regulations might be created not to serve the interest of social optimum, but rather for private 
optimum. 
Similar to profit making businesses, microfinance industry adapts to its institutional 
environment. Microfinance institutions and its predecessors, such as rural banks and credit 
unions, are developed in response to limited financial access resulting from poor institutional 
environment. In many developing countries where the majority of MFIs are located, the 
volatility of institutional environment from policy reversals, variations in policy 
implementation, and political climate can impact the performance of an MFI. However, 
microfinance programs are designed to thrive in such adverse settings (Meagher, 2010). 
Although the disabling features of weak institutional environment can severely limit the poor’s 
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access to microfinance, it might create opportunities for MFIs to expand. However, an 
investigation by Duflos (2009) indicates that microfinance programs are not sustainable unless 
the programs are integrated with a legal institution. In addition, a study by Honohan (2004) 
reveals that the poor’s access to microfinance is worse off in countries with poorer institutional 
quality, higher GDP per capita, and smaller market; which then indicates that country 
institutions encourage the growth of microfinance industry.  
Since scholars found association between institutional environment with poverty reduction, 
entrepreneurship and the performance of countries and firms (Green et al., 2006), it then makes 
sense to examine the potential interaction between institutional environment and the 
performance of microfinance industry. MFIs provide an ideal setting to explore the possible 
impact of institutional environment because they pursue both economic and social values 
simultaneously. With the constant debate of microfinance drifting away from its traditional 
mission of poverty alleviation, the effect of institutional environment on MFIs’ decisions may 
provide explanation on the behaviour of how some MFIs deviate from social welfare to profit 
making objectives.  
Although there is much analysis on what role institutional environment plays in affecting 
financial sector development (Caprio et al., 2001), evidence on how institutional environment 
affects the performance of microfinance is very limited. Studies involving microfinance and 
institutional environment mostly focus on the effect of meso-environment factors on the 
performance of microfinance - for example, the effect of infrastructures such as roads, 
information networks, and accessibility beyond the major urban areas (Christen and Drake, 
2002).  
As microfinance industry evolves, the degree of government involvement is expected to 
increase. More specifically, local governments that undertake regulatory reform to improve 
business environment for microentrepreneurs, encourage microfinance to shift towards a 
sustainable, market-based industry. Studies have found that governments that undertake 
regulatory reform to improve overall business environment help market-based microfinance by 
eliminating unfair competition from public institutions. Regulation reforms that improve the 
institutions of a country contribute to the overall performance of its finance institutions (Zeller 
and Meyer, 2002). Government policy that shapes the institutional environment in which 
microentrepreneurial decisions are made, will then affect the performance of MFIs. In order to 
encourage the growth of microfinance sector, not only the stability of institutional environment 
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is important, but also the government must “create a macroeconomic environment 
characterized by stable growth, low inflation, and fiscal discipline” to support small business 
owners (Woller and Woodworth, 2001).  
After exploring the potential impact of institutional environment on microfinance industry, we 
now turn to the impact of macroeconomic settings on the performance of microfinance 
institutions. Due to the increasing commercialization in the microfinance industry, the effect 
of macroeconomic factors on the performance of MFIs has become one of the key discussions 
among policy makers, practitioners and scholars. As such, it is not surprising that studies in the 
microfinance field have paid considerable attention to the influence of macroeconomic sector 
and macro-institutions on the performance of microfinance industry in the past few years 
(Patten et al., 2001; Ahlin et al., 2010 and Imai et al., 2011).  
2.5 Macroeconomic Environment and Microfinance Institutions 
An earlier study by Ledgerwood (1998) finds that regulated environment and strong property 
rights are important factors for the sustainability of the microfinance sector. Poor 
macroeconomic, regulatory and trade policies is proven to undermine the viability of small 
business owners and the microfinance industry that support them (Ledgerwood, 1998). The 
effect of macroeconomic instability on microfinance sector attracted the attention of academics 
(Vanroose, 2006). The relationship between macroeconomic structure and the performance of 
MFIs differ from one country to another (Patten et al., 2001) and this is made more pronounced 
by the recent waves of macroeconomic crises (Imai et al., 2011). This differences lead to an 
emerging trend in analysing the macroeconomic factors influencing the performance of MFIs. 
Existing literature on the relationship between performance of MFIs and macroeconomic 
factors can be divided into three categories. The first category examines the specific 
determinants of microfinance performance, such as lending methodology and corporate 
governance (Hartarska, 2005; Hermes and Lensink, 2011). The second series studies the 
macroeconomic factors that affect the uneven distribution of microfinance and the impact of 
country-level aggregates, such as economic growth, inflation, poverty and level of corruption 
(Marconi and Mosley, 2006; Vanroose, 2006; Vanroose and D’Espallier, 2013). The third 
strand highlights the analysis of institutional determinants of microfinance success by 
examining the impact of microfinance sustainability and the external environment they operate 
in (Imai et al., 2010; Ahlin, Lin and Maio, 2010). This study falls into the latter two categories.  
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Interestingly, literature that focus on the macroeconomic factors and country-level aggregates 
further provided two different views between the performance of MFIs and the macroeconomic 
factors – (1) the financial performance of MFIs influencing the economy as a whole (Imai et 
al., 2010; Krauss and Walter, 2009) and (2) macroeconomic factors affecting the financial 
performance of MFIs (Ahlin et al., 2010; Ahlin and Lin, 2006; Kai and Hamori, 2009).  
In general, studies find countries with stable economy and low inflation rates attract more 
microfinance providers (Rhyne, 2001) since investors are more keen to invest in regions with 
consistent economic growth.  However, researchers have also suggested that microfinance 
industry can succeed amidst moderate inflation and recession (Christen et al., 1995) as 
microfinance programs are created to survive and thrive in poor macro environments. The 
effect of macroeconomic factors on the performance of MFIs is more noticeable in countries 
with higher inflation rates and a higher proportion of agriculture to GDP (Vanroose, 2006). 
The impact of inflation on microfinance industry is comparable to the traditional financial 
sector. Higher inflation rate can lead to an increase in interest rates charged by microfinance 
institutions. This can escalate to repayment problems, hindering the development of 
microfinance industry (Kazi and Leonard, 2012).  
According to Klugman (2002) “inflation is a “regressive and arbitrary tax, the burden of which 
is borne disproportionately by the population at the bottom of the pyramid”. Two reasons can 
be provided. First, the poor’s financial possessions are mostly in cash form rather than interest-
bearing assets. Second, the poor often do not have the ability to protect the real value of their 
incomes and assets from inflation (Fischer, 1993). Therefore, inflation erodes the real wages 
and assets of the poor more than the non-poor. In addition, inflation restricts economic growth, 
an effect that can impact even the core poor who rarely use money for economic transactions 
(Bruno and Easterly, 1998; Ghosh and Phillips, 1998; Sarel, 1996). However, Romer (1998) 
suggests that the impacts of inflation on the earnings of the poor can differ between cyclical 
and long-term perspectives. In the short run, an increase in unanticipated inflation can be 
associated with a decrease in unemployment, which will benefit the poor. However, in the long 
run, higher inflation rate cannot permanently reduce unemployment, and the potential benefits 
of inflation on the poor will then be reversed.  
The development in sectors of the economy where the poor are concentrated is expected have 
a greater effect on reducing poverty in comparison to other sectors (Ames et al., 2001). Since 
it is often claimed that the majority of the poor reside in rural region, macroeconomic policies 
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that encourage the growth of agricultural sector and rural businesses will help to reduce poverty 
as it generates income for the poor. Therefore, it is not surprising that the performance of MFIs 
also relies on the development of certain sectors.  
Studies have indicated that growth in agricultural sector is more likely to benefit the rural poor 
in comparison to the growth in manufacturing and service industry (Bourguignon and 
Morrisson, 1998; Datt et al., 2016). A research by Ratha et al. (1999) also disclose that labour-
intensive economic growth is far more effective than any poverty reduction programs. It is 
often argued that economic growth which leads to the expansion of low-skilled employment is 
more likely to benefit the poor than the other segments of the population (Loayza and Raddatz, 
2006).  
From a global viewpoint, the most effective way to alleviate poverty is to increase employment 
rate. In the past few years, there has been an increasing acknowledgment that 
microentrepreneurship and small scale enterprise job creations can offer solution to reduce 
poverty (Abzug et al., 2000; Baumol, 2009; Bruton et al., 2015). Microfinance industry 
encourages the development of microenterprises, which then reduces unemployment rate. In 
rural areas where formal job opportunities are difficult to come by and economic growth is 
slow, many of the underprivileged will then turn to the microfinance industry. Since the 
majority of the poor derive most of their income from formal employment, this suggests that 
the level of employment and access to earning opportunities are crucial determinants for 
poverty alleviation and the performance of MFIs. 
The importance of employment for economic development has led to governments in 
developing regions realigning their focus on providing job opportunities as a major poverty 
reduction channel. Despite the importance of employment opportunities for the poor, there is 
still insufficient empirical evidence on the effect of unemployment rate on the performance of 
microfinance industry. The lack of data in many low-income countries and the difficulties of 
relating causality to correlations between income and employment factors led to the lack of 
research in this area (Hull, 2009).  
The potential impact of macroeconomic policies on poverty alleviation is acknowledged by 
both scholars and policy makers. The World Development Report in 2000 by World Bank 
concluded that macroeconomic policies that support economic growth are the most important 
aspect in the efforts of poverty alleviation. Good macroeconomic policies encourage higher 
growth rates in the microfinance sector (Fisher, 1993). The idea behind this is that good 
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macroeconomic policies lead to stronger economic growth, which in turn provides a 
constructive environment for the growth of microenterprises.  
In addition to macroeconomic environment, the success and sustainability of financial 
institutions is highly dependent upon the social, political, economic and cultural environments 
of the host country (Audretsch et al., 2007). Taking this into account, the external environment 
of the host country is also likely to affect the performance of microfinance and its clients who 
are largely in the informal sector. Earlier studies such as Tucker and Miles (2004), Weiss and 
Montgomery (2005) amongst others, compare the performance of MFIs in one country or 
region to another and find differences in performance. As all other players in the financial 
sector, MFIs are subject to the constraints required by the formal rules of the game, including 
the nature of its host country’s legal system, regulation and the efficiency of the host 
government institutions as well as the breadth and strength of industry-specific regulations. 
Since MFIs imitate informal lending practices and rely strongly on personalized interactions 
and communal norms, their operations should be deeply embedded in the host country's social 
and cultural context (Epstein & Yuthas, 2011). This was demonstrated in a  recent paper by 
Awaworyi Churchill and Marr (2014), which saw significant differences in the performance of 
microfinance industry in Latin America and South Asia and attribute the differences to different 
operational strategies in both regions. To gain a better understanding on regional effects in 
MFIs, the next subsection examines the development of microfinance in South Asia and Latin 
America. 
2.6 Characteristics of Microfinance in South Asia and Latin America 
The revolution of microfinance industry has provided substantial credit flows to low-income 
households in South Asia and Latin America. In both regions, microfinance is developed under 
very different ideological, political and economic conditions, which leads to distinct 
differences in both industries (Weiss and Montgomery, 2005).  
2.6.1 Microfinance in South Asia  
In South Asia, microfinance started in 1970s when poverty was extensively under scrutiny; 
therefore, it is not surprising that the main focus is on alleviating poverty in rural regions. To 
be exact, modern microfinance was born in Bangladesh when Professor Mohammad Yunus 
created an experimental research project, which is further developed into the world’s most 
renowned microfinance institution - Grameen Bank. The microfinance industry in South Asia 
experienced astonishing growth rates, especially in Bangladesh. During the 1990s, the industry 
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in Bangladesh grew to millions of clients and some of the larger MFIs have become the 
foundation for microenterprise loans. However, the services have also been drawn-out to the 
core poor over certain targeted programs. 
For the first time in history, an extensive portion of the poor households of a developing country 
had access to financial services. However, in India, the microfinance program is based on self-
helped groups. In Pakistan and Nepal, the potential of microfinance demonstrated by these 
experiences has captured the attention of governments that have created specific legal 
frameworks to facilitate its growth.  
Before microfinance, the average low-income family in the South Asia region had no access to 
financial services apart from informal lenders and cooperatives. Despite the majority of the 
populations live in rural areas, their access to formal financial services remains limited in the 
South Asia region. However, in South Asia, the number of MFIs varies from country to 
country. By 2005, World Bank estimated that the microfinance industry in South Asia covered 
at least 35 million of some 270 million families in the region and met about 15% of the overall 
credit requirements of families in the lower-income bracket. In Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, 
microfinance coverage was particularly impressive, with more than 60% of the poor covered 
by microfinance services (World Bank, 2006).   
 
2.6.2 Microfinance in Latin America  
The microfinance industry in Latin America has had remarkable success in extending its 
services to the underserved population. Since the late 1970s, microfinance clients have been 
growing, turning Latin America into one of the largest microfinance service providers in the 
world, alongside with South Asia. Microfinance has provided financial access to nearly 6 
million low income households in Latin America and the Caribbean (Navajas and Tejerina, 
2006). The Inter-American Development Bank estimates that in Latin America and the 
Caribbean there are 700 microfinance institutions. In 2010, MFIs in Latin America loaned 
$12.3 billion to more than 10.5 million low-income clients (Pages-Serra, 2010).  
The microfinance industry in Latin America was developed after the fall of the Bolivian 
populist regime to address the issues of widespread unemployment. Its development started off 
as an effort of the local governments to support the national economy and to moderate high 
levels of urban unemployment. Banco Sol was brought in to help address this issue (Weiss and 
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Montgomery, 2005). Due to the massive demand, commercialization has been a deliberate and 
beneficial approach for accelerating the development of microfinance industry in this region 
(Srnec et al., 2009). As a result, MFIs in this region have also endured a stricter supervision by 
central banks and government organizations. A more comprehensive and standardized 
application process to meet the requirements for microloans has stimulated greater confidence 
in commercial banks and investors offering more capital for the microfinance programs. As 
such, it is not surprising that in Latin America, the provision of microfinance services by 
commercial banks has become a common trend. For some banks like Banco in Peru and 
ProCredit in Ecuador, the primary line of business is microfinance (Westley, 2006). 
2.6.3 Differences between microfinance industry in South Asia and Latin 
America 
Till today, the microfinance industry in both regions is still characterised by these major 
differences. Microfinance in South Asia is more inclined towards the alleviation of poverty 
whereas Latin America is more oriented towards the promotion of microenterprises. Weiss and 
Montgomery (2005) examine the evidence from Asia and Latin America and conclude that the 
main difference between these regions is that MFIs in Latin America are used as a vehicle for 
the development of the microenterprises rather than a tool for the removal of core poverty, 
which was the main focus in Asia.  
Although South Asia is identified as one of the largest microfinance regions with the highest 
number of clients in the industry, Latin America holds primacy as having the greatest expertise 
in the field of microfinance policy (Janda and Zetek, 2013). In addition, Rutherford (2003) 
discovers that the microfinance industry in Latin America focus on the poor rather than the 
core poor.  The overall impression of microfinance in Latin America is that it has not reached 
far down the income scale. This is likely due to the greater focus on credit for urban micro-
enterprises, with lower rural outreach in Latin America compared to other regions (Weiss and 
Montgomery, 2005). Since late 1980s, the number of microfinance clients has grown steadily, 
making Latin America one of the regions where the microfinance industry has expanded the 
most, alongside with South Asia. Miller (2003) discovers that some of the most experienced, 
developed and profitable MFIs in Latin America. On average, MFIs from Latin America are 
more leveraged and they use a growing share of commercial funds in comparison to South 
Asia. MFIs in the South Asia region are relatively more efficient than their counterparts in 
Latin America. MFIs in South Asia and Southeast Asia have substantially lower operation 
expenses. The main reason behind this is because of higher population density and lower wages 
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in the South Asia region. Other factors such as strong outreach and constant low operating 
expenses have helped the MFIs in South Asia to operate more efficiently. Besides, MFIs with 
the largest asset size are also found in South Asia (Microbanking Bulletin, 2004). 
Table 2-2 Differences between microfinance industry in South Asia and Latin America 
 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
The interest of this research lies in the potential effect of institutional environment on 
microfinance. Scholars have researched about how weak institutional environment affects 
economic growth and tampers with the effectiveness of poverty alleviation programs (Chauvet 
and Guillaumont, 2003; Chong and Calderón, 2000a).  An ideal institutional environment that 
meets the demands of all levels of the economy allows the poor to gain access to finance 
(Weber, 2004). Therefore, it is possible that microfinance industry situated in countries with 
stronger governance will have better access to cheaper sources of capital, which then leads 
operational efficiency in MFIs (Hermes, Lensink and Meesters, 2009). In addition, a strong 
institutional environment that encourages economic prosperity facilitates the entrepreneurial 
activities of microfinance clients and their ability to both expand their businesses and repay 
their loans (Silva and Chávez, 2015).  
However, an environment that favours the development of formal financial system may be 
indifferent to microfinance industry. Yet a supportive institutional environment, coupled with 
economic growth, may reduce the demand of microfinance services since micro entrepreneurs 
may progress to the formal credit market – the traditional commercial banks, for larger and 
cheaper loans (Silva and Chávez, 2015). A supportive institutional environment behaves like a 
double-edged sword, whereby it can restrict the development of the microfinance sector, but 
opens up opportunities for micro entrepreneurs. Then again, a supportive institutional 
Region South Asia Latin America  
Operational Strategies Non-for-profit Highly commercialised 
History Microfinance was introduced to 
cope with rural poverty as an 
experimental project 
Brought into the region to cope 
with high urban unemployment 
rate 
Objectives Alleviate poverty 
Provide credit to 
microenterprises in the informal 
sector 
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environment may also make it harder for microfinance institutions to operate. For example, a 
country with steady institutional environment will impose strict requirements for financial 
institutions and the same restrictions can prevent MFIs from obtaining a regulated license, 
therefore limiting their ability to raise capital in the financial markets. Given these 
contradictory arguments, this study relies on empirical analysis to shed some insight on the 
impact of the quality of institutional environment on the performance of microfinance industry. 
The review of literature indicates that external environment such as institutional environment 
and macroeconomic performance of a country/region contribute towards the performance of 
MFIs that leads to the differences in the performance from one region to another. A detailed 
study of literature further finds that microfinance industry in the South Asia region adopts the 
non-for-profit approach, while microfinance industry in Latin America is highly 
commercialised. To recap, the practitioners of microfinance in both regions are left with the 
challenge of carrying out the mission of the microfinance in the present institutional 
environment of a country. The rules and regulations of governing policies in both regions can 
affect the tools used by practitioners and the framework which MFIs operate. This interaction 
between institutional environment and MFIs can ultimately influence the performance of these 
micro-lending institutions. Therefore, it becomes necessary to include discussions surrounding 
the overall environment in the mission of microfinance institutions (Weber, 2004). The 
differences between the microfinance industries in these two regions lead to the hypotheses of 
this study which will be discussed in the next chapter. The interaction of the MFIs with their 
institutional environment will be tested in chapters four to six of this study. Considering the 
emergence of the recent discussions on the trade-off between sustainability and outreach as 
well as the potential impact of external environment on the microfinance industry, this study 
sets out to examine the performance of MFIs in South Asia and Latin America based on both 
outreach and sustainability.   
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Chapter 3 Hypothesis and Empirical Model 
The previous chapter reveals that the potential effect of institutional environment on the 
microfinance sector is an area that is understudied. Therefore, this study intends to determine 
the relationship between institutional environment and the performance of MFIs in South Asia 
and Latin America. Based on the literature review, two research questions are developed: (1) 
Does institutional environment matter for the performance of MFIs in South Asia and Latin 
America? Do MFIs perform better in the context of well-developed institutions? (2) What are 
the differences between the performance of MFIs in South Asia and Latin America? Four 
hypotheses are then developed based on the research questions pertaining to the relationships 
between institutional environment, macroeconomy and the performance of MFIs. In what 
follows, an outline of the development of hypotheses and research design will be provided 
before the discussion of data and methodology.  
3.1 Research Design and Hypotheses Development  
3.1.1 Research Design 
To understand whether institutional environment plays a role in the performance of MFIs, this 
research uses a positive, longitudinal study approach to conduct an empirical analysis. Figure 
3.1 displays the research model - the left-hand side of the figure shows the institutional 
environment and macroeconomic variables while the right-hand side of the figure displays the 
dependent variables, which are MFI performance variables such as financial performance and 
outreach. The six institutional environment variables are drawn from institutions theory as a 
proxy for country-specific institutional environment. Control variables that are used for this 
study are MFI size, age, legal type and percentage of female borrowers. These are used as 
control variables since the relationship between institutional environment and the performance 
of MFIs may potentially be affected by these MFI-level variables. The variables will be 
explained further in the methodology section and summary statistics is provided at the end of 
the chapter.  
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Figure 3-1 Conceptual Framework 
 
3.1.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
Hypothesis 1: Well-regulated institutional environment leads to a reduction in the number of 
borrowers of MFIs.   
The relationship between number of borrowers and favourable institutional environment of the 
host country is expected to be negative.  Two arguments can be made. First, well-regulated 
environment can be expensive for MFIs as the cost of regulation might be a burden for 
microentrepreneurs. When it is more difficult for the poor to obtain small business licenses, 
this will prevent them from borrowing microloans. For example, if corruption is reduced 
effectively, this may hinder small and micro business owners to gain access to government 
services that are difficult to obtain without paying bribes. In this situation, the regulatory 
system hampers the progress of microenterprises, reducing the demand for microloans. This 
situation is indicated in the study of Crabb (2008), where the author finds that government 
regulations have an adverse effect on the stability of MFIs. Second, a well-regulated 
environment might lead to a growing economy. This can increase the incentives of 
microentrepreneurs in expanding their businesses, which will lead to an increase in demand for 
larger loans. Theoretically, regulatory quality of a country is an important factor for 
entrepreneurs. However, when microentrepreneurs require larger loans, they might shop 
around for the best interest rates and will borrow from commercial banks instead of MFIs, 
which will then lead to a reduction in number of borrowers.  
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Although the influence of a well-functioning government on the performance of the financial 
sector is recognised, there is little evidence that links well-functioning institutions to 
microfinance institutions’ outcomes. Despite scarce evidence, based on the reasons above we 
expect the relationship between the performance of MFI and regulatory status of a country to 
be negative, which means that countries with better governance are costly for MFIs.  
Hypothesis 2: MFIs’ average loan size is negatively related to the institutional environment 
in Latin America.  
The second hypothesis is based on the notion that microbusinesses will thrive in a regulated 
environment, and working poor will demand for larger loans to expand their businesses. 
Therefore, the relationship with institutional environment and depth of outreach is estimated to 
be positive (Depth of outreach is measured via average loan size, larger loan size shows that 
MFIs are reaching out to richer clients instead of the core poor). Practitioners and academics 
have agreed that the future of microfinance development lies in a well-regulated environment 
which allows the poor to gain access to financial services (Gallardo, 2001) as a well-developed 
regulatory system will create a business friendly environment that reduces the possibilities for 
officials abusing power to gain private benefits. Since literature have discovered that 
microfinance industry in Latin America are more interested in providing loans for 
microentrepreneurs, it is not surprising to expect a positive relationship between loan sizes and 
institutional environment.  
Hypothesis 3: Unemployment has an effect on the number of borrowers. 
Unemployment rate of MFIs’ host country is expected to affect the number of microloan 
borrowers. In developed economies, the decision to start a business is an occupational choice 
where an individual chooses between employment and becoming an entrepreneur. However, 
in low income countries where salaried employment is limited, many poor start a new business 
to fulfil basic human needs (Naudé, 2010). Since it is well known that MFI loans are often 
taken up for activities in the informal economy (Hermes and Meesters, 2011), combined with 
poverty, this will lead to an increase in the number of borrowers. When there are formal 
employment opportunities (low unemployment rate), the demand for loans decrease as it is 
expected that the poor prefer formal employment. However, formal employment opportunities 
can be complementary or substitute for MFIs performance. When there are many jobs in the 
market it could also mean that the economy is performing well and this may increase the 
incentives of microentrepreneurs to invest in new opportunities, which can lead to an increase 
in the number of borrowers. Since unemployment rate can have positive or negative effect on 
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the performance of MFIs, we will then have to rely on the data to tell us which effect is stronger. 
Given the complexity of the relationship, it is expected that the effect of the unemployment 
rate on the performance of microfinance might increase/decrease after a certain threshold level. 
Therefore, we employ “unemployment squared” to capture this.   
Hypothesis 4: Natural disasters have an effect on the performance of microfinance 
institutions.  
Due to the lack of basic living conditions, the poor are constantly affected by natural disasters 
and often require financial aid to recover their losses. Microfinance institutions could be of 
huge help to these people (Yunus, 2007). Given that the objective of MFIs is to alleviate 
poverty, natural disasters may increase the demand for loans. However, during these times the 
poor might face difficulties in repaying loans, which will lead to an adverse effect on the 
financial performance of MFIs. Previous researchers have investigated the effect of natural 
disasters on the poor (Carter et al., 2007), but such effects on the performance MFIs have not 
been formally examined. As such, the relationship between natural disaster and the 
performance of MFI is a priori unclear. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
32 
 
3.2 Data and Methodology  
3.2.1 Data Description 
The dataset is assembled from three databases – Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX 
Market), World Bank and the international disaster database (EM-DAT). The primary data 
used for the performance of microfinance institutions (MFIs) is taken from Microfinance 
Information Exchange (MIX Market), a web-based microfinance platform that comes from the 
collaboration of several global partners - the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, CGAP, and 
Citi Foundation. MIX Market provides data on individual MFIs and discloses information of 
about 19,006 institutions classified into five categories according to the degree of reliability of 
information. To maintain the quality of the database, MIX Market adopted a rating system 
based on diamonds from 1 to 5, where more diamonds mean more reliable information.  
Although MIX Market ensures financial transparency of MFIs and helps address key 
challenges faced by investors, such as – the lack of reliable and publicly available information 
on the financial and social performance of MFIs - the platform also relies on MFIs to provide 
information to compute relevant variables. If MFIs fail to provide such information, data from 
MIX Market becomes limited for certain variables. For this reason, MIX Market’s data appear 
to be less reliable compared to data collected and verified by a third party, such as a rating 
agency. In this self-reporting database, MFIs submit categories of data to MIX Market which 
closely resembles the mission of the organization. These data are then validated by the MIX 
Market following the Universal Standards for Social Performance created and disseminated by 
the Social Performance Task Force. The data submitted by MFIs are adjusted and accounted 
for “the effects of inflation on the real value of monetary balances” (MIX Market, 2013). 
The rest of the data for this research is assembled from World Development Indicators (WDI), 
World Governance Indicators (WGI) and the international disaster database (EM-DAT). 
Information regarding macroeconomic and financial development factors is obtained from the 
World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank; and data on institutional 
environment is sourced from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), also known as the 
Kaufmann governance indicators. These indicators are based on a broad series of individual 
variables measuring perceptions of governance and are taken from 31 separate data sources. 
Data from natural disasters is obtained from EM-DAT (www.emdat.be). EM-DAT is created 
with the support of World Health Organisation (WHO) and Belgian Government. The database 
compiles data from various sources, including United Nation (UN) agencies, non-
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governmental organisations (NGO), insurance companies, research institutes and press 
agencies from 1900 to present.   
3.2.2 Choices of Sample  
This study collects data on MFIs that meet certain criteria. First of all, MFIs without complete 
MFI-level data are excluded. To address the issue of reliability, only MFIs with four and five 
diamond disclosure ratings on the MIX are included in the study since financial statements of 
these MFIs are certified by the auditors. Financial statements with four diamonds are reviewed 
by audit firms, whereas financial statements with five diamonds are audited by rating agencies. 
The dataset for this study only includes institutions that were founded no later than 2004 and 
have at least four or more performance measure observations through 2007. After merging 
MFI-level data and country-level data for each country and years corresponding to MFIs, MFIs 
that are missing country-level data are removed from the sample.  
These criteria enabled this study to build a sample of 4124 firm–year observations between 
1999 and 2014 (as of 3rd of March 2017). The data that was chosen to conduct this study 
consists of two regions, South Asia and Latin America, with a total of 20 countries. Countries 
that are included in South Asia region are Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Pakistan; 
while countries that are selected in Latin America are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Savador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Peru. Due to the lack of country-level data, MFIs from 
Afghanistan and Africa region are excluded. While we try to include as many MFIs from both 
regions, this is not a representative sample of the MFIs in both regions.   
3.2.2 Estimation Methodology  
Since the sample size of the study is large, there is a need to control for heteroskedasticity. To 
do so, this study uses robust standard errors across multiple observations from the same 
institutions (Wooldridge, 2002). In the case where no heteroskedasticity is present, the robust 
standard errors will turn into conventional ordinary least square standard errors.  
In addition to heteroskedasticity, endogeneity could be a problem when assessing MFIs 
profitability and outreach. Endogeneity may occur as MFIs that are more profitable may have 
adequate resources to increase their customers’ outreach by hiring experienced personnel 
(Quayes, 2012). Besides, the performances of MFIs can be explained by other determinant, 
such as the size of MFIs. Therefore, size of MFIs is then treated as endogenous. This study also 
uses minimal MFI variables as potential endogeneity concerns arise when MFI variables are 
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featured on both right- and left-hand sides. To further minimise the risks of endogeneity, a 
larger set of MFI controls is also used. MFI control variables (except for age and institutional 
type which are dummy variables), size of MFIs and percentage of female borrowers are lagged 
by one year, corresponding to the final date of year t-1. Using lagged MFI size controls eases 
the concerns for endogeneity (Ahlin et al., 2010).  
In order to test for the presence of endogeneity, an initial augment regression test (DWH test) 
is performed by including the residuals of the endogenous right-hand side variable of the base 
model, as a function of all exogenous variables (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). The small 
p-values from the results in tables 3.1 – 3.3 indicate a possibility of endogeneity and the results 
from OLS may not be consistent.  
 
 
Table 3-1 Endogeneity Test: ALB/GNI 
 
Linear regression Number of observation = 3,025
F(11, 3013) = 36.5
Prob > F = 0.000
R-squared = 0.1631
Standard Error = 0.67456
Robust
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
MFIsizelag_residuals 0.04706 0.00848 5.55 0.000 0.03044 0.06369
Age -0.13148 0.10116 -1.3 0.194 -0.32983 0.06687
AgeSq 0.05292 0.02240 2.36 0.018 0.00900 0.09683
Bank 0.07646 0.06099 1.25 0.210 -0.04312 0.19605
NBFI -0.22748 0.04883 -4.66 0.000 -0.32321 -0.13174
CreditUnion 0.01648 0.07616 0.22 0.829 -0.13286 0.16581
NGO -0.17932 0.03911 -4.58 0.000 -0.25600 -0.10263
RuralBank 0.00000 (omitted)
Percentoffemaleborrowers -0.99695 0.08691 -11.47 0.000 -1.16736 -0.82653
Inflation 0.00086 0.00239 0.36 0.721 -0.00384 0.00555
GDPGrowth 0.00388 0.00367 1.06 0.291 -0.00332 0.01107
Personalremittances 0.01930 0.00244 7.91 0.000 0.01452 0.02409
Intercept 1.01257 0.14400 7.03 0.000 0.73022 1.29492
test MFIsizelag residuals 
( 1)  MFIsizelag_res = 0
F(  1,  3013)  = 30.81
Prob > F  =  0.0000
Average Loan Balance per 
Borrower/GNI Per capita
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Table 3-2 Endogeneity Test: Number of Active Borrowers 
 
Table 3-3 Endogeneity Test: Operational Self-Sufficiency 
 
Linear regression Number of observation = 3,026
F(11, 3014) = 624.34
Prob > F = 0.000
R-squared = 0.7573
Standard Error = 0.88035
Robust
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
MFIsizelag_residuals 0.7956 0.01681 47.340 0.000 0.7627 0.8286
Age 0.2299 0.28516 0.810 0.420 -0.3292 0.7891
AgeSq 0.1180 0.06303 1.870 0.061 -0.0055 0.2416
Bank 0.0000 (omitted)
NBFI -1.2285 0.05405 -22.730 0.000 -1.3345 -1.1225
CreditUnion -2.3302 0.05932 -39.280 0.000 -2.4465 -2.2139
NGO -2.5694 0.05237 -49.060 0.000 -2.6720 -2.4667
RuralBank -1.1071 0.08663 -12.780 0.000 -1.2770 -0.9373
Percentoffemaleborrowers 2.0239 0.10147 19.950 0.000 1.8250 2.2229
Inflation 0.0094 0.00596 1.580 0.115 -0.0023 0.0211
GDPGrowth 0.0658 0.00624 10.550 0.000 0.0536 0.0781
Personalremittances -0.0261 0.00274 -9.520 0.000 -0.0314 -0.0207
Intercept 8.0849 0.30952 26.120 0.000 7.4780 8.6918
test MFIsizelag residuals 
( 1)  MFIsizelag_res = 0
F(  1,  3014)  = 2241.02
Prob > F  =    0.0000
Number of Active Borrowers
Linear regression Number of observation = 2,983
F(11, 2971) = 7.43
Prob > F = 0.000
R-squared = 0.0268
Standard Error = 0.40326
Robust
Operational Self Sufficiency Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
MFIsizelag_residuals 0.01685 0.0056102 3.0000 0.003 0.00585 0.02785
Age 0.17907 0.1204971 1.4900 0.137 -0.05719 0.41534
AgeSq -0.02056 0.0262774 -0.7800 0.434 -0.07208 0.03097
Bank -0.00229 0.0414015 -0.0600 0.956 -0.08347 0.07888
NBFI 0.01411 0.0397628 0.3500 0.723 -0.06386 0.09207
CreditUnion -0.02049 0.0425864 -0.4800 0.63 -0.10399 0.06301
NGO -0.04006 0.0382297 -1.0500 0.295 -0.11502 0.03490
RuralBank 0.00000 (omitted)
Percentoffemaleborrowers -0.03594 0.0393238 -0.9100 0.361 -0.11305 0.04116
Inflation -0.00400 0.0018733 -2.1300 0.033 -0.00767 -0.00032
GDPGrowth 0.00767 0.002455 3.1200 0.002 0.00285 0.01248
Personalremittances 0.00147 0.0010328 1.4300 0.153 -0.00055 0.00350
Intercept 0.84382 0.1470819 5.7400 0.000 0.55543 1.13221
test MFIsizelag residuals 
( 1)  MFIsizelag_res = 0.000
F(  1,  2971) = 9.03
Prob > F = 0.0027
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Since endogeneity is detected, this study then proceeds to employ instrumental variables via 
Hausman’s estimation. Instrumental variable (IV) estimation is a two-stages least squares 
(2SLS) estimation process, where endogenous variable MFI Size is estimated with a least-
squares estimator by using valid instrumental variables.  A predicted series will then be 
generated for MFI Size from the first stage. The second stage includes a probability regression 
procedure using the predicted series of MFI Size* to replace MFI Size.  
In order to estimate via two stages least squares, it is then imperative to find an effective 
instrument. The proposed instruments for MFI size are gross loan portfolio and financial 
revenue. Intuitively, larger MFIs, will have larger loan portfolios and better profits. However, 
the instruments must be related to the endogenous variable of interest (Stock and Watson, 
2011). This can be tested in the first stage of the 2SLS by looking at the F statistics for the 
overall regression being greater than 10. As seen in table 3.4, the F statistics for the first stage 
is 31.07 for Average Loan Balance per Borrower/GNI per capita dependent variable, 30.76 for 
Number of Active Borrowers and Operational Self-Sufficiency.  
 
 
Table 3-4 F statistics: First Stage Regression 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIRST STAGE ALB/GNI NAB OSS
R-Sq 0.5049 0.5064 0.5064
Adjusted R-Sq 0.5022 0.5034 0.5034
Partial R-Sq 0.1673 0.1653 0.1653
F Statistics 31.0591 30.7563 30.7563
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 2,157     2,156    2,156    
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3.3 Models and Variables  
Using two-stage least squares, this study investigates how key macroeconomic factors and 
institutional environment influence the performance of MFIs in South Asia and Latin America.  
This subsection looks at the description of models and variables. Based on the literature review, 
the following equations are derived:  
3.3.1 Models One and Two  
Models one and two estimate the interaction between the performance of MFIs against 
institutional environment and macroeconomic factors that influence the intended outcomes of 
the institution, controlling for the size, legal type and age of each MFI. The omitted control 
variables for these two models are dummy region and fiscal year, which will be added in model 
three. Model one and two are used to separately test the effect of institutional environment on 
MFIs in South Asia and Latin America.  
Based on the discussion of literature review, we derive the following regression equations. 
First Stage  
  
where  
 = Gross Loan Portfolio for MFIs for country j at time t -1 
 = Financial Revenue for MFIs for country j at time t-1 
 = Personnel Expense for MFIs for country j at time t-1 
= error term  
 
Second Stage 
 
where  
 = a set of performance measures for MFI i in country j at time t  
= economic sector for the country j at time t  
= a set of institutional environment control variables for country j at time t  
= a set of macroeconomic control variables for the country j at time t  
= a set of microfinance institution specific variables for country j at time t -1 
= number of natural disasters that occur for the country j at time t  
= unemployment rate for the country j at time t 
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= unemployment square is added as the effect of unemployment is expected to diminish after a certain 
level  
 = error term 
 
Model Three  
This model looks at the potential regional effect over the years on the performance of MFIs by 
adding the interaction terms of fiscal year and region. 
 
where  
= dummy for region (0 – South Asia, 1– Latin America)  
= fiscal year for MFI i in country j at time t 
= interaction variable for region and year 
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3.4 Definitions and Measurements of Variables  
3.4.1 Dependent Variables  
The dependent variables for all three models measure the efficiency of microfinance 
operations. Although numerous rating institutions and performance rating methods have been 
used to analyse the performance of MFIs, there is no universal agreement. The assessment of 
MFI’s performance has traditionally been made by Yaron (1994) under the framework of 
sustainability and outreach. Yaron addresses the issue of traditional ratios in the context of 
microfinance industry and proposes an alternative framework that uses self-sustainability and 
outreach as two primary assessment criteria. As MFIs are compelled to achieve double bottom 
lines – reaching the poor and covering operating costs to reduce dependence on subsidies – it 
then makes sense to divide the performance measure into two dimensions - social and financial 
performances.  
Social performance is defined as “the effective translation of an institution's social goals into 
practice in line with accepted social values; these include sustainably serving increasing 
numbers of poor and excluded people, improving the quality and relevance of financial 
services, improving the economic and social conditions of clients, and ensuring social 
responsibility to clients, employees and the community they serve” (CGAP, 2007). As 
discussed in the previous chapter, outreach is divided into two parts – depth and breadth of 
outreach. In terms of breadth of outreach, natural logarithm of the number of active clients 
served by MFI clients (ln NAB) is used. It is widely considered that the total number of 
borrowers an MFI has over time gives a good indication of that MFI’s outreach.  On the other 
hand, depth of outreach is often associated with the ‘quality’ of an MFI’s outreach. To assess 
the depth of MFI’s outreach across both regions, this paper looks at average loan balance per 
gross national income per capita (ALB/GNI). ALB/GNI is widely used as the proxy for 
outreach in many microfinance studies (see Bhatt and Tang, 2001; Hermes et al., 2011; 
Mersland and Strøm, 2008; Schreiner, 2002); the higher values of this variable indicate a 
scaling up of operations of the organization while reaching to fewer poor clients. It is often 
argued that smaller loan size is consistent with poor borrowers’ loan demand whereas larger 
loan size implies less depth of outreach (Hermes et al., 2011).  
Financial performance is used to measure the success of MFI in terms of its financial returns. 
This measurement is often used as a benchmark by investors to conduct due diligence (CGAP, 
2007). Financial performance in microfinance sector also carries the definition of “pricing 
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financial services so that their costs are covered and they do not disappear when donors or 
governments are no longer willing or able to subsidize them” (Helms, 2006). Financial 
performance is captured in terms of operational self-sufficiency and return on assets (Hartarska, 
2005; Mersland and Øystein Strøm, 2009; Mersland and Strøm, 2008; Vanroose and 
D’Espallier, 2013). These variables have been widely used in the literature and serve as a gauge 
for the financial health of the microfinance organizations.  
 
3.4.2 Independent Variables  
The independent variables in this study are divided into three blocks – institutional, 
macroeconomic and MFI related variables.  
Institutional environment variables 
As this study explores the effects of country specific institutions on the performance of MFIs, 
it is then imperative to demonstrate how institutional measures are categorized, which is 
important when interpreting the empirical results. There are numerous measures of governance 
in the literature – objective and subjective measures. Objective measure is based on statistical 
data on the effects of institutions, while subjective measures look at people’s opinions on 
institutions and are evaluated via surveys which is then aggregated into quantitative index. This 
study uses subjective measure, as the investigations of Kauffman et al. (2009) demonstrate that 
perceptions matter since people act on their perceptions and views. If the general population 
believes that judiciary system and courts are ineffective and inefficient, and the government 
services are corrupted, people are unlikely to benefit from the services. Similarly, businesses 
including microenterprises will operate according to their perception of the business climate 
and the local government’s facilities.  
The governance indices developed by Kaufmann et al. (2009) is used to measure institutional 
environment for the periods of 1999 – 2014. These variables are further divided into three 
clusters. These clusters are (1) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and 
replaced; (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound 
policies; and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic 
and social interactions among them (Kaufmann et al., 2009). Two measurements are 
constructed corresponding to each of these clusters, leading to a total of six variables. The six 
variables are Political Stability (PS), Voice and Accountability (VA), Government 
Effectiveness (GE), Regulatory Quality (RQ), Control of Corruption (CoC), Rule of Law (RL). 
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(1) The process by which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced: 
Political Stability (PS) Political stability captures the perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional means, including politically 
motivated violence and terrorism.    
Voice and Accountability (VA) Voice and Accountability measures the perceptions of free 
and fair government elections, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and free media.  
 
(2) The capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies: 
Government Effectiveness (GE) Government effectiveness measures the perceptions of 
individuals regarding the quality of public services, civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government. This measurement focuses on the perceptions with 
regards to the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies as well as 
developing the private sector.  
Regulatory Quality (RQ). Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development.  
 
(3) The respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social 
interactions among them: 
Control of Corruption (CoC). Control of corruption is measured as perceptions regarding the 
extent to which the public power is exercised for private gain. A country with well-developed 
regulatory system to control corruption may also lead to difficulty in doing business for micro-
enterprises.  
Rule of Law (RL). Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in abiding by the rules of society, especially from the point of view of criminal and 
commercial justice systems, such as quality of contract enforcement and property rights.  
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Macroeconomic variables 
Literature has shown that broad economy affects poverty, which can then affect the performance of 
MFIs. Therefore, this study also measures the microfinance mission fulfilment with country-level 
economic development indicators such as inflation, consumer prices (annual %), GDP growth, personal 
remittances and unemployment. Three economic sectors – agriculture, manufacture and services sectors 
(value added as a percentage of GDP) are also included to examine the effect of these sectors on 
microfinance industry. Other than natural disaster and unemployment, the rest of the macroeconomic 
variables have been proven to affect the performance of MFIs in the studies of Ahlin et al. (2010); 
Hartarska (2005); Van Maanen (2004); Vanroose and D’Espallier (2013).  
MFI-specific variables 
MFI-specific variables that are included in this study are age, MFI size, percentage of female 
borrowers and legal type of the institutions. Similar variables are commonly used in other 
empirical studies that investigated the performance of MFIs. To control for the effect of legal 
type and age of institutions, dummy variables are used.    
Age of Institution. This variable measures the maturity of the MFI and is divided into three 
categories - new, young and old. Age accounts for the years MFIs have operated in the market 
and can affect the loan sizes offered by MFIs (Christen and Pearce, 2005; Dunford, 2001; 
Jansson and Taborga, 2000). However, different loan sizes may be a choice of strategy and 
larger loan size may be a ‘deliberate strategy followed by older and more established MFIs’ 
(Christen, 2001). In this study, MFI’s age is used as a control for this time effect. New MFIs 
are organisations that just entered the market within 1 -2 years, young MFIs are MFIs that have 
operated for 3 - 6 years and mature MFIs are those that have been around for more than 7 years.  
Type of Institution. MFIs with different operating structure perform differently. Lansink et al. 
(2001) suggest that institutionalist MFIs perform better financially because non bank financial 
institutions (NBFI) and banks offer larger loans to richer clients. However, Gutierrez-Nieto et 
al. (2007) find NGOs perform more efficiently as these institutions try to make a large number 
of loans and operate as cheaply as possible. Dummy variables are used to control for the legal 
types of institutions. Table 3.5 outlines the different legal types defined by MIX Market. MFIs 
are then categorised under institutionalist and welfarist in accordance with the definitions 
provided to identify the operating mission of the organizations. Commercialised MFIs, such as 
Banks, Rural Banks and NBFI are classified under the institutionalist umbrella whereas Non-
Government Organisations (NGO) and Credit Union/Cooperatives are classified under 
welfarist organisations. The idea behind categorising institutionalist or welfarist gives an 
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overview of the MFI’s emphasis; whether the targeted demographic is core poor or 
entrepreneurial poor. As there is no single variable that captures the MFI’s mission, we deploy 
the definitions of institutionalist and welfarist as a proxy for this. Dividing the MFIs into two 
categories also allows for further examination on the effect of institutional environment in the 
empirical analysis. 
       
Table 3-5 Definitions of Microfinance Institutions, adapted from MIX Market Glossary  
 
Percentage of Female Borrowers. There is a widely held view that female participation has a 
positive effect on MFI performance in recent literature (Akula, 2008; Letelier et al., 2003; 
Yunus, 2007). Although there have been attempts to address how female participation can 
influence MFI performance, their numbers are still limited (D’Espallier et al., 2011a). 
Therefore, this variable is also included to investigate the effect of female borrowers on the 
performance of MFIs.  
MFI Assets. The size of microfinance institutions is measured via total assets. As MFIs in this 
sample are fairly large, natural logarithm of total assets is used to minimise the skewness. In 
addition, to minimise potential endogeneity, this variable is lagged by 1 year (t-1). 
 
Legal Type Definition 
Bank
Rural Bank
Non Bank Financial Institution (NBFI)
Credit Union/Cooperative
Non Government Organization (NGO)
Definitions of MFIs 
A non profit, member-based financial intermediary. It may offer a range of 
financial services, including lending and deposit taking, for the benefit of its 
members. While not regulated by a state banking supervisory agency, it may 
come under the supervision of regional or national cooperative council.
In
st
it
u
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o
n
a
l 
o
rg
a
n
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a
ti
o
n
s
An organization registered as a nonprofit for tax purposes or some other legal 
charter. Its financial services are usually more restricted, usually not including 
deposit taking. These institutions are typically not regulated by a banking 
supervisory agency.
Organization whose services are not encapsulated by the definitions of other 
charter types, as classified by the MFI when data are submitted.
OthersW
el
fa
ri
st
 o
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
s 
A licensed financial intermediary regulated by a state banking supervisory 
agency. It may provide any of a number of financial services, such as deposit 
taking, lending, payment services, and money transfers.
Banking institution that targets clients who live and work in non-urban areas 
and who are generally involved in agricultural-related activities.
An institution that provides similar services to those of a Bank, but is licensed 
under a separate category. The separate license may be due to lower capital 
requirements, to limitations on financial service offerings, or to supervision 
under a different state agency. In some countries this corresponds to a special 
category created for microfinance institutions.
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Variables 
 
Definition 
 
Source 
of 
Data 
Dependent Variables 
 
MFI Performance measures 
Average loan balance per 
borrower/GNI per capita 
 
Number of Active Borrowers 
 
 
 
 
Operational Self-Sufficiency 
 
 
 
Return on Assets 
 
 
 
Average Loan Balance per Borrower/ GNI per Capita (%) 
 
 
The number of individuals or entities who currently have an outstanding loan balance with the MFI or 
are primarily responsible for repaying any portion of the Loan Portfolio, Gross. Individuals who have 
multiple loans with an MFI should be counted as a single borrower. 
 
 
                              Financial Revenue___________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
(Financial Expenses + Provision for Loan Losses + Operating Expenses) 
 
 
Net profits after taxes/Assets 
 
 
 
 
MIX 
 
 
MIX 
 
 
 
MIX 
 
 
MIX 
Independent Variables  
 
MFI-related Variables  
 
Age  
 
Age Squared  
 
MFI Size  
 
Legal Status  
 
Percentage of Female 
Borrowers 
 
Region 
 
 
Institutional Environment 
Variables  
 
Rule of Law (RL) 
 
 
 Control of Corruption (CoC) 
 
 
 
Political Stability (PS) 
 
 
 
 
Voice and Accountability 
(VA) 
 
 
 
Government Effectiveness 
(GE) 
 
 
Regulatory Quality (RQ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age of the respective MFI  
 
Age of the respective MFI, squared  
 
Log of total assets (t-1) 
 
Dummies of the following variables: Bank, Rural Banks, Credit Union/Cooperative; NGO and NBFI 
 
The ratio of the number of active female borrowers to the total number of active borrowers (%) 
 
 
Latin America, South Asia 
 
 
 
 
 
Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
Captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests. 
 
 
Captures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilised or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism 
 
 
 
Captures perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media 
 
 
 
Captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of 
its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.  
 
Captures perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MIX 
 
MIX 
 
MIX 
 
MIX 
 
MIX 
 
 
MIX 
 
 
 
 
 
WGI 
 
 
WGI 
 
 
 
WGI 
 
 
 
 
WGI 
 
 
 
 
WGI 
 
 
 
WGI 
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Variables 
 
Definition 
 
Source 
of 
Data 
Macroeconomic Variables 
 
Inflation, consumer prices 
(annual %) 
 
 
 
GDP Growth (annual %) 
 
 
Personal Remittances   
 
 
Unemployment  
 
 
Agriculture, value added (% of 
GDP) 
 
 
Manufacture, value added (% 
of GDP)  
 
 
 
Services, value added (% of 
GDP) 
 
 
 
 
Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to 
the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at 
specified interval. 
 
 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency 
 
 
Workers' remittances and compensation of employees comprise current transfers by migrant workers 
and wages and salaries earned by non-resident workers. 
 
Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking 
employment. 
 
Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as 
cultivation of crops and livestock production. 
 
 
Manufacturing refers to industries belonging to ISIC divisions 15-37. Value added is the net output of 
a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
 
 
Services correspond to ISIC divisions 50-99 and they include value added in wholesale and retail trade 
(including hotels and restaurants), transport, and government, financial, professional, and personal 
services such as education, health care, and real estate services. 
WDI 
 
 
 
 
WDI 
 
 
WDI 
 
 
WDI 
 
 
WDI 
 
 
 
WDI 
 
 
 
 
WDI 
 
Table 3-6 Variables and Definitions 
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3.5 Overview of Data 
Tables 3.7 - 3.9 present the summary of the MFIs for this study. The dataset consists of 20 countries 
and 4,124 observations of MFIs. A further breakdown of the data indicates that it is made up of 494 
Banks, 552 credit unions, 1,314 NBFIs, 1,688 NGOs and 76 rural banks. The majority of the MFIs 
(about 76% which amounts to 3,139 MFIs) in this sample fall under the mature category, while 15% 
(633 MFIs) are young MFIs and the rest are new MFIs. Amongst the sample, 1,884 MFIs are categorised 
under the umbrella of institutionalist (494 banks, 1,314 NBFIs, 76 rural banks) and the remaining 2,240 
MFIs are categorised under welfarist (552 credit unions, 1,688 NGOs). 
Country Observations of MFIs  Percentage 
Argentina 115 2.79 
Bangladesh 106 2.57 
Bolivia 195 4.73 
Brazil 165 4 
Colombia 272 6.6 
Costa Rica 135 3.27 
Dominican Republic 101 2.45 
Ecuador 513 12.44 
El Salvador 147 3.56 
Guatemala 125 3.03 
Honduras 170 4.12 
India 95 2.3 
Mexico 485 11.76 
Nepal 254 6.16 
Nicaragua 204 4.95 
Pakistan 161 3.9 
Panama 47 1.14 
Paraguay 74 1.79 
Peru 645 15.64 
Sri Lanka 115 2.79 
Total 4,124 100 
Table 3-7 Observations of MFIs in each country 
 
Current Legal Status Frequency Percent 
Bank 494 11.98 
Credit Union / Cooperative 552 13.39 
NBFI 1,314 31.86 
NGO 1,688 40.93 
Rural Bank 76 1.84 
Total 4124 100 
Table 3-8 Breakdown of MFI Legal Status 
 
Age No. of MFIs Cumulative Percentage 
New 352 8.54 
Young  633 15.35 
Mature 3,139 76.12 
Total 4,124 100 
Table 3-9 Breakdown of MFIs’ maturity 
  
47 
 
3.6 Descriptive Statistics  
Tables 3.10 and 3.11 display the descriptive statistics for this study and include MFI-specific, 
macroeconomic and institutional environment variables for both South Asia and Latin 
America. When descriptive statistics are broken down into regions, some interesting 
differences can be observed. Despite findings from various studies suggest that Asian MFIs 
lead the world in terms of breadth (number of borrowers) and depth (relative poverty of 
borrowers) of outreach (Weiss and Montgomery, 2005), the descriptive statistics of this sample 
reveal that MFI borrowers in both South Asia and Latin America do not belong to the poorest 
segment of the population. However, MFIs in South Asia still have lower average loan balance 
per borrower, even after adjusting for GNI per capita.  
The mean of ALB/GNI is 0.331 in South Asia and 0.437 in Latin America, revealing that MFIs 
in Latin America are serving richer clients, in line with the findings of Rutherford (2003). An 
average outstanding loan balance per borrower below 20% of GNI per capita is a rough 
indicator of very poor clients (CGAP, 2007). The MIX market database only includes counts 
lenders as MFIs if their average outstanding loan balance is not above 250 percent of per capita 
GNI.  
Next we look at MFIs’ average operating period. The average age of MFI is 2.62 in South Asia 
and 2.69 in Latin America, indicating that MFIs in Latin America are slightly more mature. As 
discussed earlier, age is measured via dummy variable, where age 1 captures new MFIs that 
are in the market for about 1 - 2 years, age 2 captures young MFIs that are in the market for 3 
to 6 years and Age 3 are mature MFIs that have been in the market for more than 7 years.   
Despite having the oldest MFIs on average in this sample, Latin America has a lesser number 
of active borrowers (42,973 borrowers) compared to South Asia (244,810 borrowers). This is 
noteworthy as the number of borrowers in South Asia is 6 times higher even though there are 
a higher number of MFIs in Latin America in this sample. However, this figure is heavily 
skewed as several MFIs in South Asia have very large number of borrowers. Therefore, for the 
purpose of the regression analysis, the natural logarithm of total borrowers (Ln NAB) is used.  
 
Overall, the summary statistics suggests that MFIs in South Asia are outperforming MFIs in 
Latin America in terms of outreach. On the other hand, MFIs in Latin America perform better 
financially. The results for operational self-sufficiency (OSS) show that MFIs in this sample 
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are self-sustainable, with mean of OSS being 1.115 in South Asia and 1.133 in Latin America. 
OSS is the ratio of financial revenue to annual total expense, which equals to financial expense 
plus loan loss provision expense plus operating expense. A ratio greater than 1 indicates that 
the MFI has sufficient revenue to cover its cost. The results from descriptive statistics further 
reveal that MFIs in both regions fulfil the dual objectives of reaching the poor and self-
sustainability.  
The descriptive statistics allows for categorisation of MFIs via their legal status. In South Asia, 
46% of the MFIs are formed by NGOs, 26% by Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFI), 10% 
of the MFIs by rural banks, 8% by credit unions and 10% are created by traditional banks. 
Similar to South Asia, the majority of the MFIs in Latin America are also established by NGOs, 
forming about 40% of the Latin American sample size. This is then followed by NBFI (34%), 
credit unions (14.5%), and banks (12%). An interesting observation is that there is no rural 
bank in Latin America, which reaffirms our literature findings on the Latin American 
microfinance industry concentrating in the urban areas - an indication that MFIs in Latin 
America serve more entrepreneurial poor. However, the absence of MFI rural banks may also 
be caused by the lack of focus on agriculture in the Latin America region, as seen by the low 
GDP contribution by agricultural sector.  
As for macroeconomic variables, the descriptive statistics further indicates that the countries 
in South Asia are experiencing higher economic growth and higher inflation rate, but lower 
unemployment rate. South Asia also has a higher inflow of personal remittance. Natural 
disasters occur more frequently in South Asia, with an average of 6 occurrences per year 
compared to an average of 4 occurrences per year in Latin America. In South Asia, services 
sector is the major contributor in the economy, followed by agriculture and manufacturing 
sectors. Similarly, in Latin America, services and manufacturing sectors are the main 
contributors of the GDP in the region.  
For institutional environment variables, the descriptive statistics reveal that both South Asia 
and Latin America suffer from weak institutions. In South Asia, rule of law and political 
instability affect the region more severely; while countries in Latin America suffer from 
political instability and corruption. 
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Table 3-10 Descriptive Statistics – South Asia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOUTH ASIA Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MFI Specific Variables      
Average Loan Balance per 
Borrower/GNI per capita 
701 0.331 0.657 0.000 9.901 
Number of Active Borrowers 711 244,809.80 824,994.70 
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6,610,000 
Ln Number of Active Borrowers 711 10.207 2.053 3.664 15.704 
Operational Self Sufficiency 704 1.115 0.755 -0.098 18.437 
Return on Asset 637 -0.008 0.119 -1.291 0.210 
Portfolio at risk > 30 days  628 0.068 0.131 0.000 0.995 
MFI Size t-1 (Ln Asset) 609 15.402 1.998 9.248 21.262 
Age 734 2.624 0.677 1.000 3.000 
Age Squared 734 7.343 2.869 1.000 9.000 
Percentage of Female Borrowers 648 0.824 0.272 0.000 1.041 
Personnel Expense 504 0.130 0.295 0.009 4.311 
Bank 734 0.102 0.303 0.000 1.000 
CreditUnion 734 0.083 0.276 0.000 1.000 
NBFI 734 0.255 0.436 0.000 1.000 
NGO 734 0.456 0.498 0.000 1.000 
Rural Bank 734 0.104 0.305 0.000 1.000 
            
Macroeonomic Variables           
Inflation 734 9.004 4.156 2.208 22.565 
Gross National Income per Capita 734 3507.711 2086.453 1150 10960 
Gross Domestic Product Growth 734 5.054 2.061 0.120 10.260 
Personal Remittances 734 10.306 6.991 1.658 28.818 
Unemployment  734 4.222 1.600 1.800 8.900 
Unemployment Squared 734 20.377 15.281 3.240 79.210 
Natural Disaster 734 6.431 5.991 1.000 31.000 
Agriculture 656 26.094 8.414 7.992 41.292 
Manufacture 656 12.633 4.405 6.450 20.859 
Services 656 51.725 4.254 36.899 60.859 
            
Institutional Environment Variables           
Political Stability 731 -1.690 0.544 -2.806 -0.332 
Voice and Accountability  731 -0.526 0.448 -1.228 0.428 
Government Effectivness 731 -0.569 0.307 -0.982 0.089 
Regulatory Quality 731 -0.556 0.239 -1.030 0.248 
Control of Corruption 731 -0.717 0.310 -1.409 -0.096 
Rule of Law 731 -0.582 0.409 -1.025 0.324 
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LATIN AMERICA Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
            
MFI Specific Variables           
Average Loan Balance per 
Borrower/GNI per capita 3,299 0.437 0.805 0.000 18.875 
Number of Active Borrowers 3,320 42972.750 145370 0.000 2573961 
Ln Number of Active Borrowers 3,319 9.096 1.726 0.693 14.761 
Operational Self Sufficiency 3,122 1.133 0.979 -47.845 8.339 
Return on Asset 2,901 0.010 0.135 -2.137 0.529 
Portfolio at risk > 30 days  3,003 0.065 0.078 0.000 1.000 
MFI Size t-1 (Ln Asset) 2,972 15.962 1.977 8.251 22.446 
Age 3,396 2.686 0.613 1.000 3.000 
Age Squared 3,396 7.591 2.643 1.000 9.000 
Percentage of Female Borrowers 2,723 0.627 0.213 0.000 1.000 
Personnel Expense 2,480 0.167 0.169 0.000 1.914 
Bank 3,396 0.123 0.329 0.000 1.000 
CreditUnion 3,396 0.145 0.352 0.000 1.000 
NBFI 3,396 0.333 0.471 0.000 1.000 
NGO 3,396 0.399 0.490 0.000 1.000 
RuralBank 3,396 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
            
Macroeonomic Variables           
Inflation 3,393 5.879 7.369 0.183 96.094 
Gross National Income per Capita 3,396 9105.562 3986.508 2520 19850 
Gross Domestic Product Growth 3,396 4.132 2.871 -10.894 14.036 
Personal Remittances 3,396 4.632 4.853 0.095 21.557 
Unemployment  3,396 6.455 3.105 1.300 20.100 
Unemployment Squared 3,396 51.298 55.222 1.690 404.010 
Natural Disaster 3,396 3.709 2.522 0.000 12.000 
Agriculture 3,394 9.174 4.270 3.133 23.545 
Manufacture 3,379 16.509 2.675 6.104 26.718 
Services 3,394 57.990 5.333 44.401 75.441 
            
Institutional Environment Variables           
Political Stability 3,263 -0.614 0.507 -2.386 0.983 
Voice and Accountability  3,263 -0.002 0.316 -0.653 1.133 
Government Effectiveness 3,263 -0.327 0.388 -1.170 0.499 
Regulatory Quality 3,263 -0.096 0.536 -1.279 0.609 
Control of Corruption 3,263 -0.448 0.333 -1.444 0.761 
Rule of Law 3,263 -0.664 0.349 -1.253 0.642 
Table 3-11 Descriptive Statistics – Latin America 
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3.7 Correlations table  
Table 3.12 reports the correlations between the key variables. The correlation coefficient 
matrix verifies that the links between all variables are neither too strong nor unbalanced. Panel 
A displays the correlation between MFI performance variables in terms of outreach and 
financial performance. The correlation shows no signs of mission drift in this sample size. 
Mission drift occurs when an MFI leaves the poorest segment for richer clients (Woller, 2002; 
Woller and Woodworth, 2001). The negative relationship between depth of outreach 
(ALB/GNI) and breadth of outreach (number of active borrowers) reveals that MFIs see a 
reduction in loan size as number of borrowers increase, indicating that MFIs in this sample size 
are reaching out to the core poor.  
The positive correlation between average loan balance per borrower/gross national income per 
capita (ALB/GNI), operational self-sufficiency (OSS) and return on assets (ROA), discloses 
that MFIs are more profitable when they give out larger loan sizes, a sign of potential trade-off 
between sustainability and outreach. It seems that in the attainment of financial sustainability, 
MFIs make deliberate choices as to which segment of the poor population to target. This results 
support the mission drift evidence from previous studies (see Cull et al., 2009; Quayes, 2012). 
As pointed out by Conning (1999), MFIs that focus on the 'lower end' of the market segment 
of the poor are less profitable and may not be sustainable. The correlation matrix of this study 
supports this proposition, suggesting that MFIs that strive to reach the relatively poor do so at 
the expense of reaching a large number of poor borrowers with financial services. Similarly, 
studies by Morduch (2000) and Cull et al. (2007) also find trade-off between MFIs outreach 
and profitability – MFIs that reach out to clients below poverty line suffer from higher lending 
costs, resulting in lower profitability. The correlation matrix also shows that there is a weak 
positive relationship between number of active borrowers, operating self-sufficiency and return 
on assets, suggesting that MFIs that reach more borrowers are slightly more profitable.  
Correlations between MFI variables are presented in Panel B. With the exception of number of 
active borrowers, which is significantly correlated with MFI size (0.7695), all other pairwise 
correlations between the regressors are weaker. Profitability measures (OSS, ROA) are 
significantly positively correlated, but not perfect, at 0.549. Interestingly, MFI size and all four 
performance measures are positively correlated with age, which is an indication that profitable 
MFIs tend to be larger and older. However, age and size of MFIs are negatively correlated with 
percentage of female borrowers, this means older and larger MFIs in this sample give out lesser 
loans to female borrowers. To detect potential multicollinearity between variables, correlations 
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must be at least 0.8 (Kennedy, 2008), therefore, we can rule out problems with 
multicollinearity. In addition, we compute the variation inflation factor (VIF) for all the MFI 
variables (excluding quadratic variables – age squared) and since none of them have a VIF 
greater than 4, we rule out any problem that arises from multicollinearity.  
Panel C reports the relationship between MFI performance measures and macroeconomic 
variables. There is no significant correlation between MFI variables and macroeconomic 
variables, except for agriculture which is significantly correlated with personal remittance (at 
0.6405). The computation of variation inflation factor for all the macroeconomic variables 
(excluding quadratic variables – unemployment squared) and MFI variables discloses that none 
of the variables have a VIF greater than 4, so multicollinearity is ruled out. The correlations 
between MFI performance variables and institutional environment variables are shown in Panel 
D. No significant bivariate correlations are detected between the institutional environment 
variables and MFI performance variables.  
Having summarised the descriptive statistics and correlations between variables, the next three 
chapters explores the relationship between various factors and MFI performance. In what 
follows, we employ a regression analysis with ten models to examine all four hypotheses in 
each chapter, with four different dependent variables each of which capture the performance 
of microfinance institutions. The first model is the baseline model and subsequent models are 
formed by adding a different variable that captures the effect of external environment.  
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Panel A: Correlations between MFI Performance Variables 
  
ALB/GNI NAB OSS ROA PAR > 
30 days   
ALB/GNI 1.000         
NAB -0.104 1.000 
   OSS 0.025 0.054 1.000 
  ROA 0.022 0.196 0.549 1.000 
 PAR > 30 days 0.023 -0.076 -0.099 -0.134 1.000 
 
Panel B: Correlations between MFI Variables 
       
  
ALBGNI NAB OSS ROA 
PAR > 
30 days 
MFISize(t-1) Age 
Age 
Squared 
PercFemBorr PersonnelExpense 
  
ALB/GNI 1                   
NAB -0.1042 1 
        OSS 0.0247 0.054 1 
       ROA 0.0221 0.1962 0.549 1 
      PAR > 30 days 0.0234 -0.076 -0.099 -0.134 1 
     
MFISize(t-1) 0.1939 0.7695 0.0738 0.2071 0.0043 1 
    Age 0.0678 0.1963 0.0432 0.2535 0.0553 0.2349 1 
   Age Squared 0.0716 0.1927 0.0428 0.238 0.0526 0.2367 0.9929 1 
  PercFemBorr -0.2992 0.196 -0.009 0.0013 -0.1158 -0.2199 -0.02 -0.0244 1 
 PersonnelExpense -0.1302 -0.189 -0.286 -0.504 0.0028 -0.3175 -0.265 -0.2582 0.1323 1 
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Table 3-12 Correlations table
 
Panel C: Correlations between MFI Performance Variables and Macroeconomic Variables 
       
  
ALB/GNI NAB OSS ROA 
PAR > 30 
days 
Inflation 
GNI per 
capita 
GDP 
Growth 
Personal 
Remittance 
Unemplymmt 
Unemplymmt 
Squared 
Natural 
Disasters 
Agriculture Manufacture Services 
  
ALB/GNI 1                             
NAB -0.1042 1 
             OSS 0.0247 0.054 1 
            ROA 0.0221 0.1962 0.549 1 
           PAR > 30 days 0.0234 -0.076 -0.099 -0.134 1 
          Inflation 0.0107 -0.064 -0.03 -0.077 -0.0133 1 
         
GNI per capita -0.154 -0.133 -0.069 -0.075 -0.0299 -0.1786 1 
        GDP Growth 0.0191 0.1058 0.028 -0.008 -0.0486 -0.0889 -0.095 1 
       Personal Remittance 0.0744 -0.024 0.018 0.0379 0.02 0.1372 -0.594 -0.0686 1 
      Unemplymmt -0.0596 -0.119 -0.02 -0.06 -0.0071 0.1186 0.1618 -0.1027 -0.2638 1 
     
Unemplymmt Squared -0.0606 -0.09 -0.011 -0.051 -0.0213 0.1301 0.1064 -0.0996 -0.184 0.9653 1 
    Natural Disasters -0.148 0.2601 0.0116 0.0081 0.0151 0.0001 0.0643 -0.0039 -0.1918 -0.1043 -0.0827 1 
   Agriculture 0.1188 0.0877 0.0097 -0.014 -0.0077 0.2322 -0.765 0.0268 0.6405 -0.289 -0.2152 -0.0127 1 
  Manufacture -0.1385 -0.041 -0.035 -0.084 0.0911 0.0341 0.2009 -0.0221 -0.1403 0.1476 0.1153 0.0244 -0.5529 1 
 
Services -0.1056 -0.213 -0.042 -0.022 0.0556 -0.1141 0.5902 -0.232 -0.2689 0.3738 0.3068 0.0093 -0.6119 0.314 1 
 
Panel D: Correlations between MFI Performance and Institutional Environment Variables 
   
  
ALB/GNI NAB OSS ROA 
PAR > 
30 days 
PS VA GE RQ CoC RL 
  
ALB/GNI 1 
          NAB -0.1042 1 
         OSS 0.0247 0.054 1 
        ROA 0.0221 0.1962 0.549 1 
       PAR > 30 days 0.0234 -0.076 -0.099 -0.134 1 
      PS 0.0655 -0.275 -0.015 0.0014 0.0225 1 
     VA -0.0061 -0.136 -0.013 -0.015 0.019 0.7009 1 
    GE -0.1167 -0.04 -0.032 -0.054 0.027 0.293 0.6527 1 
   RQ -0.0804 0.0201 0.0149 0.061 0.0649 0.2096 0.5189 0.7349 1 
  CoC -0.0016 -0.195 -0.005 0.0137 0.0252 0.3702 0.7129 0.7035 0.6718 1 
 RL -0.0342 -0.054 -0.018 -0.023 0.0661 0.2519 0.6155 0.6723 0.5778 0.7116 1 
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Chapter 4 : Empirical Analysis – South Asia  
Having summarised the descriptive statistics, the aim of this chapter is to discuss the extent to 
which South Asian microfinance institutions depend on the governance of the host country. To 
reiterate, the main research question for this study is: Given the differences in the microfinance 
industry between South Asia and Latin America, what are the impacts of institutional 
environment on the performance of MFIs? The ongoing debate amongst scholars on the 
existing “schism” between the traditional mission and the operational objectives of the 
microfinance institutions also encouraged this study to investigate the effect of institutions 
from the perspective of welfarist and institutionalist organisations.  
The regression results reveal that institutional environment matters for the performance of 
MFIs in South Asia. Political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of 
corruption and rule of law are quantitatively strong predictors for the performance of South 
Asian microfinance industry. Overall, MFIs in this region perform better financially in a 
volatile environment where there is higher demand for larger loans and as a result MFIs are 
more profitable.  
4.1 Empirical Analysis and Discussions of Findings  
 
Before analysing the results, it is important to examine the strengths of instrument variables 
and the degree of correlation between additional instruments, namely financial revenue, gross 
loan portfolio and personnel expense and the endogenous regressor, MFI Size. 
 
To understand the results, recall that the first stage regression is  
𝑀𝐹𝐼 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒∗ = 𝛾 +  δa(𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +  𝜌𝑏(𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +
 𝜇𝑐(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡        
where 𝜃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the error term. 
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Table 4-1 First Stage Regression Summary Statistics 
 
The relatively high R2 statistics indicate that it is unlikely for this study to have weak-
instrument problems. The F statistics of 24.83 is above the often-used threshold of 10 (Stock 
and Yogo, 2005). Since this study uses 2 stage least squares estimator, we then look at the 
critical value of 2SLS size of nominal 5% Wald test. As this study is willing to accept at most 
a rejection rate of 10% of a nominal 5% Wald test, the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
weak is rejected because the test statistics of 45.06 exceeds its critical value of 22.3. Therefore, 
on the basis of these tests, this study does not have a weak instrument problem. Further, the 
minimum eigenvalue statistic is higher the F-statistics, reaffirming that the instruments used 
are not weak. 
Moving on to the overall statistics, the estimated equations appear to fit the 2SLS reasonably 
well, as indicated by the R-squared values which have fairly stable coefficients amongst the 
alternate models. To allow for comparison, ten models are reported in tables that include results 
for institutional environment variables, with 1st model as the baseline model with all control 
variables. A comparison of the 2nd and 3rd model makes it possible to distinguish the non-linear 
effects for unemployment rate, while subsequent models allow for the inclusion of 
macroeconomic and institutional environment variables. The Wald Chi-Squared test for the 
regressions indicates that the relationship between all models and their response variables are 
statistically significant. Since the P-value for the Wald Chi-Squared is less than the significance 
level, the null hypotheses are then rejected and it can be concluded that the equations of this 
study provides a better fit than the null hypotheses. The overall explanatory power, as measured 
First-stage regression summary statistics
Adjusted Partial Robust
Variable R-sq. R-sq. R-sq. F(3,246) Prob > F
MFIsizelag 0.4994 0.473 0.3547 24.8283 0.000
Minimum eigenvalue statistic = 45.0629    
Critical Values # of endogenous regressors: 1
Ho: Instruments are weak # of excluded instruments: 3
5% 10% 20% 30%
2SLS relative bias 13.91 9.08 6.46 5.39
10% 15% 20% 25%
2SLS Size of nominal 5% Wald test 22.3 12.83 9.54 7.8
LIML Size of nominal 5% Wald test  6.46 4.36 3.69 3.32
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by R2 for all models are relatively high and is not associated with any high correlation among 
the variables.    
4.2 Average Loan Size  
Table 4.2 reports the regression results for average loan balance per borrower/Gross National 
Income per capita (ALB/GNI). Since this measurement uses average loan balance per borrower 
as a benchmark for poverty level, where smaller average loan size meant poorer clients, the 
term average loan size will be used throughout the study in replacement of ALB/GNI to allow 
for better discussion. Based on the dataset of a maximum of 260 observations, the results in 
table 4.2 show microfinance institutions in South Asia reach out to the core poor in a regulated 
environment. This is depicted by the relatively significant coefficients of most institutional 
environment variables across models 5 – 10.  
The results reveal that a unit increase in political stability reduces average loan size by 23.3%. 
In other words, if MFIs operate in an environment where the ruling government does not face 
the pressures of political violence and terrorism, the MFIs’ outreach to the core poor improves.  
In addition, the statistically significant negative coefficient on regulatory quality suggests that 
the ability of local government in implementing policies and regulations supports MFIs to 
reach out to the poorest of the poor. This is shown in model 8, where every incremental unit in 
the regulatory quality decreases average loan size by 31.9% (meaning MFIs’ outreach to the 
core poor improves by 31.9%). The results further present a negative coefficient on rule of law, 
in which MFIs will see a decrease in average loan size by 20.8% for every unit increase in this 
variable.  
Additionally, when there is more control over corruption, the depth of outreach improves as 
MFIs reach out to the core poor, as reflected by the negative coefficient of 0.342. On the other 
hand, free and fair elections and freedom of speech appears to have a positive association with 
the average loan size, as shown by the positive coefficient of voice and accountability in model 
6. But this coefficient is not significant. Intuitively, this means that the rights to vote/freedom 
of expression do not affect the daily life of the poor that are struggling to make ends meet. 
These results show that a regulated environment encourages microfinance institutions in South 
Asia to reach out to the core poor. Perhaps in a politically unrest environment, there is lack of 
formal job opportunities and the poor then turn to informal market. In addition, given that a 
volatile environment encourages the growth of informal market, it shouldn’t be surprising to 
see an increase in demand for larger loans.  
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After discussing the effect of institutional environment, we then turn to macro-level variables. 
Similar to traditional financial institutions, the performance of MFIs relies on sufficient 
macroeconomic stability. The works of Patten et al. (2001) and Marconi and Mosley (2006) 
show that country-specific conditions can influence the relationship between macroeconomic 
conditions and the performance of microfinance industry. Literature have revealed that 
macroeconomic variables such as a country’s growth have been proven to affect the 
performance of MFIs (Hartarska, 2005; Van Maanen, 2004; Ahlin et al., 2010 and Vanroose 
and D’Espallier, 2013).   
The regression results in the 3rd model saw the non-linear effect of unemployment on average 
loan size, given that coefficients on unemployment rate are negative and its quadratic terms are 
positive. Using the same model, it can be calculated that the turning point for unemployment 
rate is 11.67%. Prior to this rate, unemployment is expected to reduce average loan size, but 
after this, every additional percentage point increases average loan size. In other words, MFIs 
in South Asia should see an increase in demand for larger loan size from microborrowers when 
unemployment rate in the region is high. The positive coefficient on GDP growth reveals that 
a growing economy attracts current microfinance borrowers to expand existing businesses by 
borrowing larger loans. On the other hand, inflation that comes with economic growth 
adversely affects MFIs’ average loan size, as shown by the negative coefficients on inflation 
rate in table 4.2. This is counterintuitive as higher inflation rates should lead to a demand for 
larger loan size since the real value of loans may be eroded. The regression results also indicate 
that personal remittance has a significant relation with average loan size.  Using the results 
from model 1, it can be deduced that for every $1 of personal remittance received by MFIs’ 
host country, the average loan size increases by 2.1%. On the other hand, the events of natural 
disasters have a negative but insignificant relationship with the MFIs’ average loan size in 
South Asia.  
Following macro-level variables, it is also important to look at the results for MFI-specific 
variables. The negative and significant coefficients for most MFI legal status imply that 
microfinance industry in South Asia is providing financial services to the poorest of the poor, 
except for credit unions that are more interested in giving out larger loans. By looking at the 
regression results, it can be concluded that non-bank financial institutions (NBFI) have the 
lowest average loan size, followed by NGOs, banks and credit union.  
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The regression results in model 1 reveal that the effect of age is non-linear, where age has a 
statistically significant negative coefficient and its quadratic term carries a positive coefficient. 
The turning point for age is 2, before which age negatively affects average loan size. As age is 
measured via dummy variable (where age 1 captures new MFIs that just entered the market for 
1-2 years, age 2 captures young MFIs that have been in the market 3-6 years and age 3 are 
mature MFIs that have been in the market for more than 7 years), this means that in South Asia, 
new MFIs give out loan to poorer clients while MFIs that have been in the market for more 
than 3 years focus on richer clients.  Therefore, it can be deduced that older MFIs in the South 
Asia region hand out larger loans, a potential signal of mission drift. Interestingly, the results 
indicate that MFIs’ size does not affect the type of clients served. On the other hand, the 
negative coefficient on percentage of female borrowers means that MFIs that have larger 
proportion of female borrowers in South Asia reaches out to the core poor. This result further 
reaffirms the works of D’Espallier et al. (2011b).  
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Table 4-2 South Asia - Average Loan Balance/GNI pe capita (ALB/GNI) 
  
ALB/GNI(%) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)
* 0.017 0.01 0.01 0.011 0.011 0.005 0.006 0.00 0.002 0.008
(0.100) (0.220) (0.190) (0.220) (0.250) (0.580) (0.440) (1.000) (0.840) (0.300)
Age -0.42 -0.38 -0.379 -0.37 -0.319 -0.35 -0.277 -0.281 -0.255 -0.337
(0.080) (0.090) (0.080) (0.080) (0.100) (0.110) (0.140) (0.160) (0.150) (0.090)
Age Squared 0.105 0.097 0.097 0.094 0.085 0.091 0.073 0.073 0.068 0.086
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.080) (0.110) (0.130) (0.120) (0.070)
Bank -0.123* -0.114* -0.11 -0.11 -0.103 -0.112* -0.106 -0.115* -0.113 -0.114*  
(0.040) (0.040) (0.050) (0.050) (0.080) (0.050) (0.070) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
NBFI -0.186** -0.163* -0.156* -0.156* -0.06 -0.186* -0.074 -0.116 -0.074 -0.084
(0.010) (0.030) (0.030) (0.040) (0.620) (0.030) (0.500) (0.170) (0.470) (0.430)
Credit Union 0.93 0.909 0.913 0.912 0.957 0.878 0.937 0.885 0.907 0.95
(0.090) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.090) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080)
NGO -0.179** -0.133 -0.126 -0.124 -0.111 -0.14 -0.136 -0.166** -0.168** -0.140*  
(0.000) (0.070) (0.090) (0.100) (0.170) (0.070) (0.050) (0.010) (0.010) (0.040)
Rural Bank - - - - - - - - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers -0.436 -0.561 -0.558 -0.56 -0.478 -0.587 -0.554 -0.593 -0.563 -0.53
(0.070) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.050) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.070)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.014 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004
(0.380) (0.340) (0.370) (0.360) (0.160) (0.320) (0.430) (0.350) (0.920) (0.430)
GDP growth, annual % 0.022 0.018 0.018 0.021 0.051 0.018 0.041 0.031 0.039 0.037
(0.330) (0.390) (0.380) (0.410) (0.290) (0.450) (0.240) (0.280) (0.260) (0.270)
Personal remittance ($) 0.021** 0.012** 0.011* 0.010** 0.017* 0.009** 0.002 0.004 0.010** 0.006
(0.010) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.030) (0.010) (0.760) (0.250) (0.010) (0.100)
Main Variables 
Unemployment, total (%) -0.082 -0.139 -0.14 0.014 -0.149 -0.179* -0.122 -0.171 -0.122
(0.050) (0.070) (0.070) (0.920) (0.050) (0.040) (0.100) (0.050) (0.110)
Unemployment Squared 0.006 0.006 -0.011 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.008 0.003
(0.460) (0.520) (0.560) (0.410) (0.290) (0.880) (0.400) (0.770)
Natural Disaster -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.01 -0.009 -0.007
(0.630) (0.580) (0.430) (0.480) (0.310) (0.370) (0.440)
Political Stability -0.233
(0.230)
Voice and Accountability 0.074                
(0.280)                
Government Effectiveness -0.327                
(0.120)                
Regulatory Quality -0.319*                
(0.050)                
Control of Corruption -0.342                
(0.110)                
Rule of Law -0.208
(0.150)
Intercept 0.523* 1.130** 1.246*** 1.258** 0.232 1.459*** 1.126*** 1.258** 1.040*** 1.060***
(0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.730) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
R Squared 0.286 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.303 0.295 0.299 0.299 0.303 0.299
Wald Chi Squared 185.857 181.869 203.438 216.394 222.429 228.6 211.955 240.846 239.392 214.58
Probability > Chi Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard Error 0.552 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.545 0.548 0.546 0.547 0.545 0.547
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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4.3 Number of Borrowers  
Table 4.3 provides evidence that institutional and macroeconomic environment affect the 
demands for microloans. The results suggest that institutional environment matters for MFI’s 
breadth of outreach, where most variables are strong determinants for number of borrowers. In 
a regulated environment, microfinance industry in South Asia observes a decline in number of 
borrowers, as shown by the negative and significant coefficients on all five institutional 
environment variables. 
Since government effectiveness measures the quality of service delivered by the local 
government, such as quality of policy formulation and implementation, the regression results 
imply that an effective government which implements successful policies and is free of 
corruption might do more harm than good to the microfinance industry. An effective 
government in play could mean more rules and regulations to comply with, but the poor that 
approaches MFIs for microloans usually lack formal education and extra regulations might 
prevent current borrowers from getting larger loans to expand their businesses. Similarly, 
stringent rules might also deter new borrowers from taking up loans to start up small 
businesses. Likewise, if corruption is controlled effectively, it may be harder for 
microborrowers to access government services that are difficult to obtain without paying 
bribes. This is reaffirmed by the regression results in model 9, where the estimate on control 
of corruption is negative, indicating an additional unit of control of corruption leads to a 66.1% 
fall in number of borrowers. The regression result for rules of law further shows that for every 
unit increase in rules of law in which private property rights are protected, the number of 
borrowers goes down by 76.9% and this is statistically significant at 1%. In South Asia, every 
incremental unit in government effectiveness leads to a decrease in number of borrowers by 
2.7%. The negative coefficient of regulatory quality is also an indicator that government 
regulation can be a burden to microborrowers, where every unit of improvement in the ability 
of the local government to implement an effective policy will lead to a fall in number of 
borrowers by 106%. This coefficient is statistically significant at 5% level. In this case, it 
appears that better institutional quality may lead to lesser demand for MFI loans, which lowers 
the number of clients of MFIs. 
 
The outcomes for macro-level variables suggest that macroeconomic environment has a 
substantial effect on the demand for microloans.  A growing economy may lure new borrowers 
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to develop new businesses (Armendariz and Labie, 2011), and this is reflected in the 
statistically significant positive coefficient on GDP growth. As shown in model 1 of table 4.3, 
an additional percentage point of GDP growth leads to an increase in number of borrowers by 
13.9%. We also see a negative and significant coefficient on personal remittance, where every 
$1 of personal remittance received leads to a decrease in number of borrowers by 2.2%, as 
shown in model 1. On the other hand, inflation appears not to have any significant impact on 
demand of loans.  
Given the significantly negative coefficient on unemployment rate and significantly positive 
coefficient on unemployment squared, the effect of unemployment rate changes after a 
minimum point. Using the results from model 3, the turning point for unemployment rate is 
5.38%. This implies that when unemployment rate is below 5.38%, an additional percentage 
point has a negative effect on number of borrowers, but when unemployment in the region 
reaches the turning point, every incremental percentage point in unemployment rate will have 
a positive effect on number of borrowers. The positive and significant coefficient on natural 
disasters shows that in the event of a natural disaster, MFIs in South Asia can expect an increase 
in demand for microloans.  
Moving on to MFI-level variables, the positive and significant coefficients for most MFIs 
propose that microfinance institutions in South Asia are reaching out to the poor in terms of 
number of borrowers, except for credit union. The results further reveal that MFIs formed by 
NGOs have the highest amount of borrowers, followed by NBFIs, banks and credit unions. The 
positive and significant coefficient on MFI size also suggests that larger organisations have the 
capacity to reach out to more borrowers. Age, however, appears not to have any significant 
relationship with a microfinance institution’s number of borrowers in South Asia. The 
significant positive coefficient on percentage of female borrowers indicates that MFIs focus on 
giving out loans to female borrowers have larger amount of borrowers.   
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Table 4-3 South Asia - Number of Borrowers (NAB) 
  
Number of borrowers (Ln NAB) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)
*
1.025*** 1.010*** 1.028*** 0.970*** 0.980*** 0.999*** 0.959*** 0.935*** 0.954*** 0.973***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.567 0.651 0.652 0.344 0.47 0.229 0.644 0.616 0.566 0.463
(0.500) (0.450) (0.440) (0.650) (0.560) (0.760) (0.450) (0.450) (0.500) (0.560)
Age Squared -0.197 -0.213 -0.22 -0.135 -0.16 -0.112 -0.205 -0.199 -0.186 -0.168
(0.340) (0.310) (0.280) (0.460) (0.410) (0.540) (0.320) (0.310) (0.360) (0.380)
Bank 0.063 0.08 0.141 0.14 0.156 0.154 0.151 0.125 0.134 0.122
(0.720) (0.630) (0.390) (0.410) (0.340) (0.350) (0.360) (0.460) (0.430) (0.470)
NBFI 0.279 0.325 0.463 0.427 0.676*  0.593* 0.698* 0.546* 0.588* 0.708*  
(0.220) (0.150) (0.050) (0.050) (0.010) (0.030) (0.020) (0.020) (0.030) (0.010)
Credit Union -0.07 -0.113 -0.006 0.014 0.144 0.194 0.108 -0.071 0.009 0.181
(0.760) (0.640) (0.980) (0.950) (0.550) (0.430) (0.660) (0.780) (0.970) (0.460)
NGO 0.791*** 0.885*** 1.049*** 0.963*** 1.011*** 1.044*** 0.933*** 0.833*** 0.882*** 0.928***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rural Bank - - - - - - - - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 1.324*** 1.067** 1.115** 1.203*** 1.406*** 1.358*** 1.222*** 1.105** 1.197*** 1.311***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.029 -0.029* -0.023 -0.017 -0.040** -0.014 -0.014 -0.017 -0.009 -0.014
(0.050) (0.030) (0.120) (0.170) (0.010) (0.280) (0.240) (0.140) (0.530) (0.250)
GDP growth, annual % 0.139** 0.132** 0.133** 0.056 0.133*** 0.069 0.123*** 0.089** 0.091** 0.116***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.110) (0.000) (0.050) (0.000) (0.010) (0.010) (0.000)
Personal remittance ($) -0.022* -0.041*** -0.055*** -0.014 0.005 -0.011 -0.040** -0.030* -0.013 -0.027*  
(0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.210) (0.730) (0.320) (0.000) (0.020) (0.210) (0.020)
Main Variables
Unemployment, total (%) -0.169* -1.194** -1.118** -0.766*  -1.036** -1.268*** -1.059** -1.186** -1.099** 
(0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployment Squared 0.111* 0.125** 0.087*  0.113** 0.139*** 0.112** 0.130** 0.120** 
(0.010) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Natural Disaster 0.117*** 0.115*** 0.134*** 0.110*** 0.097*** 0.106*** 0.104***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Political Stability -0.582** 
(0.000)
Voice and Accountability -0.429                
(0.070)                
Government Effectiveness -1.061*                
(0.020)                
Regulatory Quality -0.966*                
(0.010)                
Control of Corruption -0.661                
(0.060)                
Rule of Law -0.769** 
(0.010)
Intercept -7.258*** -6.005*** -4.159*** -4.496*** -7.135*** -5.592*** -4.978*** -4.487*** -4.937*** -5.334***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
R Squared 0.78 0.788 0.79 0.847 0.852 0.845 0.855 0.857 0.853 0.854
Wald Chi Squared 1317.818 1442.68 1561.469 1860.331 1954.283 1903.361 1948.791 2103.282 1972.674 1928.159
Probability > Chi Squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard Error 0.864 0.848 0.844 0.722 0.709 0.726 0.702 0.697 0.706 0.704
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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4.4 Financial Performance  
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present the results for operational self-sufficiency and return on assets. 
Operational self-sustainability measures the sustainability of the MFIs while return on assets 
is used as a robustness check to capture the profitability of MFIs. Overall, most institutional 
environment variables have a negative relationship with the financial performance, which 
means that MFIs in South Asia are not sustainable in politically stable environment.  
The results for macro-level variables suggest that economic growth and inflation affect the 
financial performance of MFIs, while unemployment rate has no major implications on the 
profitability of these institutions. Inflation is seen to be negatively affecting both profitability 
and sustainability of MFIs. This is not surprising since it directly affects the borrowers’ loan 
repayment ability. However, the effect of inflation on the financial performance of a financial 
institution is highly dependent on whether the inflation is anticipated or unanticipated (Revell, 
1979). On the other hand, the events of natural disaster appear not to have any significant 
relationship with the financial performance of MFIs. 
MFI-level variables, however, play an important role in sustainability and profitability. 
Overall, the results in tables 4.4 and 4.5 display positive coefficients on age and negative 
coefficients on age squared, indicating that the financial performance of MFI improves with 
age but after reaching a certain level of maturity MFIs will see a decline in profitability and 
sustainability. Since the regression results detected significant non-linear effect on age, this 
could mean that there is indeed a learning curve on the financial performance. The positive 
coefficient on age captured by the regression results aligns with the general literature that find 
performance improves with the age of firms (Lumpkin and Dess, 2001) while the negative 
coefficient on its quadratic term reaffirms the literature findings that older firms do not have 
the flexibility to make rapid adjustments to changing circumstances which cause poor 
performance in the long term (Dunne and Hughes, 1994).  
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Table 4-4 South Asia – Operational Self Sufficiency (OSS) 
OSS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)
*
0.017 0.069*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.083** 0.068*** 0.067*** 0.069*** 0.070***
(0.100) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age -0.42 0.433 0.433 0.431 0.441 0.371 0.476* 0.470* 0.455 0.455
(0.080) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.130) (0.040) (0.040) (0.050) (0.050)
Age Squared 0.105 -0.093 -0.094 -0.093 -0.095 -0.081 -0.104* -0.103* -0.099 -0.099*  
(0.070) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.120) (0.040) (0.040) (0.050) (0.050)
Bank -0.123* -0.095 -0.095 -0.095 -0.094 -0.087 -0.093 -0.097 -0.095 -0.098
(0.040) (0.120) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.140) (0.110) (0.100) (0.110) (0.100)
NBFI -0.186** -0.042 -0.039 -0.039 -0.021 0.045 0.0000 -0.021 -0.022 0.015
(0.010) (0.560) (0.580) (0.590) (0.800) (0.580) (1.000) (0.780) (0.780) (0.860)
Credit Union 0.93 0.259** 0.263** 0.264** 0.273** 0.353** 0.276** 0.253** 0.263** 0.294** 
(0.090) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NGO -0.179** 0.093 0.098 0.099 0.102 0.136 0.092 0.081 0.089 0.089
(0.000) (0.110) (0.130) (0.130) (0.120) (0.070) (0.150) (0.200) (0.150) (0.160)
Rural Bank - - - - - - - - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) -0.436 0.197 0.196 0.197 0.212 0.279* 0.2 0.183 0.196 0.218
(0.070) (0.130) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.040) (0.120) (0.150) (0.120) (0.080)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006
(0.380) (0.200) (0.200) (0.200) (0.170) (0.340) (0.230) (0.200) (0.260) (0.250)
GDP growth, annual % 0.022 0.029* 0.029* 0.029** 0.035*  0.036** 0.039** 0.034** 0.033** 0.041** 
(0.330) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) -0.01 (0.000)
Personal remittance ($) 0.021** 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.004
(0.010) (0.100) (0.110) (0.120) (0.150) (0.070) (0.600) (0.410) (0.120) (0.390)
Main Variables 
Unemployment, total (%) -0.018 -0.035 -0.036 -0.009 0.018 -0.054 -0.03 -0.042 -0.027
(0.500) (0.840) (0.830) (0.960) (0.920) (0.760) (0.860) (0.810) (0.880)
Unemployment Squared 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.006 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.000
(0.920) (0.920) (0.970) (0.780) (0.850) (0.980) (0.900) (0.980)
Natural Disaster 0.0000 0.0000 0.01 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.910) (0.940) (0.130) (0.850) (0.600) (0.850) (0.590)
Political Stability -0.043
(0.610)
Voice and Accountability -0.226*                
(0.050)                
Government Effectiveness -0.158                
(0.260)                
Regulatory Quality -0.136                
(0.340)                
Control of Corruption -0.07                
(0.540)                
Rule of Law -0.15
(0.140)
Intercept 0.523* -0.711 -0.709 -0.713 -0.905 -1.265* -0.776 -0.716 -0.756 -0.863
(0.030) (0.080) (0.130) (0.130) (0.200) (0.040) (0.100) (0.120) (0.110) (0.070)
Number of Obeservations 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
R Squared 0.286 0.267 0.264 0.264 0.265 0.275 0.272 0.273 0.268 0.275
Wald Chi Squared 185.857 103.664 103.73 104.585 106.419 101.957 106.938 107.089 105.548 108.947
Probability > Chi Squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard Error 0.552 0.277 0.277 0.277 0.277 0.275 0.276 0.276 0.276 0.275
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 4-5 South Asia – Return on Assets (ROA) 
 
ROA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)
*
0.009* 0.008* 0.007* 0.007* 0.007*  0.010** 0.007* 0.007* 0.008* 0.007*  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.010) (0.020) (0.030) (0.020) (0.030)
Age 0.299* 0.301* 0.301* 0.301* 0.301*  0.290* 0.299* 0.302* 0.293* 0.303*  
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.030) (0.040) (0.030) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Age Squared -0.059* -0.059* -0.059* -0.059* -0.059*  -0.056* -0.058* -0.059* -0.057* -0.059*  
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.030) (0.040) (0.030) (0.030) (0.040) (0.030)
Bank 0.036 0.036 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.034 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.032
(0.160) (0.150) (0.190) (0.190) (0.180) (0.160) (0.190) (0.190) (0.190) (0.190)
NBFI 0.0000 0.001 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.013 -0.002
(0.980) (0.980) (0.710) (0.710) (0.710) (0.580) (0.650) (0.740) (0.510) (0.910)
Credit Union 0.052** 0.051** 0.046** 0.046** 0.045*  0.063** 0.045* 0.046** 0.046** 0.048** 
(0.000) (0.000) -0.01 (0.010) (0.020) (0.000) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
NGO 0.012 0.014 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.012 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.004
(0.400) (0.330) (0.770) (0.760) (0.780) (0.430) (0.750) (0.760) (0.590) (0.800)
Rural Bank - - - - - - - - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 0.073** 0.068** 0.065** 0.065** 0.064*  0.081** 0.065** 0.065* 0.066** 0.067** 
(0.000) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.000) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.360) (0.360) (0.180) (0.180) (0.430) (0.350) (0.170) (0.180) (0.090) (0.210)
GDP growth, annual % 0.010*** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010*** 0.009*  0.011*** 0.009** 0.010** 0.008** 0.011***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Personal remittance ($) 0.002** 0.002 0.003* 0.003 0.002 0.003* 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.000) (0.130) (0.040) (0.050) (0.130) (0.040) (0.080) (0.110) (0.050) (0.090)
Main Variables 
Unemployment, total (%) -0.003 0.052 0.052 0.051 0.062 0.054 0.052 0.055 0.053
(0.680) (0.220) (0.220) (0.300) (0.160) (0.220) (0.220) (0.210) (0.220)
Unemployment Squared -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.220) (0.220) (0.280) (0.140) (0.220) (0.200) (0.200) (0.200)
Natural Disaster 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.920) (0.930) (0.250) (0.970) (0.920) (0.750) (0.760)
Political Stability 0.003
(0.920)
Voice and Accountability -0.044                 
(0.080)                 
Government Effectiveness 0.009                 
(0.770)                 
Regulatory Quality -0.001                 
(0.970)                 
Control of Corruption 0.026                 
(0.240)                 
Rule of Law -0.013
(0.520)
Intercept -0.639** -0.614** -0.715** -0.715** -0.703*** -0.823** -0.711** -0.716** -0.698** -0.728***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
R Squared 0.287 0.287 0.293 0.293 0.293 0.303 0.294 0.293 0.296 0.294
Wald Chi Squared 93.533 97.792 100.988 104.675 104.797 102.926 108.019 110.292 104.192 113.185
Probability > Chi Squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard Error 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.085 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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4.5 Economic Sectors  
Tables 4.6 – 4.9 present the results on the effect of three major economic sectors on the 
performance of MFIs. The significant and negative coefficients on manufacturing and services 
for average loan size and number of borrowers in tables 4.6 and 4.7 show a decrease in loan 
size and the number of borrowers when these two sectors are growing, indicating when there 
are plenty of opportunities in the manufacturing and services sector, the need for the poor to 
obtain microloans to start microbusiness in informal sector may be the lowest. On the other 
hand, the results for agricultural sector differ. The positive coefficients on average loan size 
and number of borrowers indicate that MFIs are not reaching out to the core poor despite an 
increase in number of clients. Alam (1988) who investigated the productivity growth of farmers 
with access to microfinance using clients of the Grameen Bank also found positive effect 
between agricultural sector and the performance of microfinance industry. Existing literature 
suggest that agriculture is a key area of developing economies and often play an important role 
for development, notably the Green Revolution in Asia (Breisinger et al., 2008). Despite 
significantly affecting the social performance of MFIs, the economic sectors appear not to have 
any significant relationship with the financial performance of MFIs, as shown in tables 4.8 and 
4.9.  
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Table 4-6 South Asia – The Effect of Economic Sectors 
on ALB/GNI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-7 South Asia – The Effect of Economic Sectors 
on NAB  
  
ALB/GNI (%) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3   
MFI Control V ariables
MFI Size (t-1)
*
0.016 0.015 0.015
(0.150) (0.140) (0.210)
Age -0.159 -0.181 -0.14
(0.170) (0.130) (0.240)
Age Squared 0.041 0.047 0.037
(0.130) (0.090) (0.190)
Bank -0.172* -0.169* -0.172*  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
NBFI -0.252*** -0.250*** -0.264***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Credit Union 1.28 1.278 1.271
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
NGO -0.204*** -0.199*** -0.203***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rural Bank - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) -0.429 -0.422 -0.455
(0.110) (0.110) (0.090)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) 0.001 0.001 0
(0.910) (0.910) (0.970)
GDP growth, annual % 0.033 0.035 0.028
(0.230) (0.240) (0.310)
Personal remittance ($) 0.012 0.009 0.014*  
(0.060) (0.090) (0.030)
Economic Sectors
Agriculture, % of GDP 0.005*                
(0.040)                
Manufacturing, % of GDP -0.014**                
(0.010)                
Services, % of GDP -0.008
(0.060)
Intercept 0.22 0.575** 0.768*  
(0.280) (0.000) (0.020)
Number of Obeservations 239 239 239
R Squared 0.338 0.339 0.339
Wald Chi Squared 240.217 236.501 251.334
Probability > Chi Squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard Error 0.552 0.552 0.552
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Number of Borrowers (Ln NAB) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)
*
1.003*** 1.010*** 0.971***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.553 0.357 0.837
(0.550) (0.700) (0.360)
Age Squared -0.186 -0.136 -0.249
(0.410) (0.540) (0.260)
Bank 0.162 0.152 0.158
(0.340) (0.380) (0.370)
NBFI 0.793** 0.711* 0.53
(0.010) (0.010) (0.050)
Credit Union -0.165 -0.205 -0.341
(0.510) (0.420) (0.180)
NGO 1.110*** 1.088*** 1.027***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rural Bank - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 1.320*** 1.349*** 0.992** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.010)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.053* -0.043 -0.053*  
(0.020) (0.060) (0.010)
GDP growth, annual % 0.216*** 0.206*** 0.134** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Personal remittance ($) -0.082*** -0.090*** -0.048***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic Sectors
Agriculture, % of GDP 0.082***                
(0.000)                
Manufacturing, % of GDP -0.152***                
(0.000)                
Services, % of GDP -0.096***
(0.000)
Intercept -8.717*** -4.591*** -1.035
(0.000) (0.000) (0.440)
Number of Obeservations 239 239 239
R Squared 0.823 0.812 0.82
Wald Chi Squared 1374.245 1245.974 1395.821
Probability > Chi Squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard Error 0.789 0.812 0.795
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 4-8 South Asia – The Effect of Economic Sectors 
on OSS 
 
 
Table 4-9 South Asia – The Effect of Economic Sectors 
on ROA 
 
OSS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3   
MFI Control Variables 
MFI Size (t-1)
*
0.073*** 0.073*** 0.073***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.534* 0.510* 0.536*  
(0.030) (0.040) (0.030)
Age Squared -0.121* -0.115* -0.121*  
(0.020) (0.030) (0.020)
Bank -0.092 -0.089 -0.097
(0.110) (0.120) (0.100)
NBFI -0.012 -0.006 -0.032
(0.880) (0.940) (0.680)
Credit Union 0.335*** 0.337*** 0.329***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NGO 0.1 0.109 0.079
(0.100) (0.070) (0.160)
Rural Bank - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 0.234 0.239 0.238
(0.080) (0.070) (0.100)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.019* -0.019* -0.017*  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.030)
GDP growth, annual % 0.024 0.027 0.018
(0.080) (0.050) (0.130)
Personal remittance ($) 0.005 0.001 0.009*  
(0.290) (0.840) (0.010)
Economic Sectors
Agriculture, % of GDP 0.004                
(0.280)                
Manufacturing, % of GDP -0.015                
(0.120)                
Services, % of GDP 0.002
(0.690)
Intercept -0.900* -0.563 -0.949
(0.030) (0.150) (0.100)
Number of Obeservations 239 239 239
R Squared 0.28 0.285 0.277
Wald Chi Squared 103.474 102.959 102.756
Probability > Chi Squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard Error 0.279 0.278 0.279
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
ROA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)
*
0.009** 0.009** 0.010** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.000)
Age 0.331* 0.329* 0.325*  
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Age Squared -0.066* -0.066* -0.065*  
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Bank 0.038 0.039 0.037
(0.130) (0.120) (0.140)
NBFI -0.007 -0.002 -0.005
(0.760) (0.910) (0.810)
Credit Union 0.055** 0.057** 0.058** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NGO 0.009 0.013 0.006
(0.550) (0.380) (0.690)
Rural Bank - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 0.080** 0.081** 0.089** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.170) (0.100) (0.300)
GDP growth, annual % 0.007* 0.009** 0.008*  
(0.020) (0.010) (0.010)
Personal remittance ($) 0.003* 0.002 0.003** 
(0.030) (0.150) (0.000)
Economic Sectors 
Agriculture, % of GDP -0.001                 
(0.450)                 
Manufacturing, % of GDP -0.001                 
(0.720)                 
Services, % of GDP 0.003
(0.120)
Intercept -0.640** -0.645** -0.838** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 239 239 239
R Squared 0.301 0.3 0.306
Wald Chi Squared 85.152 82.551 84.846
Probability > Chi Squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard Error 0.089 0.089 0.088
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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4.6 Robustness Checks  
In order to test for the robustness of the results, alternative regressions are carried out via 
variables from the works of Hartaska (2005), Hermes et al. (2009) and Cull et al. (2014) as 
well as ease of doing business index. This index measures the strength of regulation in a 
country, a higher ease of doing business ranking means the regulatory environment is more 
conducive to business start-ups. The results for robustness checks are displayed in tables 4.10 
– 4.15. The results in table 4.10 and 4.11 reveal that an increase in costs of business start-ups 
and labour force participation lead to an increase in demand for larger loansInterest rate spread 
is also employed as an indicator for the competitiveness for giving out loans. Accordingly, the 
lower the interest rate spread, the more competitive the environment is for microfinance 
institutions. In South Asia, more competition not only decreases the average loan size but also 
lowers the number of borrowers. However, no significant relationship between financial 
performance and competition is found for this region. 
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Table 4-10 South Asia – Robustness Checks (ALB/GNI) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-11 South Asia – Robustness Checks (Ln NAB) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ALB/GNI (%) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)
*
0.017 0.017 0.005 0.01
(0.110) (0.110) (0.560) (0.250)
Age -0.415 -0.424 -0.374 -0.433
(0.070) (0.080) (0.110) (0.070)
Age Squared 0.104 0.105 0.092 0.108
(0.060) (0.060) (0.090) (0.060)
Bank -0.125* -0.085 -0.083 -0.133*  
(0.030) (0.120) (0.130) (0.030)
NBFI -0.186** -0.134 -0.065 -0.212** 
(0.010) (0.090) (0.510) (0.000)
Credit Union 0.932 0.921 0.92 0.885
(0.090) (0.080) (0.080) (0.090)
NGO -0.179** -0.104 -0.139* -0.184** 
(0.000) (0.230) (0.040) (0.000)
Rural Bank - - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) -0.435 -0.528 -0.555 -0.496
(0.070) (0.070) (0.060) (0.060)
Macroeconomic Variables 
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.005 -0.003 0.002 -0.004
(0.360) (0.610) (0.790) (0.440)
GDP growth, annual % 0.023 0.016 0.026 0.019
(0.330) (0.400) (0.280) (0.400)
Personal remittance ($) 0.021** 0.019** -0.003 0.021** 
(0.010) (0.000) (0.550) (0.010)
Time Required to Start a Business -0.001                  
(0.610)                  
Cost of Business Startups 0.005                  
(0.100)                  
Labour Force Participation 0.018*                  
(0.020)                  
Corruption (CPI Index) 0.089
(0.100)
Intercept 0.546* 0.426 -0.286 0.451
-0.03 -0.09 -0.53 -0.07
Number of Obeservations 524 524 530 483
R Squared 537 537 543 496
Wald Chi Squared 24.429 25.553 25.976 21.025
Probability > Chi Squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard Error 0.479 0.476 0.473 0.494
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Number of Borrowers (Ln NAB) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)
*
1.023*** 1.023*** 0.972*** 0.01
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.250)
Age 0.473 0.555 0.771 -0.433
(0.550) (0.500) (0.350) (0.070)
Age Squared -0.178 -0.198 -0.252 0.108
(0.370) (0.330) (0.210) (0.060)
Bank 0.112 0.172 0.236 -0.133*  
(0.520) (0.310) (0.160) (0.030)
NBFI 0.269 0.426 0.808** -0.212** 
(0.240) (0.070) (0.000) (0.000)
Credit Union -0.134 -0.097 -0.114 0.885
(0.550) (0.680) (0.660) (0.090)
NGO 0.787*** 1.001*** 0.965*** -0.184** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rural Bank - - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 1.290*** 1.064** 0.807* -0.496
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.060)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.022 -0.023 0.001 -0.004
(0.140) (0.140) (0.970) (0.440)
GDP growth, annual % 0.121* 0.124** 0.158*** 0.019
(0.010) (0.010) (0.000) (0.400)
Personal remittance ($) -0.021* -0.027** -0.125*** 0.021** 
(0.020) (0.010) (0.000) (0.010)
Time Required to Start a Business 0.019*                
(0.030)                
Cost of Business Startups 0.013***                
(0.000)                
Labour Force Participation 0.078***                
(0.000)                
Corruption 0.089
(0.100)
Intercept -7.662*** -7.519*** -10.785*** 0.451
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) -0.07
Number of Obeservations 260 260 260 252
R Squared 0.79 0.789 0.824 0.287
Wald Chi Squared 1551.728 1517.476 1534.161 182.282
Probability > Chi Squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard Error 0.845 0.846 0.773 0.559
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 4-12 South Asia – Robustness Checks (OSS)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-13 South Asia – Robustness Checks (ROA)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OSS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)
*
0.069*** 0.070*** 0.060** 0.071** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.399 0.421 0.462* 0.438
(0.080) (0.060) (0.030) (0.060)
Age Squared -0.086 -0.092 -0.102* -0.094
(0.080) (0.060) (0.030) (0.070)
Bank -0.084 -0.069 -0.064 -0.091
(0.170) (0.240) (0.280) (0.140)
NBFI -0.05 -0.009 0.051 0.009
(0.480) (0.900) (0.500) (0.910)
Credit Union 0.246** 0.257** 0.254** 0.298** 
(0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NGO 0.082 0.139* 0.115* 0.07
(0.140) (0.030) (0.050) (0.220)
Rural Bank - - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 0.215 0.156 0.128 0.278*  
(0.080) (0.230) (0.310) (0.030)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005
(0.330) (0.300) (0.850) (0.290)
GDP growth, annual % 0.025* 0.026* 0.034** 0.042***
(0.030) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000)
Personal remittance ($) 0.009** 0.008* -0.01 0.010***
(0.000) (0.010) (0.090) (0.000)
Time Required to Start a Business 0.005*                
(0.020)                
Cost of Business Startups 0.003*                
(0.020)                
Labour Force Participation 0.015***                
(0.000)                
Corruption -0.181*  
(0.050)
Intercept -0.947* -0.920* -1.495** -0.496
(0.020) (0.020) (0.000) (0.200)
Number of Obeservations 260 260 260 252
R Squared 0.285 0.282 0.309 0.287
Wald Chi Squared 103.397 101.824 111.8 102.609
Probability > Chi Squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard Error 0.273 0.274 0.269 0.255
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
ROA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)
*
0.008* 0.009* 0.006 0.009*  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.060) (0.020)
Age 0.293* 0.299* 0.308* 0.298*  
(0.040) (0.040) (0.030) (0.040)
Age Squared -0.058* -0.059* -0.061* -0.058*  
(0.040) (0.040) (0.030) (0.040)
Bank 0.039 0.038 0.043 0.036
(0.130) (0.130) (0.100) (0.170)
NBFI -0.001 0.003 0.022 0.008
(0.950) (0.850) (0.250) (0.630)
Credit Union 0.048** 0.052** 0.050** 0.057** 
(0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010)
NGO 0.011 0.017 0.019 0.009
(0.410) (0.240) (0.130) (0.520)
Rural Bank - - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 0.071** 0.067* 0.051* 0.079** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.050) (0.010)
Macroeconomic Variables 
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.650) (0.430) (0.730) (0.330)
GDP growth, annual % 0.009** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.013***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Personal remittance ($) 0.002*** 0.002** -0.002 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.070) (0.000)
Time Required to Start a Business 0.001**                
(0.000)                
Cost of Business Startups 0.000                
(0.220)                
Labour Force Participation 0.003***                
(0.000)                
Corruption -0.037
(0.070)
Intercept -0.396*** -0.392*** -0.501*** -0.321*  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010)
Number of Obeservations 260 260 260 252
R Squared 0.302 0.289 0.304 0.302
Wald Chi Squared 94.894 94.198 103.775 91.011
Probability > Chi Squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard Error 0.085 0.086 0.085 0.084
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 4-14 South Asia – Robustness Checks (Interest Rate 
Spread)  
 
 
 
Table 4-15 South Asia – Robustness Checks (Lending Interest 
Rate)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ALB/GNI (%) Ln NAB OSS ROA
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)
*
-0.041 1.012*** 0.118* 0.013** 
(0.360) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000)
Age -0.388 -0.333 -0.409 -0.066
(0.380) (0.650) (0.060) (0.050)
Age Squared 0.116 -0.015 0.064 0.012
(0.290) (0.930) (0.220) (0.130)
Bank -0.063 0.534*** -0.132** -0.010*  
(0.430) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030)
NBFI -0.362 0.638* -0.076 -0.007
(0.120) (0.030) (0.430) (0.590)
Credit Union 0.495 0.325 0.285 0.036*  
(0.220) (0.270) (0.070) (0.020)
NGO -0.153 1.031*** 0.125 0.025** 
(0.120) (0.000) (0.100) (0.000)
Rural Bank - - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) -1.749 1.570*** 0.256 0.034
(0.140) (0.000) (0.150) (0.130)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.041 -0.072*** -0.003 -0.001
(0.110) (0.000) (0.730) (0.370)
GDP growth, annual % 0.073 -0.032 0.012 0.004
(0.270) (0.510) (0.420) (0.120)
Personal remittance ($) 0.041 -0.015 0.006 0.001
(0.050) (0.300) (0.250) (0.150)
Interest rate spread 0.072 0.233*** 0.005 0.001
(0.170) (0.000) (0.800) (0.790)
Intercept 1.876 -6.543*** -0.441 -0.163
(0.210) (0.000) (0.620) (0.050)
Number of Obeservations 142 142 142 142
R Squared 0.302 0.864 0.105 0.175
Wald Chi Squared 67.621 1021.67 36.9 47.149
Probability > Chi Squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard Error 0.706 0.593 0.249 0.03
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
ALB/GNI (%) Ln NAB OSS ROA
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)
*
-0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.860) (0.860) (0.860) (0.860)
Age -0.384 -0.384 -0.384 -0.384
(0.310) (0.310) (0.310) (0.310)
Age Squared 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106
(0.240) (0.240) (0.240) (0.240)
Bank -0.057 -0.057 -0.057 -0.057
(0.470) (0.470) (0.470) (0.470)
NBFI -0.179 -0.179 -0.179 -0.179
(0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150)
Credit Union 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
(0.180) (0.180) (0.180) (0.180)
NGO -0.122 -0.122 -0.122 -0.122
(0.270) (0.270) (0.270) (0.270)
Rural Bank - - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) -1.045 -1.045 -1.045 -1.045
(0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.900) (0.900) (0.900) (0.900)
GDP growth, annual % 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026
(0.430) (0.430) (0.430) (0.430)
Personal remittance ($) 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019
(0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100)
Lending interest rate -0.039 -0.039 -0.039 -0.039
(0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110)
Intercept 1.642 1.642 1.642 1.642
(0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110)
Number of Obeservations 177 177 177 177
R Squared 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
Wald Chi Squared 86.958 86.958 86.958 86.958
Probability > Chi Squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard Error 0.647 0.647 0.647 0.647
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
  
74 
 
4.7 The Effect of Institutional Environment Variables on Welfarist and 
Institutionalist MFIs  
4.7.1 Welfarist Institutions  
The regression results give an interesting outline on the type of clientele amongst welfarist 
institutions in South Asia, as it shows that credit unions in this region service richer clients while 
non-government organisations (NGOs) service the core poor. This is displayed in table 4.16 where 
NGOs saw negative and significant coefficient on average loan size while credit unions have 
positive and significant coefficient on average loan size.  
MFI-related variables have displayed significant amount of influence on the performance of 
welfarist MFIs. The effect of age of firm on average loan size appears to be quadratic, such that 
older welfarist institutions are more interested in giving out larger loans, an indication of mission 
drift. However, the maturity of the MFIs appears not to have any effect on number of borrowers. 
The regression results in tables 4.18 and 4.19 further indicate that older welfarist organisations are 
neither sustainable nor profitable. On the other hand, the size of MFIs positively affects the 
performance of MFIs, where larger welfarist firms are able to reach out to higher number of 
borrowers and are more efficient financially.  
Overall, the regression results in tables 4.16 – 4.19 reveal that welfarist institutions underperform 
in a politically stable environment - where they reach out to the core poor but see a reduction in 
number of clients - which then spirals into profitability and sustainability issues. Amongst the 
variables, regulatory quality, rule of law and political stability have a more significant effect. It 
seems that a robust regulatory system encourages welfarist institutions to carry out their 
responsibilities as a poverty alleviation agent.  
Turning towards the effects of macroeconomic variables; the regression results in tables 4.16 and 
4.17 indicate that unemployment has a negative coefficient, while its quadratic term is positively 
related with average loan size and number of borrowers. The results in model 3 table 4.16 show that 
when unemployment rate in the region reaches 8.6%, every additional percentage point will have a 
positive effect on average loan size; prior to this, an additional percentage point of unemployment 
rate reduces the average loan size. However, unemployment rate has a diminishing effect on the 
financial performance of welfarist MFIs, as shown in tables 4.18 and 4.19. It also appears that GDP 
growth has a positive relationship with all MFIs’ performance variables. During an economic 
growth, there are higher demands for larger loans which then lead to better sustainability. As for 
personal remittance, the regression results display a positive relationship with average loan size, but 
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negative relationship with number of borrowers (as seen in table 4.17). However, it is also further 
revealed that personal remittance has a positive effect on sustainability and profitability of welfarist 
MFIs. The events of natural disaster, however, have different effects on these MFIs’ performance 
measures - where natural disasters have a positive and significant relationship with number of 
borrowers - but no significant effect on average loan size and financial performance, as shown in 
tables 4.16, 4.17, 4.18 and 4.19.  
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Table 4-16 South Asia – Welfarist (Depth of Outreach) 
ALB/GNI (%) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)
*
0.016 0.009 0.01 0.011 0.008 0.01 0.004 -0.001 0.003 0.01
(0.100) (0.250) (0.170) (0.210) (0.380) (0.220) (0.580) (0.930) (0.730) (0.240)
Age -0.392 -0.351 -0.352 -0.344 -0.318 -0.338 -0.218 -0.248 -0.243 -0.297
(0.100) (0.110) (0.100) (0.100) (0.120) (0.110) (0.250) (0.220) (0.200) (0.150)
Age Squared 0.098 0.09 0.09 0.088 0.084 0.087 0.062 0.066 0.066 0.078
(0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.100) (0.090) (0.180) (0.170) (0.150) (0.110)
Credit Union 1.02 0.989 0.994 0.992 0.985 0.986 0.993 0.957 0.971 1.02
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.050)
NGO -0.06 -0.025 -0.018 -0.016 -0.057 -0.017 -0.093* -0.085* -0.107** -0.078*  
(0.100) (0.600) (0.700) (0.740) (0.150) (0.730) (0.010) (0.040) (0.010) (0.040)
Percentage of Female Borrowers -0.436 -0.566* -0.56 -0.562 -0.507 -0.57 -0.537 -0.576 -0.529 -0.502
(0.060) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.050) (0.060) (0.060)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.013 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004
(0.290) (0.250) (0.320) (0.310) (0.070) (0.310) (0.480) (0.330) (0.870) (0.400)
GDP growth, annual % 0.015 0.012 0.013 0.015 0.047 0.014 0.05 0.031 0.041 0.038
(0.520) (0.580) (0.550) (0.560) (0.270) (0.570) (0.230) (0.320) (0.270) (0.280)
Personal remittance ($) 0.025*** 0.014*** 0.013** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.012*** -0.002 0.006 0.010** 0.005
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.800) (0.120) (0.000) (0.250)
Main Variables -0.087* -0.189** -0.189** 0.06 -0.191* -0.223** -0.121 -0.174* -0.143*  
Unemployment, total (%) (0.030) (0.010) (0.010) (0.710) (0.010) (0.000) (0.100) (0.020) (0.040)
Unemployment Squared 0.011 0.01 -0.018 0.011 0.014 0.001 0.008 0.004
(0.190) (0.240) (0.420) (0.230) (0.100) (0.900) (0.420) (0.680)
Natural Disaster -0.003 -0.01 -0.004 -0.007 -0.01 -0.01 -0.008
(0.650) (0.350) (0.620) (0.430) (0.270) (0.310) (0.380)
Political Stability -0.017
(0.080)
Voice and Accountability 0.001                
(0.740)                
Government Effectiveness -0.011*                
(0.040)                
Regulatory Quality -0.009*                
(0.010)                
Control of Corruption -0.008*                
(0.040)                
Rule of Law -0.006*  
(0.040)
Intercept 0.39 1.042** 1.237*** 1.249*** 0.810** 1.267*** 1.637*** 1.588*** 1.381*** 1.288***
(0.110) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
R Squared 0.281 0.291 0.291 0.291 0.3 0.291 0.302 0.297 0.302 0.299
Wald Chi Squared 166.265 148.717 171.801 187.386 195.935 190.775 196.417 209.259 220.995 196.683
Probability > Chi Squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard Error 0.553 0.55 0.55 0.549 0.546 0.549 0.545 0.547 0.545 0.547
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 4-17 South Asia – Welfarist (Breadth of Outreach)  
Number of Borrowers (Ln NAB) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)
*
1.025*** 1.012*** 1.031*** 0.974*** 0.967*** 0.992*** 0.965*** 0.951*** 0.963*** 0.976***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.558 0.631 0.619 0.313 0.355 0.238 0.482 0.477 0.441 0.404
(0.510) (0.460) (0.460) (0.680) (0.640) (0.750) (0.540) (0.540) (0.580) (0.600)
Age Squared -0.189 -0.204 -0.206 -0.122 -0.128 -0.106 -0.157 -0.158 -0.149 -0.141
(0.350) (0.320) (0.310) (0.490) (0.480) (0.550) (0.400) (0.380) (0.420) (0.430)
Credit Union -0.165 -0.22 -0.171 -0.139 -0.153 -0.063 -0.138 -0.203 -0.165 -0.077
(0.460) (0.330) (0.450) (0.500) (0.480) (0.770) (0.540) (0.370) (0.470) (0.720)
NGO 0.634*** 0.696*** 0.768*** 0.705*** 0.639*** 0.699*** 0.602*** 0.585*** 0.590*** 0.588***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 1.363*** 1.129*** 1.186*** 1.265*** 1.353*** 1.373*** 1.298*** 1.241*** 1.307*** 1.384***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.027 -0.027* -0.021 -0.016 -0.027*  -0.013 -0.013 -0.015 -0.01 -0.014
(0.060) (0.050) (0.160) (0.230) (0.040) (0.330) (0.300) (0.230) (0.470) (0.290)
GDP growth, annual % 0.153*** 0.148*** 0.155*** 0.077* 0.128** 0.087* 0.124*** 0.103** 0.110** 0.122***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Personal remittance ($) -0.028*** -0.046*** -0.061*** -0.019 -0.018 -0.021 -0.037** -0.029* -0.022* -0.033** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.070) (0.100) (0.050) (0.010) (0.020) (0.050) (0.010)
Main Variables 
Unemployment, total (%) -0.156* -1.058** -0.999** -0.597 -0.960** -1.042** -0.874* -0.978** -0.918*  
(0.040) (0.010) (0.000) (0.110) (0.010) (0.000) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Unemployment Squared 0.098* 0.114** 0.068 0.109** 0.118** 0.098* 0.111** 0.103** 
(0.020) (0.000) (0.110) (0.010) (0.000) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Natural Disaster 0.116*** 0.106*** 0.127*** 0.112*** 0.104*** 0.107*** 0.107***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Political Stability -0.028
(0.050)
Voice and Accountability -0.008                
(0.190)                
Government Effectiveness -0.015*                
(0.040)                
Regulatory Quality -0.016                
(0.070)                
Control of Corruption -0.01                
(0.090)                
Rule of Law -0.012*  
(0.010)
Intercept -7.183*** -6.017*** -4.389*** -4.715*** -5.398*** -4.907*** -4.193*** -4.112*** -4.546*** -4.671***
(0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
R Squared 0.779 0.786 0.786 0.843 0.847 0.841 0.847 0.849 0.847 0.846
Wald Chi Squared 1336.27 1453.025 1608.577 2033.355 2175.318 2074.618 2114.333 2152.782 2143.408 2137.836
Probability > Chi Squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard Error 0.867 0.852 0.852 0.73 0.721 0.735 0.72 0.716 0.721 0.722
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 4-18 South Asia – Welfarist (Operational Self-Sufficiency)   
OSS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)
*
0.068** 0.066** 0.068** 0.068** 0.068** 0.077** 0.067** 0.066** 0.068*** 0.067** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.449 0.457* 0.457* 0.456* 0.460*  0.398 0.488* 0.482* 0.463* 0.479*  
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.100) (0.040) (0.040) (0.050) (0.040)
Age Squared -0.095 -0.096 -0.097 -0.096 -0.097 -0.082 -0.103* -0.102* -0.098 -0.101*  
(0.060) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.110) (0.040) (0.040) (0.050) (0.050)
Credit Union 0.305*** 0.299*** 0.302*** 0.303*** 0.302*** 0.354*** 0.303*** 0.294*** 0.301*** 0.316***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NGO 0.124* 0.131** 0.134* 0.134* 0.129*  0.123* 0.115* 0.116* 0.128* 0.104*  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.030) (0.020) (0.030) (0.040) (0.020) (0.040)
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 0.246* 0.219 0.22 0.22 0.227 0.305* 0.226 0.216 0.222 0.249*  
(0.050) (0.090) (0.080) (0.080) (0.070) (0.030) (0.070) (0.080) (0.080) (0.050)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.210) (0.210) (0.210) (0.210) (0.190) (0.390) (0.240) (0.210) (0.220) (0.250)
GDP growth, annual % 0.030** 0.030** 0.030** 0.030** 0.034*  0.038*** 0.039** 0.034** 0.032** 0.041***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000)
Personal remittance ($) 0.009** 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.004
(0.000) (0.100) (0.110) (0.130) (0.130) (0.200) (0.520) (0.320) (0.140) (0.460)
Main Variables 
Unemployment, total (%) -0.018 -0.038 -0.039 -0.006 0.006 -0.048 -0.023 -0.038 -0.016
(0.480) (0.820) (0.820) (0.980) (0.970) (0.780) (0.890) (0.820) (0.930)
Unemployment Squared 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.004 0.003 0.0000 0.002 -0.001
(0.910) (0.900) (0.960) (0.850) (0.870) (0.990) (0.910) (0.970)
Natural Disaster 0.000 -0.001 0.009 -0.001 -0.002 0.0000 -0.002
(0.940) (0.880) (0.160) (0.870) (0.700) (0.950) (0.610)
Political Stability -0.002
(0.700)
Voice and Accountability -0.007                
(0.060)                
Government Effectiveness -0.003                
(0.330)                
Regulatory Quality -0.003                
(0.460)                
Control of Corruption -0.001                
(0.790)                
Rule of Law -0.003
(0.160)
Intercept -0.155 -0.013 -0.056 -0.054 -0.065 -0.298 -0.188 -0.036 -0.119 -0.124
(0.470) (0.950) (0.820) (0.830) (0.850) (0.300) (0.470) (0.880) (0.640) (0.630)
Number of Obeservations 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
R Squared 0.262 0.265 0.263 0.263 0.264 0.274 0.268 0.268 0.264 0.271
Wald Chi Squared 94.594 97.393 98.172 99.406 99.066 95.514 98.883 99.964 99.451 100.23
Probability > Chi Squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard Error 0.278 0.277 0.277 0.277 0.277 0.275 0.277 0.277 0.277 0.276
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 4-19 South Asia – Welfarist (Return on Assets)  
  
ROA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)
*
0.009* 0.008** 0.007* 0.007* 0.007*  0.010** 0.007* 0.007* 0.008* 0.007*  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.030) (0.030) (0.040) (0.000) (0.030) (0.040) (0.020) (0.030)
Age 0.290* 0.292* 0.293* 0.293* 0.295*  0.278* 0.293* 0.296* 0.290* 0.297*  
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Age Squared -0.058* -0.058* -0.058* -0.058* -0.058*  -0.055* -0.058* -0.059* -0.058* -0.059*  
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Credit Union 0.040** 0.039** 0.036* 0.036* 0.035*  0.050** 0.036* 0.035* 0.037* 0.039*  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.000) (0.020) (0.030) (0.010) (0.010)
NGO 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.0000 0.0000 0.003 0.001 0.005 -0.003
(0.710) (0.610) (0.860) (0.860) (0.970) (0.980) (0.840) (0.970) (0.710) (0.820)
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 0.062* 0.055* 0.052* 0.052* 0.056*  0.074** 0.052* 0.052* 0.051* 0.058*  
(0.010) (0.020) (0.030) (0.030) (0.020) (0.010) (0.030) (0.040) (0.040) (0.020)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.270) (0.270) (0.110) (0.110) (0.060) (0.360) (0.120) (0.120) (0.090) (0.160)
GDP growth, annual % 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.008* 0.009** 0.007** 0.010***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000)
Personal remittance ($) 0.002** 0.002 0.003* 0.003 0.003*  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003* 0.002
(0.000) (0.140) (0.040) (0.050) (0.050) (0.060) (0.070) (0.090) (0.050) (0.110)
Main Variables -0.004 0.05 0.05 0.069 0.061 0.05 0.052 0.05 0.054
Unemployment, total (%) (0.600) (0.230) (0.230) (0.180) (0.160) (0.230) (0.190) (0.230) (0.190)
-0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
Unemployment Squared (0.220) (0.220) (0.170) (0.140) (0.220) (0.180) (0.220) (0.180)
0.0000 -0.001 0.002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Natural Disaster (0.990) (0.650) (0.200) (0.990) (0.820) (0.840) (0.640)
Political Stability -0.001
(0.250)
Voice and Accountability -0.002                
(0.060)                
Government Effectiveness 0.0000                
(1.000)                
Regulatory Quality 0.0000                
(0.680)                
Control of Corruption 0.0000                
(0.560)                
Rule of Law -0.001
(0.190)
Intercept -0.602** -0.572** -0.670*** -0.671*** -0.704*** -0.702*** -0.671** -0.660** -0.675*** -0.667** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
R Squared 0.262 0.265 0.263 0.263 0.264 0.274 0.268 0.268 0.264 0.271
Wald Chi Squared 94.594 97.393 98.172 99.406 99.066 95.514 98.883 99.964 99.451 100.23
Probability > Chi Squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard Error 0.278 0.277 0.277 0.277 0.277 0.275 0.277 0.277 0.277 0.276
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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4.7.2 Institutionalist MFIs  
In South Asia, it seems that commercial MFIs are reaching out to the core poor, but are struggling 
to reach out in terms of numbers, as shown by the negative coefficients in table 4.21.  
 
MFI-related variables have a significant effect on the performance of institutionalist MFIs. Age 
appears to not have any effect on the social performance of MFIs. Despite this, the results for 
financial performance reveal that older commercial MFIs are neither sustainable nor profitable, as 
opposed to the work of Ericson and Pakes (1995), which finds that firms learn over time and 
discover how to be efficient. The size of MFIs, however, improves the performance of MFIs, where 
larger firms have higher number of borrowers and are more cost effective.  
 
A regulated environment appears to have a negative effect on the outreach of commercialised MFIs, 
where MFIs reach out to smaller number of borrowers. Turning towards macroeconomic factors, 
the results show that unemployment rate plays a role on the performance of institutionalist MFIs. 
As seen in tables 4.19 and 4.20, unemployment rate is significant at 0.05% and the effect of 
unemployment rate on average loan size and number of borrowers indicate that when 
unemployment rate is high commercial MFIs will see an increase in the number of borrowers as 
well as more demand for larger loans.  
 
On the other hand, a growing economy is positively related with all performance measures of 
institutionalist organisations. It appears that inflation has a negative relationship with commercial 
MFIs’ social performance but insignificant with financial performance. In the event of a natural 
disaster, these MFIs should see an increase in demand for loans but natural disasters appear to have 
no effect on the demand of loan sizes and profitability.  
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Table 4-20 South Asia – Institutionalist (Depth of Outreach)  
  
ALB/GNI (%) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)
*
0.013 0.002 0.006 0.009 0.006 -0.005 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.009
(0.280) (0.840) (0.580) (0.450) (0.610) (0.650) (0.630) (0.900) (0.700) (0.450)
Age -0.105 -0.069 -0.071 -0.056 -0.031 -0.005 0.025 0.007 0.01 -0.049
(0.560) (0.710) (0.690) (0.760) (0.870) (0.980) (0.900) (0.970) (0.960) (0.790)
Age Squared 0.03 0.024 0.023 0.019 0.014 0.009 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.017
(0.470) (0.570) (0.570) (0.660) (0.750) (0.830) (0.990) (0.930) (0.940) (0.690)
Rural Bank -0.015 -0.073 -0.096 -0.099 -0.104 -0.048 -0.098 -0.073 -0.078 -0.099
(0.910) (0.640) (0.540) (0.540) (0.520) (0.740) (0.540) (0.630) (0.600) (0.540)
Bank -0.15 -0.193 -0.208 -0.211 -0.21 -0.17 -0.205 -0.189 -0.194 -0.211
(0.340) (0.260) (0.230) (0.230) (0.230) (0.290) (0.230) (0.260) (0.240) (0.230)
NBFI -0.071 -0.104 -0.108 -0.11 -0.051 -0.15 -0.041 -0.055 -0.037 -0.1
(0.230) (0.160) (0.140) (0.150) (0.320) (0.110) (0.490) (0.420) (0.540) (0.180)
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) -0.872 -1.039* -1.029* -1.032* -1.005*  -1.088* -1.045* -1.055* -1.039* -1.031*  
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.01 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004
(0.330) (0.260) (0.360) (0.320) (0.140) (0.160) (0.420) (0.340) (0.730) (0.330)
GDP growth, annual % 0.031 0.024 0.024 0.028 0.051 0.023 0.045 0.036 0.041 0.03
(0.270) (0.340) (0.330) (0.340) (0.270) (0.400) (0.280) (0.270) (0.270) (0.360)
Personal remittance ($) 0.036* 0.019** 0.017* 0.015** 0.017** 0.015** 0.008 0.012* 0.015** 0.014** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.070) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000)
Main Variables
Unemployment, total (%) -0.138* -0.282* -0.285* -0.102 -0.293* -0.329* -0.252* -0.296* -0.284*  
(0.040) (0.020) (0.020) (0.440) (0.020) (0.020) (0.030) (0.020) (0.020)
Unemployment Squared 0.016 0.015 -0.007 0.018 0.019 0.01 0.015 0.014
(0.140) (0.170) (0.750) (0.100) (0.100) (0.380) (0.180) (0.170)
Natural Disaster -0.007 -0.012 -0.016 -0.01 -0.01 -0.011 -0.007
(0.470) (0.360) (0.200) (0.410) (0.310) (0.360) (0.480)
Political Stability -0.014
(0.210)
Voice and Accountability 0.008*                 
(0.040)                 
Government Effectiveness -0.006                 
(0.230)                 
Regulatory Quality -0.006                 
(0.080)                 
Control of Corruption -0.005                 
(0.180)                 
Rule of Law -0.001
(0.780)
Intercept 0.938*** 1.700*** 2.181*** 2.181*** 2.157*** 2.196*** 2.151*** 2.158*** 2.152*** 2.099***
(0.210) (0.320) (0.390) (0.390) (0.390) (0.390) (0.390) (0.360) (0.380) (0.370)
Number of Obeservations 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
R Squared 0.281 0.291 0.291 0.291 0.3 0.291 0.302 0.297 0.302 0.299
Wald Chi Squared 166.265 148.717 171.801 187.386 195.935 190.775 196.417 209.259 220.995 196.683
Probability > Chi Squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard Error 0.553 0.55 0.55 0.549 0.546 0.549 0.545 0.547 0.545 0.547
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 4-21 South Asia – Institutionalist (Breadth of Outreach)  
  
Number of Borrowers (Ln NAB) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)
*
1.029*** 1.018*** 1.033*** 0.972*** 0.962*** 1.010*** 0.956*** 0.938*** 0.954*** 0.977***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.323 0.353 0.339 0.056 0.133 -0.072 0.44 0.328 0.317 0.302
(0.690) (0.660) (0.670) (0.940) (0.860) (0.920) (0.590) (0.670) (0.690) (0.690)
Age Squared -0.139 -0.144 -0.146 -0.066 -0.082 -0.043 -0.155 -0.131 -0.128 -0.13
(0.490) (0.470) (0.460) (0.700) (0.650) (0.800) (0.440) (0.480) (0.510) (0.490)
Rural Bank -0.641*** -0.688*** -0.824*** -0.760*** -0.774*** -0.895*** -0.755*** -0.643*** -0.676*** -0.777***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bank -0.569** -0.603** -0.681** -0.619** -0.615** -0.729** -0.592** -0.521* -0.552* -0.653** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.000) (0.010) (0.010) (0.000) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.000)
NBFI -0.462** -0.489** -0.508** -0.465*** -0.283 -0.368* -0.136 -0.225 -0.174 -0.096
(0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.090) (0.020) (0.540) (0.240) (0.430) (0.650)
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 1.662*** 1.524*** 1.593*** 1.634*** 1.716*** 1.774*** 1.571*** 1.534*** 1.606*** 1.658***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.030* -0.030* -0.024 -0.018 -0.037** -0.013 -0.015 -0.018 -0.009 -0.016
(0.040) (0.030) (0.100) (0.150) (0.010) (0.300) (0.200) (0.120) (0.500) (0.180)
GDP growth, annual % 0.132** 0.126** 0.127** 0.049 0.120** 0.062 0.129*** 0.084* 0.099** 0.120***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.000) (0.170) (0.010) (0.080) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000)
Personal remittance ($) -0.034*** -0.048*** -0.062*** -0.018 -0.012 -0.018 -0.049*** -0.032* -0.019 -0.037** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.110) (0.290) (0.120) (0.000) (0.010) (0.090) (0.000)
Main Variables
Unemployment, total (%) -0.116 -1.050* -0.987** -0.423 -0.981** -1.201** -0.840* -1.032** -0.982** 
(0.140) (0.010) (0.010) (0.240) (0.010) (0.000) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010)
Unemployment Squared 0.102* 0.117** 0.052 0.112** 0.137*** 0.096* 0.118** 0.109** 
(0.020) (0.000) (0.190) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) 0.0 (0.010)
Natural Disaster 0.120*** 0.104*** 0.144*** 0.111*** 0.100*** 0.104*** 0.102***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Political Stability -0.044*  
(0.010)
Voice and Accountability -0.019*                
(0.020)                
Government Effectiveness -0.030**                
(0.010)                
Regulatory Quality -0.025**                
(0.010)                
Control of Corruption -0.019*                
(0.020)                
Rule of Law -0.024** 
(0.000)
Intercept -6.500*** -5.576*** -3.728*** -4.098*** -5.037*** -4.198*** -2.802** -3.143** -3.677*** -3.624***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
R Squared 0.771 0.776 0.778 0.837 0.845 0.836 0.848 0.848 0.847 0.849
Wald Chi Squared 1127.18 1186.566 1252.366 1472.687 1689.027 1579.404 1711.655 1716.974 1753.594 1763.545
Probability > Chi Squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard Error 0.881 0.872 0.869 0.744 0.726 0.747 0.718 0.72 0.722 0.717
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 4-22 South Asia – Institutionalist (Operational Self-Sufficiency) 
OSS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)
*
0.069*** 0.067*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.080** 0.068*** 0.067*** 0.070*** 0.069***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.475* 0.482* 0.482* 0.482* 0.486*  0.438 0.517* 0.510* 0.487* 0.512*  
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.070) (0.030) (0.030) (0.040) (0.030)
Age Squared -0.103* -0.105* -0.105* -0.105* -0.106*  -0.097 -0.113* -0.112* -0.106* -0.113*  
(0.040) (0.040) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.060) (0.030) (0.020) (0.030) (0.030)
Rural Bank -0.114* -0.125* -0.133* -0.134* -0.135*  -0.174* -0.132* -0.123* -0.132* -0.133*  
(0.050) -0.03 (0.040) (0.030) (0.030) (0.020) (0.040) (0.050) (0.030) (0.040)
Bank -0.212*** -0.221*** -0.228*** -0.229*** -0.229*** -0.260*** -0.225*** -0.220*** -0.227*** -0.230***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NBFI -0.141* -0.147* -0.149* -0.150* -0.14 -0.113* -0.119 -0.125 -0.144* -0.104
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.060) (0.040) (0.070) (0.060) (0.030) (0.100)
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 0.154 0.121 0.122 0.121 0.126 0.172 0.116 0.111 0.121 0.125
(0.140) (0.250) (0.240) (0.240) (0.220) (0.120) (0.260) (0.290) (0.240) (0.230)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.210) (0.210) (0.210) (0.210) (0.210) (0.370) (0.230) (0.220) (0.210) (0.240)
GDP growth, annual % 0.032** 0.030** 0.030** 0.030** 0.034*  0.035** 0.038** 0.034** 0.031** 0.039** 
(0.000) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000)
Personal remittance ($) 0.011*** 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.006
(0.000) (0.060) (0.080) (0.090) (0.100) (0.080) (0.410) (0.240) (0.090) (0.290)
Main Variables
Unemployment, total (%) -0.027 -0.057 -0.059 -0.028 -0.043 -0.076 -0.045 -0.058 -0.053
(0.320) (0.730) (0.730) (0.900) (0.800) (0.670) (0.780) (0.730) (0.760)
Unemployment Squared 0.003 0.003 0.0000 0.0000 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.002
(0.860) (0.860) (1.000) (1.000) (0.800) (0.940) (0.860) (0.920)
Natural Disaster 0.0000 -0.001 0.008 -0.001 -0.002 0.0000 -0.002
(0.980) (0.820) (0.210) (0.810) (0.650) (0.920) (0.570)
Political Stability -0.002
(0.720)
Voice and Accountability -0.007                
(0.080)                
Government Effectiveness -0.003                
(0.410)                
Regulatory Quality -0.003                
(0.480)                
Control of Corruption 0.0000                
(0.880)                
Rule of Law -0.003
(0.250)
Intercept -0.747* -0.54 -0.513 -0.515 -0.566 -0.527 -0.392 -0.419 -0.504 -0.448
(0.040) (0.160) (0.260) (0.260) (0.260) (0.250) (0.410) (0.410) (0.270) (0.330)
Number of Obeservations 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
R Squared 0.262 0.265 0.263 0.263 0.264 0.274 0.268 0.268 0.264 0.271
Wald Chi Squared 94.594 97.393 98.172 99.406 99.066 95.514 98.883 99.964 99.451 100.23
Probability > Chi Squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard Error 0.278 0.277 0.277 0.277 0.277 0.275 0.277 0.277 0.277 0.276
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 4-23 South Asia – Institutionalist (Return on Assets)  
 
ROA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)
*
0.008* 0.008* 0.007* 0.007* 0.007*  0.009* 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 0.007*  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.010) (0.020) (0.030) (0.020) (0.030)
Age 0.311* 0.312* 0.313* 0.314* 0.315*  0.304* 0.305* 0.311* 0.303* 0.315*  
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.040) -0.03 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Age Squared -0.062* -0.062* -0.062* -0.062* -0.062*  -0.060* -0.060* -0.061* -0.059* -0.062*  
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) -0.03 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Rural Bank -0.019 -0.021 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.022 -0.014 -0.015 -0.017 -0.013
(0.160) (0.120) (0.370) (0.360) (0.360) (0.120) (0.360) (0.300) (0.230) (0.370)
Bank 0.017 0.015 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.012 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.019
(0.560) (0.600) (0.510) (0.520) (0.520) (0.670) (0.520) (0.540) (0.570) (0.520)
NBFI -0.014 -0.016 -0.015 -0.015 -0.012 -0.007 -0.023 -0.017 -0.026 -0.013
(0.360) (0.290) (0.330) (0.330) (0.470) (0.620) (0.110) (0.310) (0.080) (0.390)
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 0.057** 0.051* 0.047* 0.047* 0.048*  0.057* 0.048* 0.048* 0.048* 0.047*  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.390) (0.380) (0.210) (0.210) (0.200) (0.420) (0.170) (0.200) (0.090) (0.220)
GDP growth, annual % 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.008* 0.010** 0.008** 0.010** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) -0.01 (0.000) (0.010) (0.000)
Personal remittance ($) 0.003*** 0.002 0.003* 0.003* 0.003*  0.003* 0.003* 0.003 0.003* 0.003
(0.000) (0.080) (0.020) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.060) (0.040) (0.060)
Main Variables
Unemployment, total (%) -0.005 0.047 0.047 0.056 0.049 0.052 0.045 0.048 0.047
(0.510) (0.270) (0.270) (0.270) (0.250) (0.240) (0.260) (0.250) (0.270)
Unemployment Squared -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
(0.240) (0.240) (0.240) (0.200) (0.220) (0.230) (0.230) (0.230)
Natural Disaster 0.0000 0.0000 0.002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.810) (0.680) (0.310) (1.000) (1.000) (0.680) (0.770)
Political Stability -0.001
(0.590)
Voice and Accountability -0.001                 
(0.100)                 
Government Effectiveness 0.001                 
(0.400)                 
Regulatory Quality 0.00                 
(0.720)                 
Control of Corruption 0.00                 
(0.130)                 
Rule of Law 0.00
(0.820)
Intercept -0.625** -0.583** -0.686** -0.686** -0.702** -0.689** -0.717** -0.697** -0.703** -0.683** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
R Squared 0.281 0.283 0.288 0.288 0.288 0.297 0.289 0.288 0.291 0.288
Wald Chi Squared 93.182 97.106 100.07 103.966 103.729 101.585 106.163 109.863 104.722 111.375
Probability > Chi Squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard Error 0.087 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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4.8 Conclusion 
The findings of this chapter reveal that well-developed institutions lead to poorer MFI performance 
in South Asia. Overall, not only the industry saw a decline in number of borrowers, the borrowers 
also request for smaller loans. Although giving out smaller loans denote that MFIs are reaching out 
to the poor in terms of depth of outreach, it can potentially spiral into profitability and sustainability 
issues in the long run. In other words, a well-governed environment allows MFIs to reach out to the 
poorest who are in need of the microloans, it also makes it costlier for MFIs to erate. In a country 
where an effective government is in play may mean that microentrepreneurs have more rules and 
regulations to obey. Tighter rules and regulations might create a barrier since the poor that needs to 
borrow from MFIs usually lack formal education and stringent regulations might deter them from 
taking up loans to start up small businesses.  
Perhaps one of the most fascinating findings is that a corruption free environment allows MFIs to 
reach out to the poor in terms of depth of outreach but MFIs cannot retain the number of borrowers. 
One possible explanation is that when corruption is reduced effectively, it may be harder for 
microborrowers to gain access to government services which are difficult to obtain without paying 
bribes. Indeed, the study of Cai et al. (2011) show that although bribery such as “grease money” 
and “protection money” expenditures offered to government officials has a significantly negative 
effect on the performance of firms, but its negative effect is much less pronounced for firms located 
in areas with low quality government service. 
Another way to look at the effect of institutions is that, when the formal economy is not performing 
as a result of political volatility, mediocre government administration and absence of law 
enforcement, the poor is then expected to turn to the informal economy possibly due to lesser job 
opportunities in the formal sector, leading to an increase in demand for microloans. These results 
are line with the study of Awaworyi Churchill and Marr (2014) and Crabb (2008). The works of 
Crabb (2008) find government regulations and interference with the finance sector adversely affects 
the financial sustainability of financial institutions. This is reaffirmed with the results of 
unemployment rate, where MFIs in South Asia initially see a decrease in demand for loans but when 
unemployment rate reaches a certain threshold, the industry will see an upsurge in demand for larger 
loans. Therefore, the poor view microfinance institutions as substitutes for formal job opportunities 
when unemployment rate is high.  
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Another interesting observation is that a growing economy encourages the growth of microfinance 
industry in South Asia. When the economy is growing, existing borrowers demand for larger loans 
to expand their microbusinesses. During an economic growth, MFIs are more profitable as 
borrowers would be more timely with their loan repayments, which then positively impacts the 
sustainability of the MFIs. An explanation offered by Ahlin et al. (2011) is highly sustainable MFIs 
would prefer to settle in high-growth economies and depending on the nature of their clienteles, 
especially if clients are relatively rich, then economic growth would promote their financial 
performance. Thus, for MFIs whose focus is not to improve on outreach performance, operating in 
a high growth economy gives them an edge of performing well financially. Although the work of 
Ahlin et al. (2011) finds that MFIs cope reasonably well with inflation by raising interest rates, the 
results of this study show that high inflation can tamper the performance of MFIs in South Asia.   
Age and firm size are critical in the performance of MFIs in this region, where larger and older 
MFIs are expected to be more sustainable (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2005). According to the 
works of Bogan et al. (2008) and Cull et al. (2009), the age of MFIs positively affects the 
performance of MFIs in terms of efficiency and profitability. Contrary to these studies, the 
regression results show that age does not play a role in microfinance institution’s number of 
borrowers. At the same time, the results point that older MFIs in South Asia prefer to give out larger 
loans, an indicator that older MFIs are more likely to move away from reaching out to the core poor. 
As for size of microfinance institutions - larger MFIs seems to be more sustainable and reach out to 
more borrowers. Larger MFIs also prefer to serve clients that are slightly above the poverty line 
(i.e., microentrepreneurs), another clue that points towards mission drift. This is in line with the 
studies of Harstarska and Nadholnyak (2007) and Ahlin et al. (2010). In addition, the results also 
unveil that MFIs formed by NGOs, banks, rural banks and NBFI concentrate on the poor while the 
clients of credit unions are made up of microentrepreneurs that can afford to borrow larger loans.  
As the results show that strong governance may hinder the performance of MFIs in terms of both 
social and financial performance, policy makers in the region should tailor institutional reforms that 
would encourage microfinance development to utilise MFIs as poverty alleviation agents. Given 
that institutions play a crucial role in the performance of microfinance industry, there is a need for 
further investigation at country level to provide more insights. Further research on how institutions 
affect the operations of microfinance and microfinance institution’s dependence on subsidies could 
also offer more insights.   
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Chapter 5 : Empirical Analysis - Latin America 
The previous chapter saw MFIs in South Asia underperform in politically stable environment. In an 
attempt to explain the differences across South Asia and Latin America, this chapter looks at how 
well-governed institutions can affect the performance of MFIs in Latin America. The regression 
results disclose that the influence of institutional environment on microfinance industry in Latin 
America is very different from South Asia. In Latin America, MFIs see an increase in average loan 
size as microborrowers demand larger loans in an environment that is conducive for business start-
ups and expansions. In addition, MFIs in this region performs better financially. 
5.1 Empirical Analysis and Discussions of Findings 
To aid discussion, the significance of the regression models is discussed as a whole. The estimated 
equations for Latin American region fit the 2SLS relatively well, as indicated by the R-squared 
values that are fairly stable amongst the alternate models. To allow for comparison, the tables that 
display results for institutional environment variables include ten models, the 1st model is set as the 
baseline model with all control variables, while 2nd and 3rd models look at the comparison between 
unemployment rate and its quadratic term to differentiate the non-linear effects. The subsequent 
models incorporate macroeconomic and institutional environment variables for hypothesis testing, 
where model 4 tests for the effect of natural disasters and models 5 – 10 look at institutional 
environment variables. The Wald Chi-Squared tests conclude that the relationship between all 
models and their response variables are statistically significant. Since the p-values for Wald Chi-
Squared are less than the significance level, the null hypotheses are then rejected and it can be 
established that the equations of this study provide a better fit.  
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5.2 Average Loan Size 
Table 5.1 reports the regression results for average loan balance per borrower/gross national income 
per capita (ALB/GNI). As mentioned in the previous chapter, the term average loan size will be 
used instead of ALB/GNI. Based on the dataset of a maximum of 1,630 MFI observations, the 
results indicate that microfinance institutions in Latin America give out larger loans in a regulated 
environment, which is portrayed by the relatively significant positive coefficients on most 
institutional environment variables. It appears that a society that is corruption free and guarantees 
property rights creates a favourable environment for the growth of microbusinesses which then 
leads to an increase in demand for larger loans; as shown by the positive coefficients on rule of law 
and control of corruption. This is in line with the study of Quintin (2008). These outcomes are 
consistent with the conjecture that borrowers in Latin America demand for larger loans in a 
regulated environment. This is not surprising as it has been long argued that countries that protect 
property rights and ensure contract enforcements enjoy economic prosperity.  
In addition to regulated environment, macroeconomic stability is also required to provide a healthy 
investment climate for microentrepreneurs. In Latin America, the elements of broad economy, such 
as inflation, personal remittance and unemployment appears to influence the size of microloans. 
The regression results display a positive relation between inflation and average loan size where 
model 1 shows that one percentage point increase in inflation rate increases average loan size by 
2.8%.  In an inflationary economy, the value of loan decreases in real terms, therefore it only make 
sense for MFIs to observe an increase in average loan size as borrowers would want to maintain 
purchasing power (Ledgerwood, 1998). The positive and significant coefficient on personal 
remittance in model 1 reveals that for every $1 of personal remittance received by the home country, 
the average loan size increases by 1.5%.  
Unemployment rate has a non-linear effect on average loan sizes, albeit insignificant. Using the 
results from model 2, it can be deduced that the turning point for unemployment rate is 19%; 
meaning when unemployment rate is lower than this point, borrowers demand for smaller loans. 
Beyond this point, unemployment appears to have a positive effect on average loan sizes; a possible 
indication that microfinance loans behave as a substitute for formal wages. The regression results 
further reveal that natural disasters have a negative and significant relationship with the average 
loan size of MFIs in Latin America. Surprisingly, economic growth appears to not have any effect 
on average loan size. 
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Next, the regression results show that MFIs age has a quadratic effect on average loan size. The 
results from model 1 indicate that the turning point of age is 2.1, a sign that younger MFIs give out 
smaller loan sizes but offer larger loans as they mature. This means new microfinance entrants in 
Latin America reach out to poorer clients, while young and mature microfinance players target 
richer clients. In other words, older MFIs are likely to be more commercialised. The results reaffirm 
the theory suggested by literature - as MFIs age, they tend to align closer to institutionalist ideology 
rather than welfarist are. Therefore, regardless of MFIs’ legal types, older MFIs should resemble 
the institutionalist philosophy. One possible explanation is that older MFIs face larger competition 
and has to reach out to richer and larger clients to achieve profitability and sustainability. In 
addition, larger MFIs are more likely to provide services to wealthier clients in this region, as shown 
by the positive and significant coefficients on MFI sizes. The results also confirm that MFIs with 
larger percentage of female borrowers give out smaller loans, in line with the findings of Hartaska 
and Nadolnyak (2014). 
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Table 5-1 Latin America- Average Loan Balance/GNI per capita (ALB/GNI) 
ALB/GNI (%) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)* 0.073*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.075*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.073***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age -0.126 -0.134 -0.153 -0.126 -0.139 -0.118 -0.138 -0.151 -0.106 -0.11
(0.3) (0.3) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.3) (0.2) (0.4) (0.4) 
Age Squared 0.03 0.032 0.037 0.029 0.031 0.026 0.031 0.034 0.023 0.024
(0.26) (0.23) (0.18) (0.29) (0.27) (0.36) (0.26) (0.21) (0.41) (0.40) 
Bank 0.509*** 0.566*** 0.567*** 0.550*** 0.554*** 0.574*** 0.552*** 0.549*** 0.603*** 0.603***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NBFI 0.062 0.013 0.014 0.017 0.019 0.02 0.018 0.017 0.032 0.027
(0.100) (0.720) (0.710) (0.660) (0.610) (0.570) (0.650) (0.660) (0.360) (0.450)
Credit Union 0.206** 0.190** 0.191** 0.182** 0.183** 0.210** 0.183** 0.182** 0.243*** 0.243***
(0.000) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NGO - - - - - - - - - -
Rural Bank - - - - - - - - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) -1.238*** -1.294*** -1.292*** -1.260*** -1.264*** -1.241*** -1.261*** -1.259*** -1.228*** -1.231***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.027***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP growth, annual % 0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
(0.28) (0.96) (1.00) (0.44) (0.45) (0.54) (0.45) (0.44) (0.36) (0.45) 
Personal remittance ($) 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Main Variables 
Unemployment, total (%) -0.041*** -0.038 -0.044* -0.044*  -0.049* -0.044* -0.044* -0.059** -0.066** 
(0.000) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployment Squared 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.001 0.001
(0.86) (0.91) (0.91) (0.72) (0.90) (0.91) (0.44) (0.38) 
Natural Disaster -0.013* -0.013*  -0.013* -0.013* -0.013* -0.016** -0.016** 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.010) (0.010)
Political Stability -0.005
(0.90) 
Voice and Accountability 0.106                
(0.17)                
Government Effectiveness -0.001                
(1.0)                
Regulatory Quality -0.001                
(0.98)                
Control of Corruption 0.196**                
(0.000)                
Rule of Law 0.168*  
(0.02) 
Intercept 1.594*** 2.032*** 2.021*** 2.006*** 2.030*** 2.005*** 2.018*** 2.003*** 2.117*** 2.246***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630
R Squared 0.206 0.224 0.223 0.232 0.23 0.232 0.231 0.232 0.235 0.231
Wald Chi Squared 367.467 381.097 381.768 407.773 405.264 483.686 517.374 433.467 442.399 463.181
Probability > Chi Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard Error 0.591 0.585 0.585 0.581 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.581 0.580 0.582
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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5.3 Number of Borrowers  
Table 5.2 provides evidence on the effect of institutional and macroeconomic environment on 
the number of borrowers. The regression results show that all six institution measurements 
influence the number of clients of microfinance institutions. In this region, it seems that a 
politically stable environment does more harm than good to the industry as MFIs see a decrease 
in borrowers. This means microentrepreneurs and the working poor are not interested in taking 
up loans in a regulated environment which encourages business start-ups/growth. However, if 
we take the regression results of average loan size into consideration, it appears that in an 
environment where effective government is in play, microentrepreneurs demand for larger 
loans. When borrowers demand for larger loans, it is expected that they will shop around for 
better interest rates; therefore, MFIs might lose some of their best clients to other financial 
institutions. These results are consistent with the 2nd hypothesis of the study.  
 
The regression results saw a unit increase in political stability reduces the number of borrowers 
by 28.5%, and this is significant at 0.1%. In addition, the negative and significant coefficients 
of regulatory quality and rule of law are indications that strong government regulation and 
efficiency in settling disputes may translate into costly burdens for MFIs. One interpretation 
could be a political environment supportive of businesses will encourage existing 
microentrepreneurs to borrow larger loans for business expansion. As mentioned, when these 
borrowers demand larger loans, some of them will graduate from microfinance institutions to 
commercial banks and MFIs will lose a percentage of their better clients. 
 
In Latin America, growing economy and inflation lure new borrowers to develop profitable 
business (Armendariz and Labie, 2011), and this is reflected in the statistically significant 
positive coefficients on GDP growth and inflation. As shown in model 1, a one percentage 
point increase in economic growth leads to an increase in number of borrowers by 1.8%; while 
every percentage point increase in inflation leads to an increase in number of borrowers by 
1.4%. The statistically significant negative coefficient on unemployment and the positive 
coefficient on unemployment squared shown in 3rd model reveal that when unemployment rate 
is low, it has a negative effect on the number of borrowers, but as the region faces higher 
unemployment rate, the effect on number of borrowers becomes positive. The turning point for 
unemployment rate is 6.25%. This is consistent with the conjecture that unemployment rate 
leads to an increase in demand for microloans, a sign that unemployment rate is a substitute for 
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formal employment. On the other hand, the positive and significant coefficient on natural 
disaster reveals MFIs will observe an increase in requests for microloans in the event of a 
calamity.  
 
Moving on to MFI-level variables, the negative coefficients on all legal types of MFIs suggest 
that the microfinance industry in Latin America is not reaching the poor in terms of number of 
clients. The positive and significant coefficient of MFI size proposes that an increase in total 
assets enhances the capacity of MFIs to reach out to more borrowers, this is reasonable from 
the point of view of economies of scale advantage (Hartarska, Nadolnyak and Mersland, 2014). 
Age, however, has a non-linear effect on the number of clients, as shown by the positive 
coefficient on the variable and negative coefficient on its quadratic terms. The results from 
model 1 show that MFIs above the age of 1.63 are facing a decline in number of borrowers. 
Recall that age of MFIs is measured via dummy variable, where age 1 represents new MFIs 
that entered the market for 1-2 years, age 2 includes young MFIs that have operated in the 
market for 3-6 years and age 3 is MFIs that have been in the market for that 7 years. The results 
then show MFIs that have operated in the market for a few years will see their client base to 
shrink. This potentially can be the consequence of competition or as MFIs age they become 
more risk averse and are selective in giving out loans. In addition, the results also reveal a 
positive and significant coefficient on percentage of female borrowers. 
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Table 5-2 Latin America- Number of Borrowers (Ln NAB)  
  
NAB (Ln Number of Borrowers) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)* 0.960*** 0.964*** 0.964*** 0.956*** 0.953*** 0.962*** 0.980*** 0.965*** 0.964*** 0.971***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.836* 0.836* 0.863* 0.856* 0.825*  0.802* 0.794* 0.843* 0.777* 0.803*  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Age Squared -0.256** -0.257** -0.263*** -0.259*** -0.250** -0.250** -0.255** -0.258** -0.244** -0.250** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bank -0.285** -0.311** -0.331** -0.309** -0.357*** -0.397*** -0.433*** -0.357*** -0.420*** -0.442***
(0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NBFI -0.011 0.011 0.005 0.001 -0.009 -0.012 0.016 0.006 -0.031 -0.024
(0.84) (0.84) (0.93) (0.98) (0.87) (0.83) (0.78) (0.91) (0.57) (0.66) 
Credit Union -0.437*** -0.430*** -0.433*** -0.422*** -0.456*** -0.526*** -0.521*** -0.470*** -0.548*** -0.577***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NGO - - - - - - - - - -
Rural Bank - - - - - - - - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 2.916*** 2.941*** 2.895*** 2.853*** 2.758*** 2.782*** 2.919*** 2.863*** 2.787*** 2.780***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.015*  0.008 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.008
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.18) (0.79) (0.67) (0.48) (0.17) 
GDP growth, annual % 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.020** 0.024*** 0.018** 0.021*** 0.018** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.023***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Personal remittance ($) 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.009*  -0.004 -0.003 0.006 -0.001 -0.001
(0.36) (0.19) (0.39) (0.14) (0.02) (0.380) (0.540) (0.15) (0.81) (0.74) 
Main Variables 
Unemployment, total 0.019** -0.056 -0.049 -0.035 -0.027 -0.036 -0.048 -0.018 0.007
(0.000) (0.060) (0.100) (0.23) (0.36) (0.230) (0.110) (0.54) (0.81) 
Unemployment Squared 0.005** 0.004* 0.003 0.003 0.004* 0.004* 0.003 0.002
(0.010) (0.020) (0.080) (0.070) (0.030) (0.010) -0.13 (0.29) 
Natural Disaster 0.017* 0.007 0.015 0.029** 0.021* 0.022** 0.024** 
(0.05) (0.40) (0.07) (0.000) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Political Stability -0.285***
(0.000)
Voice and Accountability -0.403***                
(0.000)                
Government Effectiveness -0.413***                
(0.000)                
Regulatory Quality -0.08                
(0.05)                
Control of Corruption -0.405***                
(0.000)                
Rule of Law -0.425***
(0.000)
Intercept -8.270*** -8.472*** -8.182*** -8.161*** -8.230*** -8.143*** -8.583*** -8.298*** -8.393*** -8.767***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630
R Squared 0.796 0.796 0.797 0.8 0.807 0.803 0.8 0.798 0.803 0.802
Wald Chi Squared 5403.031 5346.357 5283.723 5384.653 5158.736 5040.794 4852.143 5471.236 5170.021 5018.231
Probability > Chi Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard Error 0.738 0.738 0.737 0.733 0.719 0.727 0.732 0.736 0.726 0.728
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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5.4 Financial Performance  
The aim of this section is to determine the extent to which MFIs’ profitability and sustainability 
depend on institutional environment of the host country. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 present the results 
for operational self-sufficiency (OSS) and return on assets (ROA). In terms of profitability, 
ROA is used as it is the recommended measurement according to Microfinance Financial 
Reporting Standards. On the other hand, OSS is used to investigate the sustainability of MFIs. 
The results suggest that institutional environment play a role in the financial health of MFIs in 
Latin America. Regulatory quality, control of corruption, rule of law and political stability are 
strong predictors for both sustainability and profitability of the industry. In a society that values 
protection of private properties and ensures the enforcement of contracts, microentrepreneurs 
demand for credits, which assist MFIs to flourish financially.  
 
Surprisingly, the results in table 5.3 reveal that institutional environment variables appear to 
not have much effect on the sustainability of MFIs in Latin America. However, a regulated 
environment has a majority positive effect on profitability. Naturally, one would expect that 
political unrest will be perilous to any form of business start-ups and expansions, including 
microbusinesses. However, an interesting observation is political stability have a negative 
relationship with sustainability and profitability of MFIs; which means MFIs in this region are 
neither profitable nor sustainable in a politically stable environment. This could mean that 
institutions in this region have adapted to political violence (Blanco and Grier, 2009; Pérez-
Liñán, 2007). 
 
The regression results for macroeconomic variables show that GDP growth has a positive and 
significant relationship with the sustainability of MFIs, while inflation rate has a negative 
relationship with the profitability of MFIs. The regression results further suggest that 
unemployment rate has a non-linear effect on financial performance of MFIs, where 
unemployment rate has a negative coefficient while its quadratic term carries a positive 
coefficient. This states that MFIs are less likely to be profitable when unemployment rate is 
low, but will observe an improvement after a certain threshold. A likely explanation is when 
unemployment rate is high, the poor turn to activities in the informal market and perhaps these 
borrowers are more likely to repay MFIs in time so that they can secure future loans; this might 
help improve financial performance.  
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The results in tables 5.3 and 5.4 also suggest most MFIs in Latin America are neither 
sustainable nor profitable. In addition, the regression results also detect non-linear effect of age 
on MFIs’ financial performance, where older MFIs are more sustainable while younger MFIs 
more profitable. These results are in line with the study of Ahlin et al. (2010). A possible 
explanation behind this phenomenon is that new MFIs might be more cautious when they enter 
the market, leading to better performance in comparison to their older competitors.  
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Table 5-3 Latin America- Operational Self-Sufficiency (OSS) 
OSS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)* -0.044** 0.021 0.021 0.018 0.014 0.017 0.019 0.02 0.018 0.019
(0.01) (0.06) (0.07) (0.15) (0.30) (0.17) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) 
Age -0.262 -0.04 -0.036 -0.039 -0.048 -0.049 -0.047 -0.042 -0.041 -0.044
(0.15) (0.82) (0.84) (0.83) (0.79) (0.79) (0.79) (0.82) (0.82) (0.81) 
Age Squared 0.085* 0.02 0.02 0.021 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.022
(0.03) (0.59) (0.61) (0.58) (0.52) (0.55) (0.56) (0.58) (0.58) (0.57) 
Bank 0.509*** -0.053 -0.055 -0.046 -0.048 -0.056 -0.056 -0.056 -0.049 -0.058
(0.000) (0.20) (0.18) (0.29) (0.28) (0.22) (0.21) (0.26) (0.28) (0.23) 
NBFI 0.062 -0.009 -0.01 -0.011 -0.01 -0.012 -0.007 -0.01 -0.013 -0.013
(0.10) (0.79) (0.77) (0.74) (0.78) (0.73) (0.83) (0.75) (0.72) (0.70) 
Credit Union 0.206** -0.092** -0.093** -0.088** -0.093** -0.104** -0.099** -0.098* -0.092* -0.103*  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) -0.01 (0.000) (0.020) (0.020) (0.010)
NGO - - - - - - - - - -
Rural Bank - - - - - - - - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) -1.238*** -0.089 -0.096 -0.114 -0.143*  -0.128 -0.108 -0.112 -0.115 -0.122
(0.000) (0.15) (0.12) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) 
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) 0.028*** -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.004 -0.005* -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.005*  
(0.000) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.14) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
GDP growth, annual % 0.004 0.007* 0.006* 0.008* 0.007*  0.008* 0.007* 0.008* 0.008* 0.008*  
(0.28) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Personal remittance ($) 0.015*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.0000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.000) (0.27) (0.21) (0.58) (0.96) (0.18) (0.21) (0.57) (0.53) (0.35) 
Main Variables 
Unemployment, total -0.008* -0.02 -0.017 -0.014 -0.013 -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 -0.011
(0.03) (0.21) (0.29) (0.39) (0.42) (0.34) (0.30) (0.34) (0.52) 
Unemployment Squared 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.001 0.0000 0.000
(0.42) (0.55) (0.75) (0.69) (0.58) (0.54) (0.60) (0.75) 
Natural Disaster 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.008
(0.23) (0.40) (0.24) (0.14) (0.20) (0.23) (0.19) 
Political Stability -0.071** 
(0.000)
Voice and Accountability -0.068                 
(0.11)                 
Government Effectiveness -0.052                 
(0.08)                 
Regulatory Quality -0.017                 
(0.55)                 
Control of Corruption -0.012                 
(0.75)                 
Rule of Law -0.042
(0.31) 
Intercept 1.594*** 0.910** 0.959** 0.969** 0.999** 0.993** 0.938** 0.938** 0.958** 0.914** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630
R Squared 0.206 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.035 0.031 0.03 0.029 0.029 0.03
Wald Chi Squared 367.467 73.841 75.173 81.449 101.578 79.968 86.288 89.032 87.807 82.813
Probability > Chi Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard Error 0.591 0.417 0.417 0.417 0.416 0.417 0.417 0.417 0.417 0.417
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 5-4 Latin America- Return on Assets (ROA)  
  
ROA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)* 0.009** 0.008** 0.008** 0.007* 0.006*  0.007* 0.007* 0.005 0.007* 0.006*  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.040) (0.010) (0.010) (0.070) (0.020) (0.020)
Age 0.09 0.089 0.091 0.09 0.088 0.091 0.09 0.092 0.094 0.092
(0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.200) (0.190) (0.200) (0.180) (0.180) (0.180)
Age Squared -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.014
(0.35) (0.35) (0.34) (0.36) (0.38) (0.36) (0.37) (0.36) (0.34) (0.35) 
Bank -0.009 -0.005 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 0.0000 -0.002 0.009 0.003 0.005
(0.4) (0.6) (0.6) (0.800) (0.760) (0.970) (0.870) (0.430) (0.760) (0.630)
NBFI -0.002 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005
(0.81) (0.43) (0.40) (0.35) (0.39) (0.38) (0.37) (0.25) (0.500) (0.47) 
Credit Union -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.007 -0.003 -0.005 0.006 0.002 0.004
(0.300) (0.210) (0.190) (0.330) (0.240) (0.590) (0.380) (0.390) (0.800) (0.570)
NGO - - - - - - - - - -
Rural Bank - - - - - - - - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 0.037** 0.033* 0.030* 0.024 0.018 0.025 0.023 0.021 0.027 0.028
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.100) (0.240) (0.090) (0.100) (0.130) (0.060) (0.050)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002*  -0.002** -0.002** -0.001* -0.002** -0.002** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) (0.010) (0.010) (0.050) (0.010) (0.000)
GDP growth, annual % 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.22) (0.39) (0.53) (0.21) (0.33) (0.190) (0.21) (0.30) (0.230) (0.200)
Personal remittance ($) 0.001 0.0000 0.0000 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001*  
(0.14) (0.34) (0.45) (0.14) (0.08) (0.05) (0.11) (0.12) (0.02) (0.02) 
Main Variables 
Unemployment, total -0.003** -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 -0.010*  
(0.000) (0.09) (0.15) (0.18) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.07) (0.04) 
Unemployment Squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.32) (0.45) (0.55) (0.40) (0.44) (0.49) (0.27) (0.21) 
Natural Disaster 0.003* 0.002*  0.003* 0.003* 0.002 0.002* 0.002*  
(0.020) (0.040) (0.010) (0.020) (0.140) (0.030) (0.040)
Political Stability -0.013** 
(0.01) 
Voice and Accountability 0.009                
(0.16)                
Government Effectiveness 0.001                
(0.87)                
Regulatory Quality 0.019***                
(0.000)                
Control of Corruption 0.023***                
(0.000)                
Rule of Law 0.025***
(0.000)
Intercept -0.277** -0.245** -0.227* -0.224* -0.218*  -0.223* -0.220* -0.191* -0.212* -0.188*  
(0.000) (0.010) (0.020) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) 
Number of Obeservations 1619 1619 1619 1619 1619 1619 1619 1619 1619 1619
R Squared 0.077 0.083 0.084 0.086 0.09 0.087 0.086 0.093 0.092 0.092
Wald Chi Squared 73.91 79.333 80.587 83.357 85.752 84.899 86.641 95.862 93.013 93.822
Probability > Chi Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard Error 0.089 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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5.5 Economic Sectors  
Tables 5.5 – 5.8 look at the effects of three main economic sectors on the performance of MFIs 
in Latin America. From the results, it can be seen that agricultural sector has a positive effect 
on the social performance of MFIs. In developing economies, agricultural output still makes 
up of a considerable part of the economy. In Latin America, this sector is growing substantially 
(Janda and Zetek, 2013), as such there is a possibility that MFIs in this region are refocusing 
on agricultural activities, as reflected in the regression results. Unlike agriculture, services and 
manufacturing reported a negative relationship with average loan sizes. Although agricultural 
sector is rather small in this region, it seems that this sector provides more viable opportunities 
for microenterprises, in comparison to services sectors. Interestingly, when manufacturing 
sector is doing well, microfinance industry in Latin America sees an increase in number of 
borrowers but the demand for loans are smaller. This could mean that when jobs are abundant 
in the manufacturing sector, the working poor might view microloans as a supplementary 
income on top of formal wages, which then leads to an increase in demand for smaller loans.  
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Table 5-5 Latin America – The Effect of Economic 
Sectors on ALB/GNI 
 
 
Table 5-6 Latin America – The Effect of Economic 
Sectors on NAB  
  
ALB/GNI (%) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)* -0.033* -0.041** -0.042** 
(0.020) (0.010) (0.010)
Age -0.277 -0.255 -0.274
(0.11) (0.15) (0.13) 
Age Squared 0.081* 0.081* 0.085*  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Bank 0.461*** 0.491*** 0.459***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NBFI 0.090* 0.076 0.05
(0.020) (0.070) (0.160)
Credit Union 0.206** 0.187** 0.142*  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.02) 
NGO - - -
Rural Bank - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) -1.132*** -1.201*** -1.265***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) 0.019** 0.028*** 0.030***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP growth, annual % -0.001 0.004 -0.005
(0.88) (0.28) (0.25) 
Personal remittance ($) 0.003 0.019*** 0.014***
(0.27) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic Sectors
Agriculture, % of GDP 0.029***                
(0.000)                
Manufacturing, % of GDP -0.016*                
(0.04)                
Services, % of GDP -0.016***
(0.000)
Intercept 1.286*** 1.782*** 2.606***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 1630 1626 1630
R Squared 0.237 0.213 0.225
Wald Chi Squared 442.229 407.665 416.072
Probability > Chi Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard Error 0.580 0.589 0.584
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Number of Borrowers (Ln Nab) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)* 0.968*** 0.956*** 0.964***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.830* 0.821* 0.832*  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Age Squared -0.259** -0.248** -0.257** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bank -0.317** -0.252* -0.319** 
(0.000) (0.010) (0.000)
NBFI -0.001 -0.043 -0.021
(0.980) (0.44) (0.700)
Credit Union -0.440*** -0.397*** -0.472***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NGO - - -
Rural Bank - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 2.971*** 2.841*** 2.906***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) 0.001 0.006 0.006
(0.83) (0.280) (0.240)
GDP growth, annual % 0.019** 0.021*** 0.017** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.01) 
Personal remittance ($) -0.002 -0.005 0.003
(0.630) (0.24) (0.41) 
Economic Sectors
Agriculture, % of GDP 0.024***                
(0.000)                
Manufacturing, % of GDP 0.020**                
(0.01)                
Services, % of GDP -0.018***
(0.000)
Intercept -8.459*** -8.708*** -7.795***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 1630 1626 1630
R Squared 0.795 0.8 0.796
Wald Chi Squared 5231.884 5599.145 5216.158
Probability > Chi Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard Error 0.741 0.732 0.739
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
  
100 
 
 
Table 5-7 Latin America – The Effect of Economic 
Sectors on OSS 
 
Table 5-8 Latin America – The Effect of Economic 
Sectors on ROA  
OSS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)* 0.021 0.025* 0.022
(0.070) (0.03) (0.06) 
Age -0.038 -0.037 -0.043
(0.83) (0.84) (0.81) 
Age Squared 0.021 0.018 0.02
(0.59) (0.63) (0.60) 
Bank -0.054 -0.072 -0.072
(0.180) (0.090) (0.100)
NBFI -0.003 0.002 -0.001
(0.93) (0.94) (0.98) 
Credit Union -0.089** -0.095** -0.103** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NGO - - -
Rural Bank - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) -0.094 -0.065 -0.085
(0.12) (0.26) (0.18) 
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.005 -0.006* -0.006*  
(0.10) (0.02) (0.03) 
GDP growth, annual % 0.008** 0.008** 0.006
(0.000) (0.01) (0.05) 
Personal remittance ($) 0.0010 0.0000 -0.001
(0.66) (0.95) (0.43) 
Economic Sectors
Agriculture, % of GDP 0.00                 
(0.10)                 
Manufacturing, % of GDP -0.004                 
(0.300)                 
Services, % of GDP -0.004
(0.060)
Intercept 0.881** 0.853** 1.075** 
(0.000) (0.010) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 1630 1626 1630
R Squared 0.026 0.025 0.027
Wald Chi Squared 76.495 72.674 79.513
Probability > Chi Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard Error 0.418 0.418 0.418
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
ROA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)* 0.009** 0.010*** 0.009** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.09 0.092 0.09
(0.20) (0.18) (0.20) 
Age Squared (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
(0.35) (0.30) (0.35) 
Bank (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
(0.47) -0.16 -0.42
NBFI -0.002 0.001 -0.001
(0.74) (0.87) (0.85) 
Credit Union -0.006 -0.01 -0.005
(0.30) (0.08) (0.36) 
NGO - - -
Rural Bank - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 0.033* 0.046*** 0.037** 
(0.01) (0.000) (0.01) 
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) 0.207* 0.207* 0.207*  
(0.15) (0.10) (0.16) 
GDP growth, annual % 0.207* 0.00 0.00
(0.85) (0.94) (0.88) 
Personal remittance ($) 0.00 0.002*** 0.00
(0.08) (0.000) (0.05) 
Economic Sectors
Agriculture, % of GDP -0.001                
(0.14)                
Manufacturing, % of GDP -0.004*                
(0.030)                
Services, % of GDP 0.00
(0.62) 
Intercept -0.265** -0.242* -0.286** 
(0.000) (0.020) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 1619 1615 1619
R Squared 0.077 0.084 0.077
Wald Chi Squared 76.195 74.592 73.993
Probability > Chi Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard Error 0.089 0.088 0.089
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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5.6 Robustness Checks  
To test the robustness of the regressions, alternative models with variables obtained from the studies 
of Hartaska (2005), Hermes et al. (2009) and Cull et al. (Cull et al., 2014) are tested and presented 
in tables 5.9 – 5.14. From the results, it is found that larger costs of business start ups lead to higher 
demands for larger loans. Intuitively, when it is more expensive to start a business, borrowers will 
request for more credits. The regression results also show that lending interest rates and interest rate 
spreads influence the performance of MFIs.  
Next we look at the relationship between lending interest rates and the performance of MFIs, the 
issues that involve lending interest rate are whether the poor are affected by formal interest rate and 
whether MFIs are affected by the competition between formal financial institutions. The results in 
table 5.13 show that when lending interest rate is high, borrowers request for smaller loans. This is 
line with the study of Dehejia, Montgomery and Morduch (Dehejia et al., 2012) which find a ten 
percentage point increase in interest rate reduces the demand for credit by about 7.3 to 10.4 percent. 
In addition, it is also found that an increase in formal lending rates does not affect the profitability 
and sustainability of MFIs, contrary to the study of Vanroose and D’Espallier (2013). This may be 
due to the independence of the industry where MFIs do not rely on the funding system of the host 
country. However, this claim is not tested in this study. The development of formal financial sector, 
(measured via interest rate spreads) also affects the performance of MFIs.  
As MFIs in Latin America is highly commercialised, interest rate spread is used to gauge for 
competition in giving out loans. Accordingly, the lower the interest rate spread, the more 
competitive the environment is for microfinance institutions. The results in table 5.14 discover that 
MFIs in Latin America are competing with commercial banks, where competition increases the 
average loan size but lowers the number of borrowers and deteriorates the financial performance. 
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Table 5-9 Latin America – Robustness Checks (ALB/GNI)   
 
 
Table 5-10 Latin America – Robustness Checks (ALB/GNI)
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
   
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ALB/GNI (%) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)* -0.042* -0.021 -0.044** -0.086
(0.01) (0.10) 0.00 (0.44) 
Age -0.266 -0.367* -0.235 0.364
(0.14) (0.03) (0.18) (0.56) 
Age Squared 0.086* 0.103** 0.074 -0.042
(0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.75) 
Bank 0.506*** 0.382*** 0.507*** 1.492***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NBFI 0.064 0.045 0.090* 0.208
(0.08) (0.19) (0.04) (0.07) 
Credit Union 0.204** 0.196** 0.202** 2.269** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NGO - - - -
Rural Bank - - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) -1.061*** -1.021*** -1.074*** -1.415***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) 0.028*** 0.011 0.034*** -0.01
(0.000) (0.06) (0.000) (0.49) 
GDP growth, annual % 0.004 0.001 -0.003 -0.01
(0.32) (0.79) (0.48) (0.63) 
Personal remittance ($) 0.015*** -0.003 0.020*** -0.029*  
(0.000) (0.49) (0.000) (0.04) 
Time Required to Start a Business 0.00                
(0.48)                
Cost of Business Startups 0.006***                
(0.000)                
Labour Force Participation 0.017***                
(0.000)                
Corruption 0.197
(0.39) 
Intercept 1.558*** 1.320*** 0.385 1.919
(0.000) (0.000) (0.39) (0.26) 
Number of Obeservations 1630 1630 1630 258
R Squared 0.208 0.296 0.217 0.469
Wald Chi Squared 374.442 419.055 387.792 246.498
Probability > Chi Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard Error 0.590 0.557 0.587 0.802
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Number of Active Borrowers (Ln NAB) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)* 0.977*** 0.972*** 0.962*** -0.086
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.44) 
Age 0.792* 0.783* 0.842* 0.364
(0.030) (0.030) (0.020) (0.560)
Age Squared -0.251** -0.247** -0.259** -0.042
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.750)
Bank -0.314** -0.349*** -0.290** 1.492***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NBFI 0.011 -0.019 -0.008 0.208
(0.840) (0.720) (0.890) (0.07) 
Credit Union -0.448*** -0.442*** -0.439*** 2.269** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NGO - - - -
Rural Bank - - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 3.037*** 2.950*** 2.928*** -1.379***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) 0.005 -0.003 0.007 -0.01
(0.380) (0.570) (0.24) (0.490)
GDP growth, annual % 0.017** 0.020** 0.020** -0.01
(0.01) (0.000) (0.000) (0.63) 
Personal remittance ($) 0.007 -0.006 0.004 -0.029*  
(0.080) (0.180) (0.270) (0.040)
Time Required to Start a Business 0.003***                
(0.000)                
Cost of Business Startups 0.003***                
(0.000)                
Labour Force Participation 0.003                
(0.55)                
Corruption Index 0.197
(0.390)
Intercept -8.653*** -8.405*** -8.516*** 1.919
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.26) 
Number of Obeservations 1630 1630 1630 258
R Squared 0.795 0.796 0.796 0.469
Wald Chi Squared 5692.585 5595.765 5279.553 246.498
Probability > Chi Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard Error 0.741 0.738 0.739 0.802
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 5-11 Latin America – Robustness Checks (OSS) 
 
Table 5-12 Latin America – Robustness Checks (ROA)  
 
OSS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)* 0.029* 0.024* 0.021 0.049***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.080) (0.000)
Age -0.055 -0.044 -0.034 0.089
(0.760) (0.810) (0.850) (0.570)
Age Squared 0.021 0.021 0.017 -0.029
(0.570) (0.590) (0.640) (0.420)
Bank -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.196***
(0.070) (0.100) (0.160) (0.000)
NBFI 0.007 0.00 0.01 0.061
(0.83) (1.00) (0.780) (0.11) 
Credit Union -0.008 0.000 -0.033 -0.005
(0.710) (0.990) (0.130) (0.940)
NGO - - - -
Rural Bank - - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) -0.034 -0.075 -0.065 -0.002
(0.600) (0.220) (0.270) (0.980)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.006* -0.007* -0.004 0.000
(0.010) (0.020) (0.080) (0.900)
GDP growth, annual % 0.006* 0.008** 0.006 0.001
(0.020) (0.010) (0.070) (0.950)
Personal remittance ($) 0.0000 -0.002 0.0000 0.006
(0.880) (0.290) (0.960) (0.160)
Time Required to Start a Business 0.001**                 
(0.000)                 
Cost of Business Startups 0.0000                 
(0.33)                 
Labour Force Participation 0.005                 
(0.15)                 
Corruption 0.283***
0.00
Intercept 0.588** 0.676*** 0.164 1.372
(0.000) (0.000) (0.390) (0.070)
Number of Obeservations 1619 1619 1619 1619
R Squared 0.077 0.083 0.084 0.086
Wald Chi Squared 73.91 79.333 80.587 83.357
Probability > Chi Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard Error 0.089 0.088 0.088 0.088
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
ROA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)* 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.009** 0.006*  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.03)
Age 0.083 0.086 0.092 0.052
(0.240) (0.210) (0.180) (0.230)
Age Squared -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015
(0.370) (0.360) (0.310) (0.150)
Bank -0.014 -0.013 -0.009 -0.030** 
(0.180) (0.210) (0.410) (0.000)
NBFI 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.012
(0.87) (0.76) (0.890) (0.290)
Credit Union -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.01
(0.18) (0.28) (0.290) (0.500)
NGO - - - -
Rural Bank - - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 0.055*** 0.039** 0.042** 0.04
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.150)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.002** -0.003** -0.002* 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.370)
GDP growth, annual % 0.001 0.001 0.0000 0.002
(0.580) (0.260) (0.630) (0.300)
Personal remittance ($) 0.001* 0.000 0.001* 0.002
(0.01) (0.700) (0.04) (0.090)
Time Required to Start a Business 0.000***                
(0.000)                
Cost of Business Startups 0.000*                
(0.01)                
Labour Force Participation 0.002*                
(0.02)                
Corruption 0.086** 
0.00
Intercept -0.337*** -0.284** -0.385*** -0.426** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 1619 1619 1619 256
R Squared 0.095 0.08 0.081 0.138
Wald Chi Squared 114.124 75.657 98.149 98.081
Probability > Chi Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard Error 0.088 0.089 0.089 0.057
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
  
104 
 
                
Table 5-13 Latin America – Robustness Checks (Lending Interest Rates)  
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   
ALB/GNI (%) NAB (Ln NAB) OSS ROA
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)* -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.064***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age -0.285 -0.285 -0.285 -0.285
(0.170) (0.170) (0.170) (0.170)
Age Squared 0.101* 0.101* 0.101* 0.101*  
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Bank 0.575*** 0.575*** 0.575*** 0.575***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NBFI 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.04
(0.320) (0.320) (0.320) (0.320)
Credit Union 0.216 0.216 0.216 0.216
(0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110)
NGO - - - -
Rural Bank - - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers -1.380*** -1.380*** -1.380*** -1.380***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP growth, annual % 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.670) (0.67) (0.670) (0.670)
Personal remittance ($) 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lending Interest Rate -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intercept 2.100*** 2.100*** 2.100*** 2.100***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 1290 1290 1290 1290
R Squared 0.199 0.199 0.199 0.199
Wald Chi Squared 286.339 286.339 286.339 286.339
Probability > Chi Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard Error 0.647 0.647 0.647 0.647
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 5-14 Latin America – Robustness Checks (Interest Rate Spread)  
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   
ALB/GNI (%) NAB (Ln NAB) OSS ROA
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)* -0.060** 0.945*** 0.022 0.009** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.06) (0.000)
Age -0.279 0.834* -0.033 0.092
(0.180) (0.030) (0.870) (0.240)
Age Squared 0.097* -0.263** 0.019 -0.014
(0.030) (0.000) (0.650) (0.410)
Bank 0.572*** -0.101 0.01 0.005
(0.000) (0.35) (0.800) (0.690)
NBFI 0.06 0.057 0.049 0.005
(0.170) (0.34) (0.140) (0.500)
Credit Union 0.234 -0.13 -0.04 0.00
(0.080) (0.170) (0.150) (0.980)
NGO - - - -
Rural Bank - - - -
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) -1.321*** 3.038*** 0.02 0.051***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.700) (0.010)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) 0.025*** 0.004 -0.007* -0.002** 
(0.000) (0.550) (0.010) (0.010)
GDP growth, annual % 0.002 0.019** 0.004 0.0000
(0.710) (0.000) (0.170) (0.930)
Personal remittance ($) 0.020*** 0.012** 0.002 0.002** 
(0.000) (0.01) (0.310) (0.01) 
Interest Rates Spread -0.004 0.014*** 0.004* 0.002***
(0.09) (0.000) (0.02) (0.000)
Intercept 1.928*** -8.244*** 0.695* -0.308** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.03) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 1290 1290 1290 1280
R Squared 0.197 0.806 0.043 0.107
Wald Chi Squared 297.031 4959.887 117.165 97.43
Probability > Chi Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard Error 0.648 0.748 0.380 0.097
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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5.7 The Effect of Institutional Environment Variables on Welfarist and 
Institutionalist MFIs 
5.7.1 Welfarist  
Overall, the regression results in tables 5.15 – 5.18 show that welfarist institutions underperform in 
a regulated environment, where these institutions do not reach out to the core poor, are not 
sustainable but are profitable in terms of return of assets. Amongst the variables, political stability, 
regulatory quality and rule of law have more significant effect on the performance of welfarist 
organisations.  
 
The positive coefficient on control of corruption and rule of law again reiterates that corruption 
behaves as a barrier for the start-ups of microenterprises, which leads to repercussions on the 
performance of MFIs. Corruption is known as an expensive, hidden (absence of voice and 
accountability) and unlawful (absence of rule of law) transfer of profits. However, the results on 
political stability and regulatory quality are counter-intuitive. In a politically stable environment 
where government can implement rules and regulations, welfarist organisations see reduction in 
average loan sizes. One possible interpretation is that microentrepreneurs that borrow from MFIs in 
this region operate in the informal/black market and these markets only thrive in a politically unrest 
environment.  
 
Moving on to macroeconomic variables, the results reveal that unemployment rate has a diminishing 
effect on average loan size but an increasing effect on number of borrowers and financial 
performance. This means that when unemployment rate is high, there will be an increase in demand 
for smaller loans, perhaps due to borrowers’ fear of inability to repay loans. On the other hand, in 
an economy where the unemployment rate is low, welfarist organisations will see smaller number 
of borrowers, but borrowers demand for larger loans. Welfarist MFIs behave as an emergency loan 
centres for the poor in the events of natural disaster, as shown by the increase in number of 
borrowers for smaller loans. However, natural disasters have no significant relationship with 
financial performance of these organisations.   
  
Firm-level variables such as age and the legal types appear to affect the performance of welfarist 
MFIs. Surprisingly, only credit unions in Latin America target better-off clients while NGOs 
services the core poor, as shown by the positive coefficients on average loan size for credit unions 
and negative coefficients on NGOs. In terms of age of firms, older welfarist institutions are more 
interested in giving out larger loans, another sign of mission drift, as shown in table 5.16. Two 
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explanations can be provided – (1) the possibility of mission drift where established welfarist 
organisations are only interested in wealthier clients that can afford larger loans (2) when welfarist 
organisations age, they face competition from other financial institutions, as a result, borrowers who 
can afford larger loans will shop around for better interest rates. In addition, the results suggest that 
larger welfarist organisations also perform more efficiently in terms of financials.  
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Table 5-15 Latin America – Welfarist (Average Loan Balance/GNI per capita)  
  
ALB/GNI (%) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)* 0.01 0.013 0.013 0.020* 0.031*** 0.019* 0.020* 0.022** 0.020* 0.019*  
(0.280) (0.160) (0.160) (0.030) (0.000) (0.040) (0.030) (0.010) (0.030) (0.040)
Age -0.279 -0.282 -0.281 -0.27 -0.308 -0.264 -0.281 -0.279 -0.249 -0.262
(0.110) (0.100) (0.100) (0.120) (0.060) (0.120) (0.100) (0.100) (0.150) (0.130)
Age Squared 0.083* 0.084* 0.084* 0.079* 0.086*  0.078* 0.080* 0.080* 0.075* 0.077*  
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.020) (0.040) (0.030) (0.030) (0.050) (0.040)
Credit Union 0.056 0.065 0.065 0.052 0.051 0.063 0.039 0.009 0.073 0.072
(0.340) (0.270) (0.270) (0.380) (0.380) (0.310) (0.510) (0.880) (0.250) (0.240)
NGO -0.099* -0.072 -0.072 -0.073 -0.053 -0.077 -0.074 -0.071 -0.079* -0.080*  
(0.020) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.200) (0.050) (0.070) (0.080) (0.040) (0.040)
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) -1.196*** -1.228*** -1.230*** -1.175*** -1.136*** -1.165*** -1.172*** -1.174*** -1.158*** -1.160***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.034***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP growth, annual % 0.005 0.002 0.002 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004
(0.180) (0.570) (0.600) (0.320) (0.110) (0.380) (0.250) (0.470) (0.260) (0.300)
Personal remittance ($) 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.004 0.011*** 0.008** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.230) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Main Variables 
Unemployment, total (%) -0.028*** -0.03 -0.041* -0.063** -0.044* -0.041* -0.041* -0.049* -0.052*  
(0.000) (0.130) (0.040) (0.000) (0.030) (0.040) (0.030) (0.020) (0.020)
Unemployment Squared 0.0000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.920) (0.530) (0.070) (0.450) (0.530) (0.460) (0.340) (0.320)
Natural Disaster -0.024*** -0.012*  -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.018** -0.026*** -0.026***
(0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Political Stability -0.082***
(0.000)
Voice and Accountability 0.002                
(0.350)                
Government Effectiveness -0.002                
(0.280)                
Regulatory Quality -0.002*                
(0.010)                
Control of Corruption 0.002                
(0.110)                
Rule of Law 0.002
(0.190)
Intercept 0.888** 1.035*** 1.044*** 1.084*** 1.625*** 0.977** 1.167*** 1.166*** 0.971** 1.057***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630
R Squared 0.226 0.241 0.241 0.253 0.271 0.253 0.254 0.259 0.255 0.254
Wald Chi Squared 371.576 379.551 380.489 407.626 423.415 511.553 508.069 431.613 484.051 481.486
Probability > Chi Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard Error 0.584 0.578 0.578 0.573 0.567 0.573 0.573 0.571 0.573 0.573
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 5-16 Latin America – Welfarist (Number of Borrowers) 
Number of Borrowers (Ln NAB) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)* 0.925*** 0.924*** 0.923*** 0.916*** 0.934*** 0.915*** 0.922*** 0.916*** 0.915*** 0.919***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.845* 0.846* 0.872* 0.861* 0.790*  0.824* 0.797* 0.860* 0.811* 0.826*  
(0.020) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020) (0.030) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020)
Age Squared -0.253** -0.254** -0.260*** -0.255*** -0.241** -0.248** -0.246** -0.254*** -0.245** -0.249** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Credit Union -0.375*** -0.378*** -0.372*** -0.359*** -0.362*** -0.429*** -0.431*** -0.367*** -0.411*** -0.446***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NGO 0.029 0.019 0.026 0.028 0.061 0.045 0.031 0.028 0.045 0.055
(0.600) (0.740) (0.630) (0.620) (0.270) (0.420) (0.590) (0.620) (0.410) (0.320)
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 2.886*** 2.900*** 2.854*** 2.800*** 2.869*** 2.738*** 2.828*** 2.800*** 2.760*** 2.739***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.005 0.003 -0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.002
(0.690) (0.740) (0.860) (0.710) (0.450) (0.580) (0.580) (0.800) (0.930) (0.720)
GDP growth, annual % 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.018** 0.024*** 0.020** 0.022*** 0.019** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Personal remittance ($) 0.00 0.004 0.00 0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 0.006 0.002 0.000
(0.420) (0.290) (0.540) (0.140) (0.270) (0.410) (0.740) (0.140) (0.640) (0.990)
Main Variables 
Unemployment, total (%) 0.012 -0.061* -0.051 -0.092** -0.034 -0.045 -0.051 -0.033 -0.005
(0.060) (0.030) (0.080) (0.000) (0.240) (0.120) (0.080) (0.250) (0.860)
Unemployment Squared 0.004** 0.004* 0.006*** 0.003 0.004* 0.004* 0.003 0.002
(0.010) (0.020) (0.000) (0.070) (0.030) (0.020) (0.080) (0.240)
Natural Disaster 0.023** 0.044*** 0.023** 0.037*** 0.024** 0.029*** 0.033***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000)
Political Stability -0.154***
(0.000)
Voice and Accountability -0.012***                
(0.000)                
Government Effectiveness -0.010***                
(0.000)                
Regulatory Quality 0.000                
(0.700)                
Control of Corruption -0.006***                
(0.000)                
Rule of Law -0.010***
(0.000)
Intercept -7.773*** -7.838*** -7.540*** -7.579*** -6.530*** -6.908*** -7.168*** -7.563*** -7.312*** -7.455***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010)
Number of Obeservations 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630
R Squared 0.803 0.803 0.804 0.807 0.808 0.811 0.81 0.807 0.809 0.81
Wald Chi Squared 5250.204 5273.394 5232.077 5334.879 5121.57 5026.614 4969.977 5394.277 5292.749 5071.501
Probability > Chi Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard Error 0.727 0.726 0.724 0.720 0.717 0.711 0.713 0.720 0.716 0.713
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 5-17 Latin America – Welfarist (Operational Self-Sufficiency) 
 
OSS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)* 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.02 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.014
(0.130) (0.100) (0.120) (0.210) (0.080) (0.290) (0.230) (0.190) (0.200) (0.210)
Age -0.037 -0.038 -0.034 -0.038 -0.057 -0.046 -0.047 -0.039 -0.04 -0.042
(0.840) (0.830) (0.850) (0.830) (0.750) (0.800) (0.800) (0.830) (0.830) (0.810)
Age Squared 0.02 0.021 0.02 0.022 0.025 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022
(0.600) (0.590) (0.610) (0.580) (0.510) (0.550) (0.550) (0.580) (0.580) (0.560)
Credit Union -0.077** -0.074** -0.073** -0.069** -0.069** -0.083** -0.079** -0.072* -0.071** -0.080** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
NGO 0.006 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.027 0.016 0.013 0.016 0.017 0.018
(0.860) (0.680) (0.660) (0.650) (0.430) (0.650) (0.700) (0.640) (0.620) (0.610)
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) -0.083 -0.093 -0.101 -0.119 -0.098 -0.133 -0.118 -0.118 -0.12 -0.127
(0.170) (0.130) (0.110) (0.070) (0.130) (0.060) (0.070) (0.070) (0.080) (0.070)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.007** -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.008*** -0.006* -0.007** -0.006* -0.006* -0.006*  
(0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.000) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
GDP growth, annual % 0.008** 0.007* 0.006* 0.008* 0.007*  0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 0.008*  
(0.010) (0.020) (0.040) (0.010) (0.030) (0.020) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Personal remittance ($) -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004*  -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.490) (0.240) (0.180) (0.580) (0.010) (0.170) (0.260) (0.590) (0.540) (0.370)
Main Variables 
Unemployment, total (%) -0.009* -0.02 -0.017 -0.028 -0.014 -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 -0.011
(0.010) (0.190) (0.290) (0.080) (0.380) (0.300) (0.290) (0.330) (0.500)
Unemployment Squared 0.001 0.0000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.440) (0.580) (0.200) (0.680) (0.580) (0.580) (0.640) (0.780)
Natural Disaster 0.008 0.013*  0.008 0.01 0.008 0.008 0.009
(0.190) (0.030) (0.180) (0.110) (0.190) (0.190) (0.150)
Political Stability -0.042***
(0.000)
Voice and Accountability -0.002                 
(0.090)                 
Government Effectiveness -0.001                 
(0.140)                 
Regulatory Quality 0.0000                 
(0.780)                 
Control of Corruption 0.0000                 
(0.770)                 
Rule of Law -0.001
(0.340)
Intercept 0.927** 0.978** 1.027** 1.014** 1.281*** 1.159** 1.085** 1.018** 1.019** 1.035** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630
R Squared 0.024 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.035 0.03 0.03 0.029 0.029 0.029
Wald Chi Squared 70.398 72.317 74.656 81.74 93.791 80.655 85.47 91.281 89.598 82.843
Probability > Chi Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard Error 0.418 0.418 0.418 0.417 0.416 0.417 0.417 0.417 0.417 0.417
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 5-18 Latin America – Welfarist (Return on Assets)  
  
ROA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)* 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008** 0.010*** 0.008** 0.007** 0.007** 0.008** 0.008** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.09 0.089 0.091 0.09 0.082 0.09 0.089 0.091 0.094 0.091
(0.200) (0.200) (0.190) (0.200) (0.230) (0.190) (0.200) (0.190) (0.180) (0.190)
Age Squared -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.012 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.014
(0.350) (0.350) (0.340) (0.360) (0.410) (0.360) (0.370) (0.360) (0.330) (0.350)
Credit Union -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.0000 0.0000 0.001 -0.001 0.009 0.005 0.006
(0.580) (0.730) (0.780) (0.990) (0.980) (0.830) (0.910) (0.080) (0.350) (0.220)
NGO 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.01 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.004
(0.720) (0.430) (0.390) (0.380) (0.140) (0.420) (0.410) (0.380) (0.490) (0.530)
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 0.036** 0.033* 0.030* 0.024 0.032*  0.025 0.024 0.024 0.028 0.029*  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.030) (0.090) (0.020) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.050) (0.050)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.003*** -0.002** -0.002** -0.001 -0.002* -0.002** 
0.0 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.000) (0.010) (0.010) (0.060) (0.010) (0.010)
GDP growth, annual % 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.230) (0.380) (0.530) (0.210) (0.430) (0.200) (0.230) (0.310) (0.250) (0.230)
Personal remittance ($) 0.001 0.0000 0.0000 0.001 0.0000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001*  
(0.140) (0.340) (0.450) (0.130) (0.280) (0.060) (0.140) (0.140) (0.020) (0.020)
Main Variables 
Unemployment, total (%) -0.003** -0.007 -0.006 -0.011*  -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.009*  
0.0 (0.090) (0.150) (0.020) (0.130) (0.150) (0.150) (0.080) (0.040)
Unemployment Squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.320) (0.450) (0.090) (0.410) (0.440) (0.490) (0.280) (0.220)
Natural Disaster 0.003* 0.005*** 0.003* 0.003* 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.020) (0.000) (0.020) (0.020) (0.180) (0.060) (0.080)
Political Stability -0.017***
(0.000)
Voice and Accountability 0.0                
(0.310)                
Government Effectiveness 0.0000                
(0.730)                
Regulatory Quality 0.001***                
(0.000)                
Control of Corruption 0.001***                
(0.000)                
Rule of Law 0.001***
(0.000)
Intercept -0.500*** -0.477*** -0.487*** -0.494*** -0.497*** -0.501*** -0.476*** -0.543*** -0.539*** -0.525***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630
R Squared 0.024 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.035 0.03 0.03 0.029 0.029 0.029
Wald Chi Squared 70.398 72.317 74.656 81.74 93.791 80.655 85.47 91.281 89.598 82.843
Probability > Chi Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard Error 0.418 0.418 0.418 0.417 0.416 0.417 0.417 0.417 0.417 0.417
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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5.7.2 Institutionalist   
The regression results suggest that institutionalist organisations fail to perform in the context of 
well-developed institutional environment. Interestingly, political stability, government 
effectiveness and regulatory quality have negative relations with average loan size while voice and 
accountability, control of corruption and rule of law are positively related to average loan size. As 
discussed in chapter 3, corruption is an expensive, hidden and unlawful transfer of public revenue 
that occurs in the absence of rule of law and voice and accountability. The results show that these 
variables may create desirable environment for microbusinesses to thrive, which then lead to 
demand for larger loans. Intuitively, higher corruption taxes microenterprises and creates barriers 
for microtrades to expand, reducing the demand for microloans. The negative coefficient of 
regulatory quality shows that borrowers are less confident in expanding their business when there’s 
lighter burden of government regulation. Government effectiveness, however, is not significant in 
explaining the demand for loan sizes.  
The regression results also provide evidence that broad economy affects the performance of 
institutionalist MFIs. The effect of unemployment rate is non-linear; where the results on number 
of borrowers and financial performance report a negative coefficient on unemployment rate and 
positive coefficient on its quadratic terms. On the other hand, table 5.19 reports a positive coefficient 
on unemployment and negative coefficient on unemployment squared, albeit insignificant. When 
unemployment rate in the region is high, institutionalist organisations will see an increase in demand 
for smaller loans, an indication that commercialised microfinance industry substitutes for formal 
employment. Similar to welfarist MFIs, institutionalist organisations in Latin America also behave 
as emergency loan centres in the events of natural disasters.  
 
In Latin America, the age appears not to have much influence on the financial performance of 
institutionalist organisations. However, larger MFIs in terms of assets are more profitable and 
sustainable as they have the ability to reach out to larger number of wealthier clients. As mentioned 
earlier, NBFIs target poorer clients while banks prefer borrowers that can afford larger loans. The 
negative and significant coefficient on percentage of female borrowers for average loan size and 
positive coefficient for the number of borrowers tell us that large proportion of female borrowers 
helps commercialised MFIs to reach out to the core poor.  
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Table 5-19 Latin America – Institutionalist (Average Loan Balance/GNI per capita)  
  
ALB/GNI (%) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)* -0.040* -0.048** -0.048** -0.041* -0.03 -0.043** -0.041** -0.037* -0.043** -0.044** 
(0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.070) (0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010)
Age -0.253 -0.254 -0.255 -0.249 -0.276 -0.245 -0.256 -0.256 -0.229 -0.24
(0.170) (0.170) (0.170) (0.170) (0.110) (0.180) (0.160) (0.150) (0.210) (0.190)
Age Squared 0.078* 0.081* 0.081* 0.078* 0.083*  0.078* 0.080* 0.080* 0.074 0.077
(0.050) (0.040) (0.040) (0.050) (0.030) (0.050) (0.040) (0.040) (0.060) (0.050)
Bank 0.435*** 0.499*** 0.500*** 0.485*** 0.444*** 0.494*** 0.481*** 0.466*** 0.498*** 0.498***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NBFI -0.005 -0.051 -0.05 -0.044 -0.048 -0.046 -0.039 -0.033 -0.049 -0.049
(0.870) (0.100) (0.100) (0.150) (0.110) (0.170) (0.240) (0.330) (0.130) (0.140)
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) -1.342*** -1.391*** -1.390*** -1.350*** -1.309*** -1.352*** -1.344*** -1.331*** -1.352*** -1.354***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.025***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP growth, annual % 0.004 0.0000 0.000 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004
(0.300) (0.900) (0.930) (0.350) (0.180) (0.390) (0.320) (0.440) (0.290) (0.330)
Personal remittance ($) 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.006 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.060) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Main Variables
Unemployment, total (%) -0.043*** -0.041* -0.047* -0.061** -0.049* -0.046* -0.046* -0.054** -0.057** 
(0.000) (0.040) (0.020) (0.000) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010)
Unemployment Squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.001 0.001
(0.920) (0.830) (0.310) (0.760) (0.820) (0.780) (0.600) (0.600)
Natural Disaster -0.014* -0.007 -0.014* -0.013* -0.012 -0.016** -0.016** 
(0.010) (0.200) (0.010) (0.030) (0.050) (0.010) (0.010)
Political Stability -0.055***
(0.000)
Voice and Accountability 0.001                
(0.570)                
Government Effectiveness -0.001                
(0.550)                
Regulatory Quality -0.001                
(0.230)                
Control of Corruption 0.002                
(0.150)                
Rule of Law 0.002
(0.300)
Intercept 1.700*** 2.144*** 2.139*** 2.115*** 2.410*** 2.077*** 2.148*** 2.085*** 2.058*** 2.138***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630
R Squared 0.201 0.219 0.219 0.229 0.246 0.227 0.23 0.235 0.229 0.227
Wald Chi Squared 310.204 329.669 332.482 354.448 367.856 478.359 516.103 435.094 442.817 482.651
Probability > Chi Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard Error 0.593 0.586 0.586 0.583 0.576 0.583 0.582 0.580 0.583 0.583
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 5-20 Latin America – Institutionalist (Number of Borrowers) 
Number of Borrowers (Ln NAB) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)* 0.952*** 0.956*** 0.956*** 0.947*** 0.977*** 0.953*** 0.963*** 0.943*** 0.949*** 0.954***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.817* 0.817* 0.842* 0.835* 0.752*  0.805* 0.772* 0.839* 0.804* 0.808*  
(0.030) (0.030) (0.020) (0.020) (0.040) (0.030) (0.040) (0.020) (0.030) (0.030)
Age Squared -0.241** -0.243** -0.248** -0.244** -0.228** -0.239** -0.235** -0.245** -0.237** -0.238** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bank -0.127 -0.16 -0.178 -0.157 -0.266** -0.200* -0.223* -0.145 -0.177 -0.197*  
(0.170) (0.080) (0.050) (0.100) (0.010) (0.030) (0.020) (0.120) (0.050) (0.030)
NBFI 0.132** 0.156** 0.150** 0.142** 0.134** 0.157** 0.175*** 0.135** 0.150** 0.156** 
(0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000)
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 3.135*** 3.161*** 3.118*** 3.063*** 3.179*** 3.065*** 3.142*** 3.050*** 3.065*** 3.073***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) 0.012* 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.006 0.014* 0.009 0.012 0.011 0.013*  
(0.040) (0.050) (0.090) (0.070) (0.380) (0.030) (0.160) (0.060) (0.080) (0.040)
GDP growth, annual % 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.020** 0.025*** 0.020** 0.024*** 0.021** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.026***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Personal remittance ($) 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.006 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.004 0.002
(0.500) (0.250) (0.470) (0.150) (0.180) (0.830) (0.860) (0.150) (0.390) (0.620)
Main Variables
Unemployment, total (%) 0.022*** -0.05 -0.041 -0.086** -0.028 -0.035 -0.042 -0.031 -0.011
(0.000) (0.100) (0.170) (0.010) (0.350) (0.260) (0.170) (0.310) (0.720)
Unemployment Squared 0.004* 0.004* 0.007*** 0.003 0.004* 0.004* 0.003 0.003
(0.010) (0.030) (0.000) (0.060) (0.030) (0.030) (0.060) (0.130)
Natural Disaster 0.019* 0.041*** 0.019* 0.030*** 0.018* 0.022* 0.025** 
(0.020) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.050) (0.010) (0.010)
Political Stability -0.168***
(0.000)
Voice and Accountability -0.008***                
(0.000)                
Government Effectiveness -0.008***                
(0.000)                
Regulatory Quality 0.001                
(0.480)                
Control of Corruption -0.003*                
(0.050)                
Rule of Law -0.006** 
(0.000)
Intercept -8.488*** -8.720*** -8.443*** -8.410*** -7.443*** -8.099*** -8.283*** -8.387*** -8.327*** -8.474***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630
R Squared 0.792 0.792 0.793 0.796 0.794 0.796 0.795 0.796 0.796 0.795
Wald Chi Squared 5709.689 5628.311 5569.79 5680.609 5388.993 5444.323 5326.021 5770.686 5660.76 5478.511
Probability > Chi Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard Error 0.747 0.747 0.746 0.740 0.744 0.739 0.741 0.738 0.740 0.74
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 5-21 Latin America – Operational Self-Sufficiency (OSS)  
  
OSS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)* 0.022 0.02 0.02 0.016 0.026*  0.015 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.016
(0.060) (0.070) (0.070) (0.170) (0.040) (0.210) (0.170) (0.170) (0.150) (0.170)
Age -0.044 -0.044 -0.04 -0.043 -0.064 -0.049 -0.05 -0.042 -0.04 -0.045
(0.810) (0.810) (0.820) (0.810) (0.720) (0.790) (0.780) (0.820) (0.820) (0.800)
Age Squared 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.024 0.028 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.025
(0.550) (0.540) (0.560) (0.530) (0.460) (0.510) (0.510) (0.540) (0.550) (0.520)
Bank -0.032 -0.022 -0.024 -0.015 -0.049 -0.016 -0.017 -0.014 -0.015 -0.016
(0.350) (0.530) (0.480) (0.670) (0.180) (0.650) (0.630) (0.710) (0.660) (0.650)
NBFI 0.029 0.021 0.021 0.017 0.013 0.022 0.022 0.016 0.016 0.019
(0.320) (0.460) (0.470) (0.520) (0.620) (0.420) (0.410) (0.570) (0.560) (0.490)
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) -0.032 -0.041 -0.047 -0.069 -0.035 -0.074 -0.065 -0.071 -0.068 -0.07
(0.550) (0.450) (0.390) (0.250) (0.560) (0.230) (0.270) (0.210) (0.260) (0.240)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006*  -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.060) (0.070) (0.060) (0.070) (0.010) (0.080) (0.050) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080)
GDP growth, annual % 0.008** 0.007* 0.006* 0.008** 0.007*  0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 0.008*  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.030) (0.010) (0.030) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Personal remittance ($) -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004** -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.440) (0.230) (0.180) (0.560) (0.010) (0.260) (0.300) (0.560) (0.690) (0.490)
Main Variables
Unemployment, total (%) -0.007* -0.018 -0.015 -0.026 -0.013 -0.015 -0.015 -0.016 -0.013
(0.050) (0.240) (0.340) (0.100) (0.400) (0.350) (0.340) (0.330) (0.440)
Unemployment Squared 0.001 0.0000 0.001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.001 0.0000
(0.450) (0.590) (0.190) (0.650) (0.580) (0.600) (0.570) (0.660)
Natural Disaster 0.008 0.013*  0.008 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.008
(0.200) (0.040) (0.190) (0.140) (0.240) (0.230) (0.190)
Political Stability -0.043***
(0.000)
Voice and Accountability -0.001                 
(0.200)                 
Government Effectiveness -0.001                 
(0.240)                 
Regulatory Quality 0.0000                 
(0.780)                 
Control of Corruption 0.0000                 
(0.700)                 
Rule of Law 0.0000
(0.690)
Intercept 0.723*** 0.790*** 0.833*** 0.831*** 0.878*** 0.900*** 0.865*** 0.856*** 0.857*** 0.842***
(0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630
R Squared 0.024 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.035 0.03 0.03 0.029 0.029 0.029
Wald Chi Squared 70.398 72.317 74.656 81.74 93.791 80.655 85.47 91.281 89.598 82.843
Probability > Chi Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard Error 0.419 0.418 0.418 0.418 0.417 0.418 0.418 0.418 0.418 0.418
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 5-22 Latin America – Return on Assets (ROA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ROA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10   
MFI Control Variables
MFI Size (t-1)* 0.009** 0.008** 0.008** 0.007* 0.010*** 0.007* 0.007* 0.005 0.007* 0.006*  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.089 0.089 0.09 0.089 0.081 0.09 0.089 0.092 0.094 0.092
(0.200) (0.200) (0.190) (0.200) (0.230) (0.190) (0.200) (0.190) (0.180) (0.190)
Age Squared -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.012 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 -0.015 -0.014
(0.350) (0.360) (0.350) (0.370) (0.420) (0.370) (0.370) (0.350) (0.330) (0.350)
Bank -0.007 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.013 0.001 0.0000 0.006 0.002 0.003
(0.420) (0.760) (0.670) (0.920) (0.170) (0.930) (0.960) (0.480) (0.830) (0.720)
NBFI 0 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.01 -0.006 -0.006
(0.980) (0.590) (0.550) (0.420) (0.310) (0.410) (0.470) (0.100) (0.300) (0.260)
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 0.040** 0.036** 0.034* 0.026 0.039** 0.026 0.026 0.019 0.026 0.026
(0.000) (0.010) (0.010) (0.070) (0.010) (0.070) (0.060) (0.200) (0.070) (0.080)
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) -0.002** -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.003** -0.002** -0.002* -0.001* -0.002* -0.002** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.000) (0.010) (0.010) (0.050) (0.020) (0.010)
GDP growth, annual % 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.220) (0.380) (0.520) (0.200) (0.420) (0.190) (0.210) (0.320) (0.250) (0.230)
Personal remittance ($) 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001*  
(0.140) (0.350) (0.460) (0.140) (0.260) (0.050) (0.120) (0.140) (0.020) (0.020)
Main Variables
Unemployment, total (%) -0.003** -0.007 -0.006 -0.011*  -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.009*  
(0.000) (0.100) (0.160) (0.020) (0.130) (0.160) (0.140) (0.070) (0.040)
Unemployment Squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.320) (0.460) (0.090) (0.420) (0.460) (0.530) (0.280) (0.220)
Natural Disaster 0.003* 0.005*** 0.003* 0.003* 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.010) (0.000) (0.010) (0.020) (0.130) (0.050) (0.060)
Political Stability -0.017***
(0.000)
Voice and Accountability 0.000                
(0.220)                
Government Effectiveness 0.0000                
(0.890)                
Regulatory Quality 0.001***                
(0.000)                
Control of Corruption 0.001***                
(0.000)                
Rule of Law 0.001***
(0.000)
Intercept -0.281** -0.250** -0.233* -0.229* -0.135 -0.235* -0.224* -0.218* -0.243** -0.223*  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Obeservations 1619 1619 1619 1619 1619 1619 1619 1619 1619 1619
R Squared 0.076 0.083 0.084 0.086 0.108 0.086 0.086 0.094 0.091 0.092
Wald Chi Squared 56.194 60.051 60.373 63.712 71.728 66.066 63.885 80.486 76.714 77.494
Probability > Chi Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard Error 0.089 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.087 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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5.8 Conclusion  
The focus of this chapter lies in the influence of institutional environment on microfinance industry 
in Latin America. In general, the results show that good governance which secure property rights, 
enforce contracts, provide adequate public goods, and eliminate bribery encourages the working 
poor to borrow larger loans. However, borrowers might shop around for the best interest rates and 
might leave MFIs for other financial institutions which then lead to a decrease in client numbers. In 
a regulated environment, MFIs are also more profitable and sustainable. A reasonable interpretation 
of the findings is that good institutions and functioning government encourages the entrepreneurial 
poor to start or expand microbusinesses.  
The most interesting finding in this chapter is that MFIs in Latin America offer larger loans 
compared to MFIs in South Asia, reaffirming the literature findings on MFIs servicing different 
clienteles in both regions. In addition, it appears that welfarist institutions in Latin America has 
diverted from the traditional objectives to refocus on wealthier clients. Similar to the microfinance 
industry in South Asia, percentage of women borrowers is compatible with the profitability and 
sustainability of MFIs. These findings are consistent with the works of Cull et al. (2007b) and 
Quayes (2012) which indicate higher rate of women borrowers help to reduce administrative 
expenses, leading to higher sustainability. This phenomenon is also explained in the study of 
Vanroose and D’Espallier (Vanroose and D’Espallier, 2013).  
Therefore, it can be concluded that the effect of external environment on microfinance industry is 
different in Latin America than in South Asia. One major discovery is that most welfarist and 
institutionalist organisations in Latin America are serving the entrepreneurial poor. Given the 
differences between the results from chapters 4 and 5, there is then scope for further work to include 
region-specific variables in order to provide policy conclusions at the regional level. In the next 
chapter, the effects of time and region on the performance of MFIs are explored.  
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Chapter 6 : Empirical Analysis – South Asia and Latin America 
In chapters 4 and 5, the regression results revealed distinct differences on the effect of environment 
on the performance of MFIs in South Asia and Latin America. One might then wonder if the 
interaction between region and time effect play a role in these differences. This chapter examines 
the regression results for both regions, with the additional region-fiscal year interaction variable to 
identify the effect of region on the performance of microfinance industry from 2003 to 2014. 
Marginal effect (ME) is then used to measure the result on conditional mean of MFI performance 
by observing the change in fiscal year. ME is commonly used to quantify the effect of variables on 
an outcome of interest and are known as average treatment effects, average partial effects, and 
average structural functions in different contexts (Wooldridge, 2002, Blundell and Powell, 2003). 
In the linear regression model, the ME equals the relevant slope coefficient (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2005), which will then help simplify the analysis. A marginal plot is then used to present the results.  
It is acknowledged that multicollinearity is present for some of the results in this chapter. Although 
literature recommend mean-centering for interaction term to minimise this error, but it does not 
make sense in this case as it is a dummy coded categorical variable (where South Asia – 1, Latin 
America – 0). Therefore, the variables are left in their original form. Since the main aim of this 
chapter is to look at the regional effect on the performance of MFIs, the coefficients on institutional 
environment and macroeconomic variables will not be interpreted in detail.  
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6.1 Regional Effect on the Performance of Microfinance Industry 
6.1.1 Average Loan Size 
The regression result for average loan size is displayed in table 6.1; while the result for margin 
effect is presented in table 6.2. As discussed earlier, the coefficients for most variables will not be 
interpreted in detail. Overall, institutional environment has a positive effect on average loan size. 
On the other hand, the effect of unemployment rate on average loan size is non-linear, as shown by 
the significantly negative coefficient on unemployment rate and positive coefficient on its quadratic 
term.  
The regression results in model 1 display that the average loan size for South Asia is 15.7%, an 
indication that MFIs in this region are serving the core poor. (Average loan size below 20% is a 
rough indication that the clients are very poor). The results for interaction term (fiscal year*South 
Asia) further reaffirm this point as the coefficients ranges from -0.2 to -0.56.  
Moving on to the results on marginal effects (ME) in table 6.2, the numbers reported in the “margin” 
column are average predicted probabilities. While the model for ME is static for the sake of 
simplicity, it helps to shed light on MFIs’ scaling-up process - whether institutions in these two 
regions target better-off customers to minimise potential loan arrears. Based on the results, the 
average value for average loan size is 0.45 for Latin America and 0.25 for South Asia. This means 
that average loan size in South Asia is 20 percentage points smaller than Latin America, reaffirming 
the literature that microfinance in Latin America is more focused on richer clients. Additionally, 
average loan sizes for MFIs in both regions are facing downward trend from 2003 to 2008 before 
seeing an increasing trend as displayed in figure 6.1.  
An interesting observation is that in terms of average loan size, the microfinance industry in South 
Asia saw a downward trend from 2003 – 2010 and an upward trend from 2011 – 2014. The results 
reveal a huge dip in average loan size from 2003 to 2007, possibly due to the Andhra Pradesh 
microfinance crisis. The microfinance crisis in the Southern India State of Andhra Pradesh was the 
result of hyper-competitive environment with MFIs chasing market shares by offering large loans 
to anybody who was willing to take up loans. Similarly, the results for Latin America also show a 
decreasing trend in average loan size from 2003 to 2011.  In addition, the microfinance industry in 
Latin America saw a sharp dip in average loan size in 2008, potentially an effect of the great 
recession in the region. 
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ALB/GNI (%) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5    Model 6 Model 7    
          
South Asia 0.157 0.192 0.225* 0.159 0.139 0.139 0.106 
  (0.24) (0.20) (0.02) (0.27) (0.31) (0.35) (0.47) 
Fiscal Year          
           
2003 0.149 0.218* 0.190* 0.162 0.14 0.128 0.211*   
  (0.07) (0.01) (0.03) (0.06) (0.10) (0.12) (0.02) 
2004 -0.007 0.036 0.034 0.000 -0.008 -0.018 0.032 
  (0.93) (0.63) (0.66) (1.00) (0.91) (0.81) (0.68) 
2005 0.084 0.133 0.126 0.093 0.078 0.074 0.126 
  (0.37) (0.17) (0.19) (0.33) (0.41) (0.43) (0.20) 
2006 0.073 0.12 0.098 0.081 0.067 0.052 0.121 
  (0.38) (0.17) (0.25) (0.35) (0.43) (0.53) (0.17) 
2007 0.06 0.101 0.083 0.065 0.053 0.045 0.108 
  (0.45) (0.23) (0.31) (0.43) (0.51) (0.56) (0.21) 
2008 -0.140* -0.087 -0.107 -0.136* -0.144*   -0.159* -0.07 
  (0.03) (0.20) (0.10) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.35) 
2009 0.043 0.075 0.069 0.055 0.032 0.039 0.106 
  (0.50) (0.26) (0.29) (0.41) (0.63) (0.53) (0.13) 
2010 0.007 0.04 0.044 0.012 0.0000 0.005 0.061 
  (0.92) (0.59) (0.55) (0.87) (0.99) (0.94) (0.43) 
2011 -0.064 -0.036 -0.03 -0.066 -0.068 -0.078 -0.015 
  (0.29) (0.55) (0.63) (0.28) (0.26) (0.19) (0.82) 
2012 -0.082 -0.066 -0.05 -0.084 -0.088 -0.089 -0.034 
  (0.16) (0.25) (0.40) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.59) 
2013 -0.043 -0.032 0.0000 -0.042 -0.049 -0.04 -0.003 
  (0.45) (0.57) (1.00) (0.46) (0.40) (0.47) (0.96) 
           
Fiscal Year* South Asia          
          
2003 -0.315 -0.317 -0.271 -0.317 -0.305 -0.21 -0.284 
  (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.37) (0.20) 
2004 -0.492* -0.419* -0.3 -0.500* -0.487*   -0.351 -0.379 
  (0.01) (0.03) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.06) 
2005 -0.332* -0.269 -0.286* -0.329 -0.324*   -0.238 -0.302 
  (0.05) (0.13) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.20) (0.10) 
2006 -0.537** -0.447* -0.434** -0.544** -0.519**  -0.478* -0.504**  
  (0.000) (0.02) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.01) (0.01) 
2007 -0.564** -0.456* -0.513*** -0.574** -0.546**  -0.548** -0.581**  
  (0.000) (0.01) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2008 -0.206 -0.077 -0.17 -0.214 -0.184 -0.192 -0.217 
  (0.60) (0.85) (0.65) (0.59) (0.64) (0.63) (0.58) 
2009 -0.412** -0.320* -0.404*** -0.415** -0.395**  -0.361* -0.404**  
  (0.000) (0.03) (0.000) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
2010 -0.393** -0.319* -0.433*** -0.395** -0.380**  -0.356* -0.386*   
  (0.01) (0.03) (0.000) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
2011 -0.364** -0.285 -0.360*** -0.361* -0.349*   -0.332* -0.364*   
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  (0.01) (0.06) (0.000) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
2012 -0.248 -0.187 -0.305** -0.246 -0.234 -0.244 -0.302*   
  (0.07) (0.21) (0.000) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.05) 
2013 -0.233 -0.175 -0.348** -0.232 -0.224 -0.218 -0.258 
  (0.12) (0.27) (0.000) (0.14) (0.13) (0.18) (0.11) 
           
MFI Size (t-1)* -0.021 -0.017 -0.024 -0.023 -0.019 -0.024 -0.027*   
  (0.12) (0.25) (0.08) (0.08) (0.15) (0.07) (0.05) 
Age -0.202 -0.229 -0.213 -0.203 -0.205 -0.192 -0.21 
  (0.21) (0.15) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) (0.24) (0.19) 
Age Squared 0.075* 0.080* 0.078* 0.076* 0.075*   0.073* 0.078*   
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Bank 0.124 0.127 0.191 0.13 0.117 0.205* 0.183 
  (0.23) (0.22) (0.06) (0.20) (0.25) (0.04) (0.07) 
NBFI -0.309** -0.317** -0.282** -0.320** -0.302**  -0.265** -0.305**  
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Credit Union -0.057 -0.054 0.011 -0.052 -0.064 0.029 0.006 
  (0.66) (0.68) (0.93) (0.69) (0.62) (0.83) (0.96) 
NGO -0.282** -0.284** -0.257* -0.288** -0.278**  -0.244* -0.274**  
  (0.01) (0.000) (0.01) (0.000) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Rural Bank          
           
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) -1.097*** -1.078*** -1.084*** -1.106*** -1.094*** -1.078*** -1.086*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation, consumer price (annual %) 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.025*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth, annual % 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.006 
  (0.220) (0.310) (0.270) (0.170) (0.250) (0.200) (0.230) 
Personal remittance 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployment, total (%) -0.050* -0.059** -0.057* -0.051* -0.051*   -0.059** -0.072**  
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.000) 
Unemployment Squared 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.720) (0.420) (0.530) (0.720) (0.660) (0.490) (0.320) 
           
Political Stability    0.090*                      
    (0.03)                      
Voice and Accountability    0.207**                     
     (0.000)                     
Government Effectiveness     0.048                    
      (0.42)                    
Regulatory Quality       -0.022    
       (0.48)    
Control of Corruption       0.186**                 
        (0.000)                 
Rule of Law         0.193**  
         (0.01) 
           
Intercept 1.669*** 1.705*** 1.662*** 1.714*** 1.645*** 1.750*** 1.905*** 
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  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
           
           
Number of Observations 1888 1888 1888 1888 1888 1888 1888 
R Squared 0.24 0.247 0.246 0.239 0.242 0.244 0.243 
Wald Chi Squared 585.291 601.206 651.816 722.047 640.072 609.647 627.095 
Probability > Chi Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Standard Error 0.579 0.576 0.576 0.579 0.578 0.577 0.578 
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Table 6-1 Regression Results - Average Loan Size 
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Table 6-2 Marginal Effects Base Model (Average Loan Size)  
 
 
ALB Margin Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Fiscal Year
2002 0.6313005 0.0652821 9.67 0.000 0.5032979 0.759303
2003 0.5785697 0.042716 13.54 0.000 0.494814 0.6623255
2004 0.4946941 0.0319792 15.47 0.000 0.4319906 0.5573976
2005 0.5155252 0.0454137 11.35 0.000 0.4264798 0.6045707
2006 0.4657139 0.0452477 10.29 0.000 0.376994 0.5544337
2007 0.4366708 0.0422982 10.32 0.000 0.3537342 0.5196074
2008 0.3912856 0.0525076 7.45 0.000 0.2883307 0.4942404
2009 0.4167599 0.044013 9.47 0.000 0.3304609 0.5030589
2010 0.3542223 0.028427 12.46 0.000 0.2984837 0.409961
2011 0.3283612 0.0227453 14.44 0.000 0.2837632 0.3729592
2012 0.2909257 0.0200891 14.48 0.000 0.2515357 0.3303156
2013 0.3748591 0.0872223 4.3 0.000 0.2038371 0.545881
2014 0.297044 0.0395174 7.52 0.000 0.2195598 0.3745281
South Asia
0 0.4503691 0.0149104 30.21 0.000 0.4211452 0.4795929
1 0.2462099 0.0680471 3.62 0.000 0.11284 0.3795798
FiscalYear#SouthAsia
2003 0.449864 0.1042109 4.32 0.000 0.2456145 0.6541136
2004 0.1175591 0.129025 0.91 0.362 -0.135325 0.3704435
2005 0.3680102 0.0641084 5.74 0.000 0.2423601 0.4936604
2006 0.1529242 0.0936165 1.63 0.102 -0.030561 0.3364091
2007 0.1116125 0.0806033 1.38 0.166 -0.046367 0.269592
2008 0.2704802 0.3987326 0.68 0.498 -0.511021 1.051982
2009 0.2475439 0.0575037 4.3 0.000 0.1348387 0.3602492
2010 0.2307285 0.0530102 4.35 0.000 0.1268304 0.3346266
2011 0.188524 0.0563827 3.34 0.001 0.0780159 0.2990321
2012 0.2870243 0.0640264 4.48 0.000 0.1615348 0.4125138
2013 0.3405601 0.0950366 3.58 0.000 0.1542918 0.5268284
2014 0.6163392 0.1244658 4.95 0.000 0.3723906 0.8602877
FiscalYear#LatinAmerica
2003 0.5860368 0.0583393 10.05 0.000 0.4716939 0.7003797
2004 0.4066354 0.0480254 8.47 0.000 0.3125073 0.5007635
2005 0.5187647 0.0708941 7.32 0.000 0.3798149 0.6577145
2006 0.4805392 0.0591734 8.12 0.000 0.3645615 0.5965168
2007 0.4629371 0.0567208 8.16 0.000 0.3517664 0.5741078
2008 0.3126634 0.0728472 4.29 0.000 0.1698855 0.4554414
2009 0.4671099 0.0390064 11.98 0.000 0.3906587 0.5435611
2010 0.4342395 0.0407817 10.65 0.000 0.3543088 0.5141702
2011 0.3671322 0.0282012 13.02 0.000 0.3118587 0.4224056
2012 0.365052 0.0264402 13.81 0.000 0.3132302 0.4168738
2013 0.4058716 0.027273 14.88 0.000 0.3524176 0.4593256
2014 0.4805094 0.0483264 9.94 0.000 0.3857913 0.5752275
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Figure 6-1 Predictive Margins (Average Loan Size – Base 
Model) 
 
Figure 6-2 Predictive Margins (Average Loan Size – 
Political Stability)  
 
Figure 6-3 Predictive Margins (Average Loan Size – Voice 
and Accountability 
 
 
 
       
 
Figure 6-4 Predictive Margins (Average Loan Size – 
Government Effectiveness)  
 
 
Figure 6-5 Predictive Margins (Average Loan Size – 
Regulatory Quality) 
 
Figure 6-6 Predictive Margins (Average Loan Size – Control 
of Corruption)  
 
Figure 6-7 Predictive Margins (Average Loan Size – Rule of 
Law) 
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6.2 Number of Borrowers  
Moving on, the results for the number of borrowers are displayed in table 6.3. The results reveal 
positive and significant coefficients on fiscal year from 2002 to 2013.  A closer look at the 
results disclose that microfinance industry in both regions are expanding from 2002 to 2004, 
before facing a reduction in the number of borrowers. This decreasing trend is more obvious 
in South Asia, as shown in figure 6.8.  
In general, institutional environment variables appear to have a negative effect on the number 
of borrowers. On the other hand, the effect of unemployment is non-linear, where a significant 
and negative coefficient is observed on unemployment rate while a significant and positive 
coefficient is seen on its quadratic terms. Turning towards marginal effects, the results in table 
6.4 reveal that the average value for the number of borrowers is 10.44 in South Asia and 9.35 
in Latin America, which translates to an average of 34,200 borrowers in South Asia and an 
average of 11,499 borrowers in Latin America.  
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Number of Borrowers (Ln NAB) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5    Model 6 Model 7    
          
South Asia 1.150*** 1.098*** 1.076*** 1.144*** 1.115*** 1.196*** 1.245*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fiscal Year         
2002 0.350* 0.329* 0.361* 0.252 0.296 0.259 0.312*   
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.11) (0.06) (0.09) (0.04) 
2003 1.024*** 0.926*** 0.980*** 0.973*** 1.006*** 1.074*** 0.909*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2004 1.282*** 1.223*** 1.239*** 1.255*** 1.277*** 1.308*** 1.210*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2005 0.886*** 0.817*** 0.841*** 0.849*** 0.874*** 0.909*** 0.808*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2006 0.773*** 0.708*** 0.747*** 0.745*** 0.759*** 0.826*** 0.686*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2007 0.714*** 0.656*** 0.690*** 0.693*** 0.701*** 0.750*** 0.624*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2008 0.596*** 0.523*** 0.562*** 0.583*** 0.587*** 0.644*** 0.462*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2009 0.497*** 0.451*** 0.469*** 0.449*** 0.475*** 0.505*** 0.380**  
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2010 0.420** 0.376** 0.381** 0.403** 0.406**  0.425*** 0.321*   
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.02) 
2011 0.347** 0.309* 0.311* 0.354** 0.337**  0.383** 0.258*   
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.000) (0.05) 
2012 0.326* 0.306* 0.292* 0.336** 0.312*   0.344** 0.238 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.07) 
2013 0.217 0.203 0.171 0.214 0.204 0.211 0.144 
  (0.08) (0.11) (0.17) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.25) 
          
Fiscal Year* South Asia         
2003 0.107 0.111 0.06 0.115 0.126 -0.15 0.05 
  (0.77) (0.78) (0.86) (0.75) (0.73) (0.61) (0.88) 
2004 0.358 0.259 0.152 0.386 0.366 0.012 0.149 
  (0.44) (0.58) (0.74) (0.42) (0.44) (0.98) (0.75) 
2005 0.65 0.56 0.601 0.639 0.667 0.419 0.595 
  (0.12) (0.21) (0.16) (0.15) (0.12) (0.36) (0.20) 
2006 0.501 0.375 0.391 0.528 0.535 0.356 0.441 
  (0.15) (0.29) (0.22) (0.15) (0.13) (0.31) (0.20) 
2007 0.236 0.083 0.182 0.273 0.271 0.196 0.266 
  (0.34) (0.76) (0.39) (0.32) (0.30) (0.46) (0.31) 
2008 -0.204 -0.388 -0.242 -0.176 -0.161 -0.24 -0.185 
  (0.41) (0.15) (0.26) (0.52) (0.54) (0.37) (0.48) 
2009 0.083 -0.047 0.075 0.095 0.115 -0.043 0.069 
  (0.74) (0.86) (0.73) (0.73) (0.66) (0.87) (0.80) 
2010 0.359 0.254 0.403 0.365 0.385 0.268 0.347 
  (0.16) (0.36) (0.08) (0.20) (0.15) (0.34) (0.21) 
2011 -0.035 -0.146 -0.039 -0.047 -0.006 -0.114 -0.037 
  (0.87) (0.55) (0.84) (0.85) (0.98) (0.65) (0.88) 
2012 -0.282 -0.369 -0.22 -0.29 -0.255 -0.291 -0.182 
  (0.19) (0.11) (0.21) (0.23) (0.26) (0.23) (0.44) 
2013 -0.221 -0.305 -0.096 -0.226 -0.202 -0.258 -0.175 
  (0.41) (0.28) (0.69) (0.44) (0.46) (0.37) (0.53) 
          
MFI Size (t-1)* 1.013*** 1.008*** 1.016*** 1.021*** 1.017*** 1.020*** 1.023*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age 0.776* 0.815* 0.788* 0.781* 0.771*   0.751* 0.790*   
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Table 6-3 Regression Results – Number of Borrowers 
  
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Age Squared -0.238** -0.246** -0.242** -0.244** -0.238**  -0.234** -0.244**  
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bank 0.725*** 0.718*** 0.651*** 0.702*** 0.711*** 0.528*** 0.617*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NBFI 1.224*** 1.236*** 1.195*** 1.265*** 1.238*** 1.117*** 1.216*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Credit Union 0.799*** 0.797*** 0.726*** 0.781*** 0.783*** 0.588*** 0.682*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NGO 1.280*** 1.285*** 1.254*** 1.299*** 1.288*** 1.185*** 1.264*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rural Bank         
          
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 2.715*** 2.691*** 2.702*** 2.750*** 2.720*** 2.669*** 2.695*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation, consumer price -0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 0.001 
  (0.80) (0.71) (0.89) (0.58) (0.63) (0.40) (0.86) 
GDP growth, annual % 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.007 
  (0.47) (0.360) (0.430) (0.85) (0.52) (0.51) (0.47) 
Personal remittance -0.008* -0.005 -0.012** -0.012** -0.008*   -0.015*** -0.014*** 
  (0.040) (0.200) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployment, total -0.080** -0.067* -0.072* -0.076* -0.082**  -0.058 -0.04 
  (0.010) (0.03) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010) (0.050) (0.20) 
Unemployment Squared 0.006** 0.005** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006**  0.005** 0.004*   
  (0.000) (0.01) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.02) 
          
Political Stability   -0.129**                      
   (0.010)                      
Voice and Accountability   -0.225**                     
    (0.010)                     
Government Effectiveness    -0.181**                    
     (0.010)                    
Regulatory Quality      -0.045    
      (0.24)    
Control of Corruption      -0.454***                 
       (0.000)                 
Rule of Law        -0.354*** 
        (0.000) 
          
Intercept 
-
10.332*** 
-
10.421*** 
-
10.338*** 
-
10.494*** 
-
10.367*** 
-
10.521*** 
-
10.757*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
          
           
Number of Obeservations 1888 1888 1888 1888 1888 1888 1888 
R Squared 0.817 0.819 0.818 0.816 0.817 0.822 0.819 
Wald Chi Squared 6791.552 6651.417 8365.598 6413.314 6875.56 6744.428 6483.802 
Probability > Chi Squared 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard Error 0.742 0.738 0.741 0.745 0.744 0.734 0.74 
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001      
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Table 6-4 Marginal Effects Base Model (Ln NAB) 
  
NAB Margin Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Fiscal Year
2003 9.964641 0.1117679 89.15 0.000 9.74558 10.1837
2004 10.28227 0.1542568 66.66 0.000 9.979932 10.58461
2005 9.917462 0.0817461 121.32 0.000 9.757243 10.07768
2006 9.783083 0.0645247 151.62 0.000 9.656617 9.909549
2007 9.691165 0.0496405 195.23 0.000 9.593871 9.788458
2008 9.493387 0.057745 164.4 0.000 9.380209 9.606565
2009 9.468181 0.0622075 152.2 0.000 9.346256 9.590105
2010 9.433886 0.05548 170.04 0.000 9.325147 9.542625
2011 9.312433 0.0440893 211.22 0.000 9.226019 9.398846
2012 9.278662 0.0498508 186.13 0.000 9.180956 9.376368
2013 9.18462 0.0562589 163.26 0.000 9.074354 9.294885
2014 9.02356 0.1083597 83.27 0.000 8.811179 9.235941
South Asia
0 9.354031 0.0187881 497.87 0.000 9.317207 9.390855
1 10.44334 0.0886703 117.78 0.000 10.26955 10.61713
FiscalYear#SouthAsia
2003 11.00861 0.3105103 35.45 0.000 10.40002 11.6172
2004 11.45372 0.3857777 29.69 0.000 10.69761 12.20983
2005 11.34934 0.3753256 30.24 0.000 10.61372 12.08497
2006 11.05456 0.2880053 38.38 0.000 10.49008 11.61904
2007 10.71063 0.1601518 66.88 0.000 10.39674 11.02452
2008 10.10626 0.1860575 54.32 0.000 9.741592 10.47092
2009 10.37554 0.1654322 62.72 0.000 10.05129 10.69978
2010 10.60158 0.1586231 66.83 0.000 10.29068 10.91247
2011 10.13426 0.1146117 88.42 0.000 9.909628 10.3589
2012 9.907873 0.1149975 86.16 0.000 9.682482 10.13326
2013 9.869678 0.2042574 48.32 0.000 9.46934 10.27001
2014 9.971651 0.1818686 54.83 0.000 9.615195 10.32811
FiscalYear#LatinAmerica
2003 9.799399 0.1197741 81.82 0.000 9.564646 10.03415
2004 10.09685 0.1664843 60.65 0.000 9.770547 10.42315
2005 9.690821 0.07571 128 0.000 9.542432 9.83921
2006 9.581832 0.0580767 164.99 0.000 9.468003 9.69566
2007 9.529801 0.0517513 184.15 0.000 9.428371 9.631232
2008 9.39638 0.0549488 171 0.000 9.288683 9.504078
2009 9.324562 0.0696397 133.9 0.000 9.188071 9.461054
2010 9.249062 0.060351 153.25 0.000 9.130776 9.367348
2011 9.182351 0.0500475 183.47 0.000 9.08426 9.280443
2012 9.179069 0.0570361 160.93 0.000 9.06728 9.290858
2013 9.076188 0.0574152 158.08 0.000 8.963656 9.188719
2014 8.873494 0.1210522 73.3 0.000 8.636236 9.110752
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Figure 6-8 Predictive Margins (Number of Borrowers – 
Base Model)  
 
Figure 6-9 Predictive Margins (Number of Borrowers –
Political Stability)  
 
Figure 6-10 Predictive Margins (Number of Borrowers – 
Voice and Accountability)  
      
Figure 6-11 Predictive Margins (Number of Borrowers – 
Government Effectiveness)  
 
Figure 6-12 Predictive Margins (Number of Borrowers – 
Regulatory Quality)  
 
 Figure 6-13 Predictive Margins (Number of Borrowers 
– Control of Corruption)  
 
Figure 6-14 Predictive Margins (Number of Borrowers – 
Rule of Law)  
  
  
130 
 
6.3 Financial Performance 
Overall the results show that MFIs in both regions are sustainable, with microfinance industry 
in Latin America being slightly more sustainable and profitable. A breakdown of the results 
show that regulated environment do not have much impact on sustainability (as shown in the 
table 6.5) but appears to have positive and significant effect on the profitability of MFIs (table 
6.7). 
Moving on to the results in table 6.6, it can be seen that the average sustainability is 1.17 for 
Latin America and 1.13 for South Asia. This means that MFIs in Latin America are more 
sustainable by 4 percentage points. On the other hand, the marginal effects in table 6.8 reveal 
that the average profitability of MFIs is 0.02 in Latin America and -0.06 in South Asia. Another 
suggestion that MFIs in Latin America perform better financially, as reflected in figure 6.22. 
This is not surprising as MFIs in South Asia favours welfarist ideology while MFIs in Latin 
America are more commercialised and operates with institutionalist ideology.  
Despite being more profitable and sustainable, microfinance industry in Latin America also 
experiences a decreasing trend in sustainability and profitability, similar to South Asia. These 
results also reaffirm the work of Navajas et al. (2003), which find that almost all microfinance 
institutions in Latin America face a decreasing profitability and lower repayment rate. The 
decreasing trend in the financial performance of MFIs in Latin America might be the 
consequences of the 2007 scandal of Banco Compartamos’ initial public offering (IPO) in 
Mexico. This IPO created a massive lash back from the public due to the industry’s 
overemphasis in profiteering and claims of unethical behavior. These claims were found to be 
true as it was the industry norm in Latin America, where the sector increasingly behaved as 
Wall Street-style greed and profiteering (Sinclair, 2012).  
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OSS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5    Model 6 Model 7    
          
South Asia -0.011 -0.018 -0.011 -0.01 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013 
  (0.88) (0.80) (0.88) (0.89) (0.84) (0.86) (0.87) 
Fiscal Year         
2003 0.155* 0.138* 0.154* 0.154* 0.153*   0.153* 0.157*   
  (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
2004 0.094 0.083 0.093 0.093 0.094 0.094 0.096 
  (0.07) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
2005 0.112* 0.099* 0.111* 0.111* 0.111*   0.111* 0.113*   
  (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
2006 0.052 0.04 0.052 0.052 0.051 0.05 0.054 
  (0.21) (0.35) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.20) 
2007 0.034 0.024 0.034 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.036 
  (0.37) (0.55) (0.38) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39) (0.36) 
2008 0.073 0.06 0.073 0.073 0.072 0.071 0.076 
  (0.19) (0.28) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21) (0.15) 
2009 0.047 0.039 0.047 0.047 0.045 0.047 0.049 
  (0.29) (0.38) (0.29) (0.28) (0.33) (0.29) (0.27) 
2010 0.012 0.003 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.014 
  (0.85) (0.96) (0.86) (0.86) (0.87) (0.85) (0.83) 
2011 -0.026 -0.033 -0.026 -0.026 -0.027 -0.027 -0.024 
  (0.49) (0.38) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.52) 
2012 0.08 0.076 0.08 0.08 0.079 0.08 0.082 
  (0.28) (0.29) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.26) 
2013 -0.036 -0.039 -0.036 -0.036 -0.037 -0.036 -0.035 
  (0.35) (0.31) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.37) 
          
Fiscal Year* South Asia         
2002 -0.168 -0.152 -0.153 -0.126 -0.139 -0.153 -0.145 
  (0.71) (0.73) (0.73) (0.78) (0.76) (0.73) (0.75) 
2003 0.342 0.341 0.341 0.341 0.344 0.353 0.343 
  (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38) 
2004 -0.334 -0.354 -0.336 -0.336 -0.333 -0.319 -0.33 
  (0.25) (0.23) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.28) (0.26) 
2005 0.038 0.02 0.037 0.037 0.039 0.048 0.039 
  (0.77) (0.87) (0.78) (0.78) (0.76) (0.72) (0.77) 
2006 -0.012 -0.035 -0.013 -0.013 -0.009 -0.006 -0.011 
  (0.92) (0.77) (0.91) (0.91) (0.94) (0.96) (0.92) 
2007 -0.025 -0.051 -0.025 -0.026 -0.021 -0.023 -0.025 
  (0.78) (0.60) (0.78) (0.78) (0.81) (0.80) (0.78) 
2008 -0.055 -0.086 -0.056 -0.056 -0.051 -0.053 -0.056 
  (0.58) (0.42) (0.59) (0.58) (0.59) (0.60) (0.58) 
2009 -0.057 -0.08 -0.058 -0.058 -0.054 -0.052 -0.057 
  (0.51) (0.39) (0.52) (0.51) (0.53) (0.57) (0.52) 
2010 0.003 -0.014 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.003 
  (0.97) (0.88) (0.97) (0.98) (0.95) (0.94) (0.97) 
2011 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.041 -0.037 -0.036 -0.04 
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  (0.63) (0.49) (0.63) (0.63) (0.65) (0.67) (0.63) 
2012 -0.105 -0.119 -0.104 -0.105 -0.102 -0.104 -0.106 
  (0.36) (0.32) (0.35) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.34) 
2013 0.06 0.047 0.061 0.06 0.062 0.061 0.059 
  (0.45) (0.56) (0.46) (0.46) (0.44) (0.45) (0.46) 
          
Age 0.058 0.064 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.059 0.058 
  (0.71) (0.68) (0.71) (0.71) (0.71) (0.70) (0.71) 
Age Squared -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.96) (0.94) (0.96) (0.96) (0.96) (0.95) (0.96) 
Bank -0.126* -0.126* -0.126* -0.126* -0.128*   -0.119* -0.124*   
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
NBFI (0.04700) (0.04600) (0.04700) (0.04700) (0.04500) (0.04200) (0.04700) 
  (0.36) (0.38) (0.37) (0.35) (0.37) (0.43) (0.37) 
Credit Union -0.092 -0.093 -0.092 -0.092 -0.093 -0.083 -0.089 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.20) (0.15) 
NGO -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 0.0000 -0.004 
  (0.94) (0.91) (0.93) (0.92) (0.95) (1.00) (0.94) 
Rural Bank         
          
MFI Size (t-1)* 0.037*** 0.035** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) -0.018 -0.024 -0.019 -0.019 -0.018 -0.016 -0.018 
  (0.74) (0.68) (0.74) (0.72) (0.74) (0.78) (0.75) 
Inflation, consumer price 
-
0.009*** 
-
0.008*** 
-
0.009*** 
-
0.009*** -0.009**  
-
0.009*** 
-
0.009*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth, annual % 0.009* 0.009* 0.009* 0.009* 0.009*   0.009* 0.009*   
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Personal remittance 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.45) (0.31) (0.49) (0.45) (0.46) (0.36) (0.44) 
Unemployment, total -0.027 -0.025 -0.027 -0.027 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 
  (0.070) (0.10) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.060) (0.070) 
Unemployment Squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.19) (0.27) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) 
          
Political Stability   -0.021                      
   (0.36)                      
Voice and Accountability   -0.001                     
    (0.97)                     
Government Effectiveness    0.001                    
     (0.97)                    
Regulatory Quality      -0.004    
      (0.88)    
Control of Corruption      0.019                 
       (0.54)                 
Rule of Law        0.007 
        (0.84) 
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Table 6-5 Regression Results – Operational Self-Sufficiency 
  
          
Intercept 0.565 0.574* 0.57 0.576* 0.558 0.567* 0.572*   
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
          
           
Number of Observations 1888 1888 1888 1888 1888 1888 1888 
R Squared 0.05 0.051 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Wald Chi Squared 171.414 176.438 171.657 171.273 178.886 179.042 176.633 
Probability > Chi Squared 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard Error 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.401 
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001      
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Table 6-6 Marginal Effects Base Model (OSS)  
  
OSS Margin Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Fiscal Year
2002 0.6313005 0.0652821 9.67 0.000 0.5032979 0.759303
2003 1.336535 0.0724736 18.44 0.000 1.19449 1.478581
2004 1.183526 0.051101 23.16 0.000 1.08337 1.283682
2005 1.252104 0.0281383 44.5 0.000 1.196954 1.307254
2006 1.185665 0.0223373 53.08 0.000 1.141885 1.229445
2007 1.166148 0.0170405 68.43 0.000 1.132749 1.199547
2008 1.200512 0.0370235 32.43 0.000 1.127947 1.273076
2009 1.174256 0.0309916 37.89 0.000 1.113514 1.234998
2010 1.147263 0.0473969 24.21 0.000 1.054367 1.24016
2011 1.103587 0.0160293 68.85 0.000 1.07217 1.135004
2012 1.201174 0.056825 21.14 0.000 1.089799 1.312549
2013 1.107335 0.0206624 53.59 0.000 1.066838 1.147833
2014 1.135112 0.0300961 37.72 0.000 1.076125 1.1941
South Asia
0 1.172049 0.0101043 116 0.000 1.152245 1.191854
1 1.133645 0.0275021 41.22 0.000 1.079742 1.187548
FiscalYear#SouthAsia
2003 1.291337 0.0598644 21.57 0.000 1.174005 1.408669
2004 1.230704 0.0382928 32.14 0.000 1.155652 1.305757
2005 1.24843 0.0277308 45.02 0.000 1.194079 1.302781
2006 1.188837 0.0208988 56.89 0.000 1.147877 1.229798
2007 1.171008 0.0176518 66.34 0.000 1.136411 1.205604
2008 1.209547 0.0396973 30.47 0.000 1.131741 1.287352
2009 1.183582 0.0358259 33.04 0.000 1.113364 1.253799
2010 1.148314 0.0538277 21.33 0.000 1.042814 1.253815
2011 1.110548 0.0173038 64.18 0.000 1.076633 1.144463
2012 1.216948 0.0634952 19.17 0.000 1.0925 1.341396
2013 1.100619 0.0223207 49.31 0.000 1.056872 1.144367
2014 1.136597 0.0333642 34.07 0.000 1.071205 1.20199
FiscalYear#LatinAmerica
2003 1.622091 0.3757547 4.32 0.000 0.8856258 2.358557
2004 0.8854626 0.2786994 3.18 0.001 0.3392217 1.431703
2005 1.275315 0.1095621 11.64 0.000 1.060577 1.490052
2006 1.16562 0.0920992 12.66 0.000 0.9851092 1.346131
2007 1.135447 0.0531389 21.37 0.000 1.031297 1.239598
2008 1.14343 0.0678872 16.84 0.000 1.010373 1.276486
2009 1.115338 0.0453034 24.62 0.000 1.026545 1.204131
2010 1.140623 0.0370958 30.75 0.000 1.067917 1.21333
2011 1.059606 0.0431411 24.56 0.000 0.9750507 1.144161
2012 1.101515 0.0671548 16.4 0.000 0.9698941 1.233136
2013 1.149765 0.0518401 22.18 0.000 1.04816 1.251369
2014 1.125731 0.0661319 17.02 0.000 0.9961147 1.255347
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ROA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5    Model 6 Model 7    
           
South Asia -0.040** -0.040** -0.035** -0.039* -0.023 -0.043** -0.049**  
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.200) (0.010) (0.000) 
Fiscal Year          
2002 -0.028 -0.026 -0.027 -0.026 -0.016 -0.023 -0.026 
  (0.340) (0.380) (0.380) (0.380) (0.590) (0.450) (0.400) 
2003 0.045** 0.045** 0.048** 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.042** 0.056*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2004 0.022 0.022 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.021 0.029 
  (0.140) (0.150) (0.090) (0.090) (0.100) (0.170) (0.050) 
2005 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.016 0.018 0.011 0.019 
  (0.380) (0.410) (0.270) (0.250) (0.190) (0.430) (0.160) 
2006 -0.002 -0.002 0.0000 0.001 0.005 -0.005 0.006 
  (0.870) (0.880) (1.000) (0.920) (0.680) (0.670) (0.600) 
2007 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 -0.003 0.007 
  (0.920) (0.920) (0.940) (0.900) (0.620) (0.760) (0.480) 
2008 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.007 0.009 
  (0.780) (0.790) (0.920) (0.860) (0.970) -0.62 (0.530) 
2009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.004 0.001 -0.01 0.001 
  (0.390) (0.410) (0.500) (0.700) (0.930) (0.360) (0.910) 
2010 -0.028* -0.028* -0.025* -0.026* -0.021 -0.028* -0.019 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020) (0.050) (0.010) (0.080) 
2011 -0.018 -0.018 -0.016 -0.019* -0.014 -0.021* -0.01 
  (0.060) (0.060) (0.110) (0.050) (0.150) (0.030) (0.300) 
2012 -0.015 -0.015 -0.012 -0.016 -0.008 -0.016 -0.006 
  (0.260) (0.260) (0.350) (0.220) (0.530) (0.230) (0.620) 
2013 -0.024* -0.024* -0.021 -0.024* -0.018 -0.024* -0.018 
  (0.020) (0.030) (0.060) (0.030) (0.100) (0.030) (0.110) 
           
Fiscal Year* South Asia          
2003 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.005 -0.004 0.022 0.011 
  (0.890) (0.890) (0.830) (0.920) (0.930) (0.670) (0.830) 
2004 -0.087 -0.087 -0.073 -0.09 -0.091 -0.065 -0.068 
  (0.230) (0.230) (0.310) (0.210) (0.210) (0.370) (0.350) 
2005 0.019 0.019 0.023 0.02 0.011 0.034 0.024 
  (0.320) (0.320) (0.200) (0.340) (0.610) (0.120) (0.250) 
2006 0.021 0.021 0.029 0.018 0.005 0.03 0.027 
  (0.310) (0.330) (0.150) (0.420) (0.850) (0.170) (0.230) 
2007 0.025 0.025 0.029 0.021 0.008 0.028 0.022 
  (0.140) (0.200) (0.070) (0.260) (0.690) (0.120) (0.220) 
2008 0.029 0.029 0.031 0.026 0.008 0.031 0.027 
  (0.120) (0.150) (0.070) (0.200) (0.700) (0.110) (0.170) 
2009 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.012 -0.002 0.021 0.014 
  (0.400) (0.440) (0.320) (0.510) (0.900) (0.220) (0.400) 
2010 0.035* 0.035* 0.032* 0.035* 0.023 0.041* 0.036*   
  (0.020) (0.030) (0.020) (0.050) (0.220) (0.010) (0.030) 
2011 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.027 -0.008 -0.013 
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  (0.670) (0.650) (0.660) (0.700) (0.400) (0.790) (0.670) 
2012 -0.007 -0.007 -0.011 -0.006 -0.02 -0.007 -0.016 
  (0.810) (0.810) (0.680) (0.840) (0.510) (0.820) (0.580) 
2013 0.031 0.031 0.022 0.031 0.022 0.033 0.026 
  (0.050) (0.060) (0.160) (0.080) (0.250) (0.060) (0.130) 
2014 -0.039 -0.023 -0.029 -0.03 -0.023 -0.032 -0.018 
  (0.600) (0.780) (0.730) (0.720) (0.770) (0.700) (0.830) 
           
Age 0.128* 0.128* 0.127* 0.127* 0.130*   0.129* 0.126*   
  (0.040) (0.040) (0.050) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.050) 
Age Squared -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 
  (0.100) (0.100) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.100) (0.110) 
Bank 0.009 0.009 0.014 0.011 0.016 0.021 0.019 
  (0.460) (0.450) (0.240) (0.350) (0.210) (0.090) (0.140) 
NBFI 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.008 0.006 0.019 0.013 
  (0.270) (0.270) (0.190) (0.470) (0.610) (0.090) (0.240) 
Credit Union 0.017 0.017 0.022 0.019 0.025 0.031* 0.028*   
  (0.160) (0.170) (0.070) (0.120) (0.050) (0.010) (0.030) 
NGO 0.02 0.02 0.022 0.018 0.016 0.026* 0.021 
  (0.120) (0.120) (0.080) (0.160) (0.210) (0.040) (0.090) 
Rural Bank          
           
MFI Size (t-1)* 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.008**  0.010*** 0.009*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Percentage of Female Borrowers (t-1) 0.036** 0.031** 0.033** 0.033** 0.033**  0.037** 0.035**  
  (0.000) (0.010) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation, consumer price 0.00 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.00 0.00 -0.001 
  (0.380) (0.370) (0.240) (0.250) (0.750) (0.420) (0.180) 
GDP growth, annual % 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.001 
  (0.880) (0.970) (0.780) (0.820) (0.990) (0.760) (0.710) 
Personal remittance 0.002*** 0.002** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployment, total -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* -0.008 -0.010* -0.012**  
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.020) (0.030) (0.050) (0.010) (0.000) 
Unemployment Squared 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 
  (0.220) (0.220) (0.180) (0.210) (0.360) (0.130) (0.080) 
           
Political Stability    0.0000                      
    (0.990)                      
Voice and Accountability    0.016*                     
     (0.020)                     
Government Effectiveness     0.019**                    
      (0.000)                    
Regulatory Quality       0.022***    
       (0.000)    
Control of Corruption       0.029***                 
        (0.000)                 
Rule of Law         0.032*** 
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Table 6-7 Regression Results – Return on Assets (ROA) 
  
         (0.000) 
           
Intercept 
-
0.309*** 
-
0.307*** 
-
0.309*** 
-
0.292*** 
-
0.288*** 
-
0.298*** -0.271**  
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
           
           
Number of Obeservations 1877 1877 1877 1877 1877 1877 1877 
R Squared 0.139 0.139 0.141 0.142 0.148 0.147 0.149 
Wald Chi Squared 171.814 174.625 176.835 180.504 186.364 184.07 183.897 
Probability > Chi Squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard Error 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.087 
Significance in Parantheses  p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001      
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Table 6-8 Marginal Effects Base Model (ROA)  
  
ROA Margin Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Fiscal Year
2003 0.0705172 0.0117402 6.01 0.000 0.0475068 0.0935276
2004 0.0344697 0.0143428 2.4 0.016 0.0063582 0.0625812
2005 0.0390486 0.0094147 4.15 0.000 0.0205962 0.0575011
2006 0.0254448 0.007239 3.51 0.000 0.0112567 0.0396329
2007 0.0268815 0.004797 5.6 0.000 0.0174796 0.0362833
2008 0.0246336 0.0088649 2.78 0.005 0.0072587 0.0420085
2009 0.0168771 0.0072806 2.32 0.020 0.0026074 0.0311468
2010 0.001621 0.006229 0.26 0.795 -0.010588 0.0138296
2011 0.0042349 0.0058277 0.73 0.467 -0.007187 0.015657
2012 0.0089152 0.0091378 0.98 0.329 -0.008995 0.026825
2013 0.0042957 0.0069135 0.62 0.534 -0.009255 0.0178459
2014 0.0244275 0.0073776 3.31 0.001 0.0099676 0.0388873
South Asia
0 0.0208985 0.002411 8.67 0.000 0.0161729 0.025624
1 -0.006178 0.0079435 -0.78 0.437 -0.021747 0.0093907
FiscalYear#SouthAsia
2003 0.0752568 0.0125155 6.01 0.000 0.0507269 0.0997867
2004 0.051929 0.0119432 4.35 0.000 0.0285208 0.0753372
2005 0.0418996 0.0109384 3.83 0.000 0.0204608 0.0633385
2006 0.0280127 0.0080299 3.49 0.000 0.0122744 0.0437509
2007 0.0289208 0.0053056 5.45 0.000 0.0185221 0.0393195
2008 0.0261842 0.0092822 2.82 0.005 0.0079914 0.044377
2009 0.0205708 0.0086728 2.37 0.018 0.0035725 0.0375692
2010 0.0022704 0.0072656 0.31 0.755 -0.01197 0.0165106
2011 0.0115284 0.0047564 2.42 0.015 0.0022059 0.0208508
2012 0.0153708 0.0098115 1.57 0.117 -0.003859 0.034601
2013 0.0055636 0.0080629 0.69 0.49 -0.010239 0.0213666
2014 0.029918 0.0084351 3.55 0.000 0.0133855 0.0464504
FiscalYear#LatinAmerica
2003 0.0407754 0.0361573 1.13 0.259 -0.030092 0.1116424
2004 -0.075091 0.0704911 -1.07 0.287 -0.213251 0.063069
2005 0.0211581 0.0128303 1.65 0.099 -0.003989 0.046305
2006 0.009331 0.0148406 0.63 0.53 -0.019756 0.0384181
2007 0.0140844 0.0092717 1.52 0.129 -0.004088 0.0322565
2008 0.0149029 0.0146899 1.01 0.31 -0.013889 0.0436946
2009 -0.006302 0.0081097 -0.78 0.437 -0.022196 0.0095929
2010 -0.002454 0.0091415 -0.27 0.788 -0.020371 0.0154631
2011 -0.041533 0.0298502 -1.39 0.164 -0.100039 0.0169723
2012 -0.031595 0.025336 -1.25 0.212 -0.081253 0.0180626
2013 -0.003661 0.010606 -0.35 0.73 -0.024448 0.0171265
2014 -0.010027 0.0109006 -0.92 0.358 -0.031391 0.0113382
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6.4 Conclusion 
The results of this chapter reaffirm the findings of chapters 4 and 5, where microfinance 
industry in Latin America concentrates on richer clients, while its counterpart in South Asia 
serve to relatively less well-off clients by giving out smaller loans. However, it appears that 
microfinance industry in both regions are facing sustainability and profitability issues. The 
stark difference in operational methods in South Asia and Latin America has led to different 
effects on the performance of MFIs.  
In South Asia, the welfarist ideology has led to MFIs in the region reaching out to the core poor 
while the institutionalist ideology in Latin America has resulted in a commercialised 
microfinance industry that focuses on the entrepreneurial poor. While MFIs in Latin America 
and South Asia have driven global microfinance industry growth in the past, the results from 
margin effects show that both markets have slowed down, where both region is facing a decline 
in the number of borrowers. On the other hand, the results for financial performance 
demonstrate that MFIs in Latin America is more sustainable with microfinance industry in 
Latin America being more profitable while microfinance providers in South Asia are 
sustainable despite mostly operating at a loss.  
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Figure 6-15 Predictive Margins (Operational Self-
Sufficiency – Base Model)  
 
Figure 6-16 Predictive Margins (Operational Self-
Sufficiency –Political Stability) 
 
Figure 6-17 Predictive Margins (Operational Self-
Sufficiency – Voice and Accountability)  
 
Figure 6-18 Predictive Margins (Operational Self-
Sufficiency – Government Effectiveness) 
 
Figure 6-19 Predictive Margins (Operational Self-
Sufficiency – Regulatory Quality) 
 
Figure 6-20 Predictive Margins (Operational Self-
Sufficiency – Control of Corruption)  
 
Figure 6-21 Predictive Margins (Operational Self-
Sufficiency –Rule of Law)  
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Figure 6-22 Predictive Margins (Return on Assets – Base 
Model)  
 
Figure 6-23 Predictive Margins (Return on Assets – 
Political Stability)  
 
Figure 6-24 Predictive Margins (Return on Assets – 
Voice and Accountability)  
 
Figure 6-25 Predictive Margins (Return on Assets – 
Government Effectiveness)  
 
Figure 6-26 Predictive Margins (Return on Assets – 
Regulatory Quality)  
 
Figure 6-27 Predictive Margins (Return on Assets – 
Control of Corruption)  
 
Figure 6-28 Predictive Margins (Return on Assets – Rule 
of Law) 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 7 : Conclusion  
For many developing countries, microfinance remains an important mechanism to fight 
poverty. There is a general consensus that providing the poor with credit allows them to escape 
the vicious cycle of poverty. Despite various efforts in developing the industry, microfinance 
has not expanded equally everywhere. The results of this study indicate that institutional 
environment plays an important role in the performance of MFIs. Specifically, the quality of 
government institutions, the effect of natural disasters and macroeconomic factors – affect the 
performance of MFIs in South Asia and Latin America. This chapter concludes the thesis, 
summarizes the findings, discusses the policy implications, and finally identifies areas for 
further research. 
7.1 Main Findings  
The broad conclusion that arises from this study is that MFIs in South Asia underperform in 
the presence of good institutions whereas MFIs in Latin America cannot execute its function 
of banking for the poor in a regulated environment.  
In South Asia, regulated environment allows MFIs to approach the poorest segment yet the 
organisations are not reaching out to the poor in terms of numbers. However, MFIs in this 
region are sustainable despite operating at a loss. This proposes that the quality of the 
environment may not necessarily translate to a better performance.  The results further reveal 
that microfinance behaves as a substitute for formal employment in South Asia.  
On the other hand, regulated environment encourages MFIs in Latin America to offer larger 
loans to their recipients. MFIs in this region are seen to assist the entrepreneurial poor at a 
greater rate than the “poorest of the poor”, as it is often assumed that the entrepreneurial poor 
carry less risk. However, the findings of unemployment rate do not endorse the results of 
institutional environment. In a regulated environment where unemployment rate is anticipated 
to be low, borrowers are expected to demand for larger loans. Instead, the regression results 
indicate that MFIs in Latin America give out smaller loans when unemployment rate is low. 
This means that when unemployment rate is high, the poor relies on microloans to operate in 
the informal market. This is displayed by Betancur (2014), where the author finds that the 
majority of the population in Latin America thrives on informal sector. In addition, Fernandes 
(2011) discovers that an estimated 20-25% of the population in Latin America survives in 
informal settlements.  
  
 
 
 
 
7.2 Policy Implications and Recommendations 
The empirical results suggest that on top of firm level indicators, institutional environment of 
the host country should also be taken into account when evaluating the social performance of 
MFIs. As such, more consideration should be directed towards external environment that can 
support/destroy the development of microfinance. More precisely, this study discovers that 
MFIs perform better in a less regulated environment. The question to ask is whether the 
microfinance industry should be regulated like formal financial institutions? The works of 
Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) find that MFIs which transform into regulated institutions are 
less likely to be better off financially or reach relatively poor borrowers than unregulated MFIs. 
However, before looking into regulating or deregulating the microfinance industry, the 
challenge is whom to focus: core poor or entrepreneurial poor. The former objective implies 
that the focus is on reducing poverty, whereas the latter implies that the focus is to increase the 
income of relatively poor. Policymakers should be mindful that MFIs which concentrate on the 
core poor will not be financially sustainable and will have to rely on financial subsidies to 
maintain long term operations. On the other hand, MFIs that focus entrepreneurial poor are 
more sustainable due to their commercialisation. 
For governments that are interested in reducing poverty, the focus on promoting the core poor’s 
access to the industry is vital. Although many policies propose the enhancement of the overall 
development of the financial sector, it is better to regulate microfinance as a solidary sector. 
For example, regulations aimed at providing financial access to poorer households without 
imposing strict credit policies will definitely benefit the core poor’s access to microcredit. 
However, by doing so, local governments would have to inject large amount of subsidies into 
the industry and there could be a bailout risk for insolvent MFIs.    
As for governments that prefer to concentrate on the less poor, it is better for the policymakers 
to look into boosting microentrepreneurial activities instead of solely focusing on building an 
environment that can develop microfinance. Regulators can then provide microenterprise 
programs that help microentrepreneurs. However, studies have found mixed results on these 
“microenterprise development programs” (Bhatt, 1999). Nevertheless, these programs should 
be tailored according to the culture and antipoverty strategy of the country. In addition, 
regulators can encourage MFIs to aim certain clienteles using some sort of targeting 
mechanism such as stricter credit policies (i.e., low level of collaterals). In addition, 
  
 
 
 
governments that are interested in the less poor should focus on removing entry barriers to 
encourage competition in the microfinance industry. This will benefit microentrepreneurs as it 
allows them to reach the best offers. At the same time, policymakers should be aware of the 
optimal threshold of competition such that it improves the quality of loans (Gomez and Ponce,  
2014). 
Although it is widely believed that regulations of the microfinance industry is important to 
protect the benefits of the poor, the results of this study suggest that it would be more 
advantageous if the regulators introduce a liberalised framework that includes only the essential 
regulations to encourage the development of microfinance institutions. Since microfinance is 
commonly used as an instrument to combat poverty, the challenge for local governments also 
involves providing financial and infrastructure support to steer the microfinance industry 
towards intended outcomes in the long run.  
The evidence of larger MFIs being financially sustainable and reaching out to a larger number 
of borrowers suggests that MFIs have to follow the profit-maximising objective in order to 
preserve their function as banking for the poor. If economies of scale is one of the conditions 
for MFIs to achieve profitability and to reach out to the poor, the policy should also be tailored 
towards encouraging the growth of MFIs by lowering regulatory costs.  
7.3 Limitations and Further Research Areas  
The limitation of this study is discussed at length in chapter 3, whereby a richer analysis of 
microfinance institutions can be performed should a greater degree of MFI-level and country-
level data is available.  Finally, MIX Market is a database that is self-reported by MFIs, 
incorrect information may arise due to entry errors. 
For future research, there is a need to further understand the degree of impact of well-developed 
institutions on the performance of MFIs at a microlevel. For example, how well-developed 
institutions affect the borrowers of microfinance It would also be interesting to look at the 
performance of MFIs which are located in countries that provide regulatory support to the 
microfinance industry. Further studies should also look into why MFIs in South Asia are not 
performing as emergency loan centre when natural disasters occur.  
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